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Abstracts 
E N G L I S H  
Since the late 1980s, European welfare states and labour market regulation have 
gradually but radically been transformed into ways of underpinning a more “active 
society” where active usually entails paid work or activities, such as training and 
qualification, that aim towards work. The thesis investigates the transformation towards 
the ‘active society’ through the spectre of unemployment and how it is governed. Two 
puzzles in the transformations have motivated the inquiry: firstly, the co-existence of a 
plurality of different, and often contradictory, conceptions of who the unemployed are 
and why they are unemployed; and secondly, the co-existence of wills to emancipate the 
unemployed alongside the justification of using coercive measures towards them.  
This thesis argues that if we want to understand the varieties within the transformations, 
the “what?” question, it is necessary to address the “how?”; i.e., how transformations are 
legitimised. Here, ideas and morality are pivotal. Inspired by French pragmatic sociology 
(Boltanski and Thévenot), the ideas are approached as cities of unemployment that are 
mobilised to justify and criticise policies related to the governing of unemployment. In 
these situations where the question of what is the best way to govern unemployment is 
put to the test, cities of unemployment enable actors to prepare and qualify the reality of 
the situation for critique and justification.  
Each city of unemployment is founded on a principle with specific principles to try or 
test both those who govern and the subjects inhabiting each city, thus entailing a specific 
understanding of what emancipating the unemployed involves, i.e., what kind of moral 
subject the unemployed person is with what kind of needs and characteristics. The thesis 
thus asks which cities of unemployment are mobilised in contemporary reform 
processes of the governing of unemployment, how are the cities mobilised to justify and 
criticise, and how do the cities sediment into instruments and institutions governing the 
unemployed?  
The questions are operationalised through an in-depth comparative study of four key 
contemporary reform processes: two in Denmark and two in France. The thesis is the 
first systematic investigation into the test situations that unfold in the public debates 
 
 
with a focus on the plurality of ideas that are mobilised to qualify and evaluate existing 
policies and justify changes.  
The thesis shows how the governing of unemployment is the result of an ongoing 
sedimentation in the cities tied together in compromises. This makes the governing 
inherently composite and unstable. The thesis identifies and maps seven distinct cities of 
unemployment that are mobilised in all debates surrounding all four reforms: the cities 
of Demand, Redistribution, Insurance, Incentives, Mobility, Investment and the Paternal city. 
Regardless of differences between the four cases, all analyses show that reforms are 
particularly driven by justifications from the Paternal, Mobility, Investment and Incentives 
cities, which are all tied together in multiple ways. The other three cities do not vanish 
completely, but in the qualification of the unemployed they are increasingly put to the 
margins.  
Finally, the thesis shows how the tensions between the cities that are mobilised for 
justificatory purposes are mitigated in categorisations and various institutionalised tests 
that continuously evaluate the behaviour of the unemployed. The tests, such as triage, 
screening, interviews and contracts, thus question and settle what kind of subject the 
unemployed person is, i.e., what city he lives in, how worthy he is, and what instruments 
will bring him closer to emancipation (i.e., the ‘active society’). In this way, the possibility 
of requalifying the unemployed is made permanent. A similar experimentalist dynamic is 
identifiable in the public debates concerning justification and critique. Here 
unemployment is increasingly seen as a multi-causal phenomenon that, in the end, is a 
matter of how to make the unemployed act in certain ways. The result is a constant 
uncertainty as to how to attach particular causes to particular categories of 
unemployment. Hence, the demand for targeting or “personalising” the governing in 
order to make the unemployed respond to it results in increasingly intimate and often 
coercive instruments. 
  
 
 
D A N S K  
Siden slutningen af 1980erne er de europæiske velfærdsstater og arbejdsmarkeder 
gradvist men radikalt blevet ændret i retning af at understøtte det ’aktive samfund’, hvor 
aktiv som regel betyder lønnet arbejde eller aktiviteter, som fx jobtræning og uddannelse 
med sigte på beskæftigelse. Afhandlingen undersøger vendingen mod det ’aktive 
samfund’ gennem fænomenet arbejdsløshed og hvordan det kan og bør styres. 
Undersøgelsen er motiveret af at nå til en bedre forståelse af to tendenser: For det første 
en samtidig tilstedeværelse af en mangfoldighed af forskellige, og ofte modstridende, 
forestillinger af hvem den arbejdsløse er og hvor han er arbejdsløs. For det andet, en 
samtidig tilstedeværelse af på den ene side en erklæret vilje til at emancipere den 
arbejdsløse fra hans passive tilstand, og på den anden side øget brug af tvangsmidler 
over for den arbejdsløse.  
Metodisk argumenterer afhandlingen for at hvis man vil forstå indholdet og 
forskelligheden i ændringerne (spørgsmålet om ”hvad”), er det nødvendigt at adressere 
spørgsmålet om ”hvordan”, dvs. hvordan ændringerne legitimeres. Her er ideer og moral 
afgørende. Med inspiration fra den franske pragmatiske sociologi (Boltanski og 
Thévenot) teoretiserer afhandlingen idéerne som arbejdsløshedsbyer, der mobiliseres når 
arbejdsløshedspolitikker retfærdiggøres og kritiseres. I disse situationer, hvor 
spørgsmålet om hvordan man bedst håndterer arbejdsløsheden er sat på prøve, sætter 
arbejdsløshedsbyerne aktørerne i stand til at kvalificere den komplekse virkelighed til 
konkrete kritikker og løsningsforslag.  
Arbejdsløshedsbyer er bygget op omkring et princip med en specifik forestilling hvad det 
indebærer at emancipere den arbejdsløse og ud fra hvilket styringen såvel som de styrede 
subjekter, der beboer byerne, kan evalueres eller sættes på prøve. Hver by tilskriver 
således den arbejdsløse et bestemt moralsk subjekt med særlige behov og karakteristika. 
Afhandlingens problemformulering er derfor hvilke arbejdsløshedsbyer der mobiliseres 
og i nutidige reformprocesser af styringen af arbejdsløshed, hvordan byerne mobiliseres 
til at retfærdiggøre og kritisere, og sidst hvordan byerne nedlejres i instrumenter og 
institutioner der udgør styringen af den arbejdsløse?  
Spørgsmålene er operationaliseret ved hjælp af et dybtgående komparativt studie af fire 
betydningsfulde reformprocesser – to i Danmark og to i Frankrig. Afhandlingen er den 
første til systematisk at undersøge de ’prøvesituationer’ der udspiller sig i den offentlige 
 
 
debat med et blik for mangfoldigheden af idéer, der mobiliseres til at kvalificere og 
evaluere de eksisterende politikker og retfærdiggøre ændringer. 
Analysen viser hvordan styringen af arbejdsløshedsproblemet er et resultat af 
vedvarende sedimentering af arbejdsløshedsbyer, forbindes med hinanden i 
kompromisser. Dette gør styringen grundlæggende sammensat og ustabil. Afhandlingen 
kortlægger syv forskellige arbejdsløshedsbyer, der alle blev mobiliseret i alle fire debatter: 
Efterspørgselsbyen, Omfordelingsbyen, Forsikringsbyen, Incitamentsbyen, Investeringsbyen, 
Mobilitetsbyen, og den Paternalistiske by. På trods af forskelle imellem casestudierne, er de 
alle karakteriseret ved primært at være understøttet af den Paternalistiske by og Mobilitets-, 
Incitaments-, og Investeringsbyerne. De resterende tre byer forsvinder ikke fuldstændig fra 
landkortet men er i kvalificeringen af den arbejdsløse i stigende grad marginaliseret.  
Endelig viser afhandlingen hvordan spændingerne inden for og imellem de mobiliserede 
byer afbødes ved hjælp af kategoriseringer og forskellige institutionaliserede prøver der 
kontinuerligt evaluerer den arbejdsløses adfærd. Prøver, som fx visitation, screening, 
interviews og kontrakter spørger og fastsætter hermed hvilket subjekt den arbejdsløse er, 
med andre ord hvilken by han beboer, hans status, og hvilke instrumenter, der vil bringe 
ham tættere på emancipation, det vil sige det ’aktive samfund’. Hermed gøres 
muligheden for at rekvalificere den arbejdsløse permanent. En lignende eksperimentel 
dynamik kan ses i retfærdiggørelsen og kritikken i den offentlige debat. Her er 
arbejdsløshed i stigende grad set som et multikausalt fænomen, der, i sidste ende, er et 
spørgsmål om hvordan man kan få den arbejdsløse til at handle på en bestemt måde. 
Resultatet er en konstant usikkerhed omkring hvordan bestemte årsagsforklaringer 
tilknyttes bestemte kategorier af arbejdsløse. Således skabes et behov for mere målrettet 
og ”skræddersyet” styring der skal få den arbejdsløse til at respondere samt mere intime, 
og ofte tvangsbetonede, instrumenter. 
 
  
 
 
F R A N Ç A I S  
Depuis la fin des années 1980, les États-providence et les marchés du travail au sein de 
l’Europe connaissent des transformations radicales quoique graduelles, les amenant à 
privilégier une société plus « active », où actif a généralement le sens de travail rémunéré 
ou d’activités rémunérées comme px la formation sur le tas ou la formation 
professionnelle. Cette thèse étudie ce virage vers la ”société active” à travers le 
phénomène du chômage et sa gestion, la motivation étant d’arriver à une meilleure 
compréhension de deux tendances : Premièrement, la coprésence d’une pluralité de 
conceptions différentes et souvent contradictoires sur le chômeur et les circonstances 
ayant causé  sa situation. Deuxièmement, la coprésence d’intentions visant à émanciper 
le chômeur, d’une part, et de  justifications de mesures coercitives à l’encontre du 
chômeur, d’autre part. 
La méthodologie proposée pour étudier et comprendre ces deux tendances suppose que 
pour savoir en quoi consistent ces transformations, il est nécessaire d’étudier comment 
les acteurs essaient de les justifier. À cette fin, une étude des idées et de leurs fondements 
moraux s’impose. S’inspirant de l’école française de la sociologie pragmatique (Boltanski 
et Thévenot), cette thèse propose  une déclinaison du concept de  cité du chômage pour 
rendre compte des idées mobilisées dans la justification et la critique des politiques de 
chômage. Dans de telles situations où la question de savoir comment gérer au mieux le 
chômage est mise à l’épreuve, des ‘cités du chômage’ permettent aux acteurs de préparer 
et qualifier la réalité afin de la critiquer et de la justifier.  
Chaque cité du chômage est fondée sur un principe particulier se référant à une 
conception spécifique de l’émancipation du chômeur, et à partir de ce principe tant la 
gestion que les êtres présents qui y sont soumis peuvent être évalués ou mis à l’épreuve. 
Chaque cité attribue à chacun des chômeurs un sujet moral défini par des besoins et 
caractéristiques spécifiques. D’où la problématique suivante : Quelles cités de chômage 
sont mobilisées dans les processus de réforme contemporains de la gestion du 
chômage ? Comment les cités sont-elles mobilisées pour nourrir la justification et la 
critique ? Et enfin, comment se sédimentent-elles sous formes de dispositifs et 
d’institutions de gestion du chômeur ? 
Ces questions sont traitées à travers une étude comparative détaillée de quatre processus 
de réforme importants – deux au Danemark et deux en France. Cette thèse est la 
 
 
première à étudier d’une manière systématique les ‘situations d’épreuve’ du débat public, 
et cela dans le but de mettre en évidence la pluralité des idées mobilisées pour qualifier et 
évaluer les politiques existantes et pour justifier des changements. 
L’analyse montre comment la gestion du problème du chômage est le résultat d’une 
sédimentation continue de cités de chômage agencées par voie d’arbitrages. Cela rend la 
gestion du chômage hétéroclite et instable. Cette thèse révèle sept cités de chômage 
différentes, toutes mobilisées dans chacun des quatre débats : une cité de la demande, 
une cité de la redistribution, une cité des assurances, une cité des mesures incitatives, une 
cité des investissements, une cité de la mobilité, une cité paternaliste. Malgré les 
différences entre les cas étudiés, ceux-ci se caractérisent par étant fondés surtout sur la 
cité paternaliste et les cités de la mobilité, des mesures incitatives et des investissements. 
Les trois autres cités ne disparaissent pas complètement, mais elles sont de plus en plus 
marginalisées dans la qualification du chômeur.  
Enfin ce travail de thèse montre comment les tensions décelées entre les cités mobilisées 
et au sein de celles-ci sont apaisées à l’aide de catégorisations et diverses épreuves 
institutionnalisées soumettant le comportement du chômeur à une évaluation continue. 
Des épreuves comme le triage, le dépistage, des interviews et des contrats questionnent 
et fixent le sujet du chômeur, à savoir sa cité de ‘domicile’ ou d’appartenance, sa valeur, 
et les instruments les plus indiqués pour l’amener vers son émancipation, c’est-à-dire 
vers ‘la société active’. Ainsi la possibilité de requalifier le chômeur est rendue 
permanente. Une dynamique d’expérimentation similaire se manifeste à travers la 
justification et la critique véhiculés par le débat public, où le chômage est considéré de 
plus en plus comme un phénomène à causes multiples et dont la solution consiste à 
découvrir, en fin de compte, comment amener le chômeur à agir d’une façon spécifique. 
Le résultat en est une incertitude constante concernant l’attribution de certaines causes à 
certaines catégories de chômeurs. D’où le besoin d’une gestion plus ciblée et 
personnalisée pour motiver le chômeur à agir ainsi que le besoin de dispositifs plus 
intimes et souvent coercitifs.  
  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
At times, the path towards finalising this dissertation has indeed been ‘trying’. I am 
deeply grateful to a number of people whom are the main reason for why the trying 
events have only been parentheses in a process I would truly not do without. Firstly, I 
would like to thank Ida Lunde Jørgensen, Ivar Kjar, Mathias Herup Nielsen, and Pelle 
Korsbæk Sørensen – all co-founders of our forum of pragmatic sociology that provided 
invaluable space for thinking out loud. Somehow, the our reading circle became a 
stepping stone for acquainting other great scholars somehow sharing the same 
‘pragmatic’ passion, including Stefano Ponte, Marie Leth Meilvang, and Thomas 
Presskorn-Thygesen. A big thanks also goes to Tim Holst Celik, Juan Ignacio Staricco, 
and Anders Sevelsted – the ‘core’ members of the alcoholised reading group; and to 
Mathieu Charbonneau for re-connecting, collaborating and joint biking as well as 
exploration of the delicacies of the markets in Paris. It was also in Paris, this supposedly 
‘self-sufficient’ city full of arrogant people (and, I was told, in particular professors) that 
I met the most remarkable and plain intellectual engagement with my work as well as 
hospitality towards me and my little family. Thank you, Laurent Thévenot, not least for 
introducing me to the concept and format of ‘commonality’ of Ateliers de sociologie et de 
cuisine. I hope there will be many more to come.  
Thanks to all my former and current colleagues at the Department of Business and 
Politics, in particular to Martin B. Carstensen and Eva Hartmann for in-depth comments 
at my final seminar, to John L. Campbell, Grahame Thompson, and Martin Bøje 
Rasmussen for engaging with my work, to Lene Tolstrup Christensen and Louise Thorn 
Bøttkjær for comments and moral support in some of those ‘trying’ situations, and 
finally to Janine Leschke for comments and support throughout all years and for finding 
‘pragmatic’ solutions when they were most needed. I am highly indebted to my 
supervisors, Ove K. Pedersen and Peter Triantafillou, who both stroke the perfect 
balance between telling me ‘truths’ and respecting, and encouraging me to go with, my 
own ideas. And, finally, thank you my one love and ‘editor-in-chief’, Franciska Leander 
Larsen who, together with Matti and Linus, keep reminding me about the necessity of 
qualifying the goods of life beyond the ‘wooden’ world of work. 
Magnus Paulsen Hansen  
Copenhagen, 17 February 2017  
 
 
  
 
 
Contents 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 1
Towards the ‘active society’ ................................................................................................... 1
Varieties .................................................................................................................................... 4
Legitimation as justification ................................................................................................... 6
Research question and method ............................................................................................. 9
Aim and key findings ............................................................................................................ 11
Structure of the thesis ........................................................................................................... 15
 
Part I Towards a grammar of cities of unemployment ....................................................................... 16
 
2 Analytical grid: Meta-concepts and methods ............................................................................................... 17
Key concepts from French pragmatic sociology ............................................................. 18
Repertoires of evaluation: Cities of unemployment ........................................................ 22
Situating test situations: compromises, sedimentation, institutions .............................. 25
Selection of cases .................................................................................................................. 28
Selection of data .................................................................................................................... 30
Coding ..................................................................................................................................... 32
Analysing ................................................................................................................................ 34
 
3 Cities of unemployment: A grammar of tests, governing and subjects ...................................................... 37
City of Demand ..................................................................................................................... 39
City of Insurance ................................................................................................................... 42
City of Redistribution ........................................................................................................... 46
City of Incentives .................................................................................................................. 51
The Paternal city .................................................................................................................... 54
City of Investment ................................................................................................................ 61
City of Mobility ..................................................................................................................... 68
Conclusion: Analytical grid and critical map .................................................................... 72
 
Part II Tipping points ............................................................................................................................... 75
 
4 ‘Help plan for the return to employment’: The French unemployment insurance system put to the test . 81
Creation and reforms of Assurance chômage ........................................................................ 82
 
 
Launch of the debate: Medef’s Refondation sociale .............................................................. 86
The employers’ proposal ...................................................................................................... 88
Initial evaluations of Assurance chômage and Care .............................................................. 90
An offer you can refuse? Sanctions put to the test .......................................................... 92
Testing limitations and authority to coerce ....................................................................... 96
Sedimentation: tests, subjects ............................................................................................ 101
 
5 The ‘Active labour market policy act’: The Danish unemployment insurance system put to the test ...... 107
The creation and reforms of dagpengesystemet ................................................................... 108
The black box of “structural unemployment” ............................................................... 113
Qualifying labour and wages inside and outside the labour market ............................ 116
Financing put to the test .................................................................................................... 122
Requalifying the role of job offers.................................................................................... 123
The ambiguous worth of jobrotation .................................................................................. 128
Sedimentation: tests, subjects ............................................................................................ 130
 
Part III Intensification, displacements ................................................................................................. 135
 
6 ‘Income of active solidarity’: Putting the poor and low-paid work to the test in France ......................... 139
The wills to insertion ............................................................................................................. 140
RMI’s interference with work ........................................................................................... 143
Requalifying poverty ........................................................................................................... 146
Emancipating the economic, consuming, working, responsible, un(der)employed . 148
Putting the recipient’s behaviour to the test ................................................................... 152
The problematic thresholds to and from part-time work............................................. 154
Financing put to the test of Redistribution ..................................................................... 157
Sedimentation: tests, subjects ............................................................................................ 158
 
7 ‘Everyone can be useful’: Putting the long-term unemployed and the youth to the test in Denmark ........ 163
The welfare state and the uninsured unemployed ......................................................... 165
Crisis diagnosis and the ‘third way’ out ........................................................................... 170
The affair of “‘poor’ Carina” ............................................................................................. 172
The affair of “lazy Robert” ................................................................................................ 176
Categorising between and within cities ............................................................................ 178
Justification of ‘utility jobs’ ................................................................................................ 183
 
 
Sedimentation: tests, subjects ............................................................................................ 186
 
 
8 Conclusion: The permanent trying of the unemployed ............................................................................... 191
Cumulative transformations, composite governing ....................................................... 192
Justice and governing in the ‘active society’ .................................................................... 195
Multi-causality and the many-faced emancipator ........................................................... 198
 
Appendix A: Selected cases ......................................................................................................................... 205
Appendix B: Coding scheme ....................................................................................................................... 206
Appendix C: Examples of coding in nVivo ................................................................................................ 209
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................. 211
List of abbreviations, terms and actors ................................................................................................. 229
Endnotes .................................................................................................................................................... 233
 
 
  

1 
1  
Introduction 
T O W A R D S  T H E  ‘ A C T I V E  S O C I E T Y ’  
Since the late 1980s, European welfare states and labour market regulation have 
transformed gradually, but radically. In this period transformations seem to follow a 
pattern that works its way regardless of previous paths. Regardless of whether welfare 
states are Bismarckian, social democratic or residual, (Esping-Andersen 1990), it has 
been argued that they are all being transformed into “competition states” (Cerny 1997; 
1990; Pedersen 2011), “enabling states” (Gilbert 2002) or “Schumpetarian workfare 
states” (Jessop 1993; Torfing 1999a). Policies representing the transformations have 
been given many labels, such as “active social policies” (Bonoli 2013), “active labour 
market policies” (Hedegaard 2014; Bonoli 2010), and “activating labour market policies” 
(Dingeldey 2009). The new policies are concerned with “workfare” (Peck 2001; Lødemel 
and Trickey 2001; Torfing 1999b), “welfare-to-work” (Bonoli 2010), and “activation” 
(Barbier 2002; 2004; Serrano Pasqual 2007; van Berkel et al. 2012).  
The many labels illustrate a certain ambiguity in the transformations. However, what 
characterises the transformations is a will to construct policies that somehow underpin a 
more “active society” where active usually entails paid work or activities, such as training 
and qualification, that aim towards work. The term derives from some OECD visions of 
the late 1980s of what it would take to bring the welfare states out of the economic 
downturn (Gass 1988; OECD 1989; See also Dean 1995; Walters 1997). Since then, the 
term has come to be used to describe a direction of change that is, however, qualified in 
many ways. As I will try to show in the chapters to follow, “active” can in fact imply 
different and often contradictory meanings in the active society. Hence, the 
transformation towards it entails uncertainty, tensions and critique. The active society is 
permanently under construction and has been for the last 25 years. It never quite works 
as expected and never quite fulfils its promises. It can thus always be improved and 
always be more active; but why is it that the need to reform, despite radical changes, 
seems to persist? What is it that makes the ‘active society’ an attractive destination for 
the majority of political actors in Europe?  
2 
The thesis investigates the transformation towards the ‘active society’ through the 
spectre of unemployment. Unemployment is the labour market’s ‘other’. It is not simply a 
natural phenomenon. It is an invented and plastic category (Salais et al. 1986; Baxandall 
2004); a paradoxical and contradictory result of historical struggles and attempts to 
control and govern the unemployed as well as the employed (Zimmermann 2001; 
Walters 2000). It defines a population of unemployed people that can be qualified and 
categorised further with thresholds set for the working population of the labour market 
and those who are not working, but for various reasons are not unemployed (children, 
retired, ill, etc.). The category makes the people behind the phenomenon, those who for 
one reason or another are not selling their labour, ‘governable’. However, the governing 
of unemployment not only concerns the unemployed; it also sends signals to the rest of 
society by underpinning why the population should work, what it takes to do it, and why 
someone fails to do it. The governing of unemployment is therefore embedded with 
both ‘grey’ numbers, technicalities and rules, as well as ‘colourful’ questions of morality, 
emancipation and what characterises the good or just society. 
Unemployment is a phenomenon that keeps disturbing the harmony of the active 
society; the thorn in the side that won’t go away. Its numbers oscillate, but never 
completely vanish. At the same time, the presence of unemployment reaffirms the need 
to make society even more active. The active society is permanently at war against 
unemployment. Unlike many other studies (e.g. Martin and Grubb 2001; Estevao 2003; 
Martin 2014), this thesis has no intention of criticising its failure or providing solutions 
as to how to make policies more “effective”. Rather, it takes a step back and asks a 
question similar to the one of why the “proclamation of the failure of the prison has 
always been accompanied by its maintenance”: 
[P]erhaps one should reverse the problem and ask oneself what is served by the failure of 
the prison; what is the use of these different phenomena that are continually being 
criticized (…). If so, one would be forced to suppose that the prison, and no doubt 
punishment in general, is not intended to eliminate offences, but rather to distinguish 
them, to distribute them, to use them. (Foucault 1977: 272) 
This is not to say that the unemployed are our inmates of today, although there are 
sometimes clear resemblances (Wacquant 2009). Rather, it is to say that the governing of 
unemployment does a lot more than just respond to a functional problem – it shapes the 
problem, and by doing so it shapes, or at least intends to shape, the lives and behaviour 
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of those who fall either inside or outside the immense categories that are tied to this 
abstract and statistical artefact of unemployment.  
In the active society, unemployment is not merely an abstract number; it is a matter of 
making the unemployed active, whether this is working inside or outside the ordinary 
labour market, participating in a job training course, educating oneself, getting up in the 
morning, applying for jobs, not receiving benefits etc. This cannot be reduced to an 
attempt to retrench or dismantle the welfare state, as in the UK in the 1980s (Pierson 
1994). The active society does not govern the unemployed less; it governs them 
differently. In other words, this is not radical, neoliberal laissez-faire in action. In fact, it 
governs more intensely. It entails a “politics of behaviour” (Rose 2000) that insists on 
emancipating the unemployed, even if it takes coercive measures to carry it through.  It 
insists on “targeting” and “personalising” the governing to identify who the unemployed 
are, and for this purpose develops and revises instruments of screening and continuous 
evaluation of the unemployed.  
The ideas driving the political reforms position themselves at the party political centre, 
beyond “left and right”  (Giddens 1994) as a new “third way” or “new centre” (Giddens 
1998; Blair and Schroeder 1998). A pragmatic, managerial and ‘realist’ approach that 
refuses the teleological language of old ideologies and the clash of classes, and in this 
way imagines a kind of “post-political” era (Mouffe 2005) in which interests are aligned 
towards the same goals (Hansen and Triantafillou 2011). Of course, these dynamics are 
not entirely new; (reformative) social democracy and the development of the welfare 
state has from the beginning been seen as a pragmatic “middle way” between capitalism 
and revolutionary socialism (e.g. Childs 1948; Marshall 1964). However, the 
transformation towards the active society is not located between socialism and 
capitalism, but displaced to somewhere between unfettered, deregulating and privatising 
neoliberalism and the post-war welfare state and labour market regulation. Today, social 
democrats have become the fiercest critics of the welfare state that their predecessors 
created, while the once revolutionary left have become its most loyal defenders and 
right-wing parties now insist on reintegrating rather than acting laisser faire towards the 
unemployed.  
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V A R I E T I E S  
In asking how and what transformations are unfolding, the thesis is certainly not original. 
However, by taking a different perspective, the thesis claims that there are dynamics in 
the transformations that hitherto have been neglected in the literature. There are a 
substantive number of studies that have theorised the “what” of transformations, and 
they usually distinguish between two policy approaches that, to simplify, can be labelled 
the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ approach. Table 1 shows some of the most important 
dichotomies: 
Table 1: Varieties of policy approaches in transformations 
 Hard Soft 
Torfing (1999b: 17) Defensive Offensive 
Larsen et al. (2001: 25) Social disciplining Social integration 
Barbier (2002: 316) Liberal Social democrat 
Torfing (2004: 41) Work first Human capital 
Serrano Pascual (2004: 502-507) Sticks Carrots 
Dingeldey (2007: 824-826) Workfare Enabling 
Dean (2007) Authoritarian Egalitarian 
Taylor-Gooby (2008) Negative Positive 
Bonoli (2013: 19-22) (Re-)commodification Active social policy 
 
Although the dichotomies have different focus points and emphasise different levels of 
analysis, some are more philosophical and some more instrumental and institutional, 
they largely seem to agree on the content of the two approaches. At the more 
philosophical/moral level, the ‘hard’ side entails an individualistic approach, valuing self-
reliance, welfare-to-work (Barbier), re-commodification (Bonoli) and work as a moral 
requirement (Dean), while the ‘soft' side entails a universalistic approach (Barbier, 
Torfing 1999b), enhancing human capital (Torfing, Dingeldey, Taylor-Gooby), enabling 
active participation (Dingeldey) and “enhancing the productive potential”, and work is 
seen as an “ethical commitment amongst subjects of equal worth” (Dean). Back on the 
‘hard’ side, the governed are treated as assisted and poor (Barbier) “rational utility 
maximizing individuals” (Torfing, 2004) who lack “incentives” (Larsen et al.), whereas 
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they are citizens (Barbier) and “actors with social resources to be empowered” (Torfing 
2004) who lack “competences and skills” (Larsen et al.) on the ‘soft’ side.  
The two approaches also differ when it comes to instruments. In the  ‘hard’ approach, 
benefits are short-term and low level (Barbier), shorter, time-limited and harder to get 
(Torfing, 2004), conditional (Dingeldey, Dean) and quid pro quo (Torfing 1999b), 
whereas benefits are on a high level and long term (Barbier), and based on reciprocity 
(Dingeldey, Barbier) and “balanced rights and obligations” (Barbier) in the ‘soft’ 
approach . When the ‘hard’ approach reforms, it reduces benefits (Torfing 1999b) and 
enhances the flexibility of the labour market (Dingeldey) as well as the mobility and job-
searching efficiency of the unemployed (Torfing 1999b), whereas the ‘soft’ approach 
“supplements welfare” (Torfng 2004) with activation (Torfing 1999b, Barbier), training, 
education (Torfing 1999b), up-skilling (Torfing 2004) and investing in human capital 
(Taylor-Gooby). 
Finally, the two approaches entail a ‘hard’ vs. ‘soft’ treatment of the unemployed, which 
makes it clear that there is a more or less explicit preference among the authors towards 
the latter side. The ‘hard’ side adopts “conditional obedience” (Dean) and uses 
“organized systematic use of sanctions”, whereas sanctions are “negotiated” and 
“marginal” in the latter (Barbier); “restrictions on benefits” in the ‘hard’ approach vs. 
“positive support” in the ‘soft’ approach (Taylor-Gooby), “sanctions” vs. “self-
motivation” (Larsen et al.), or penalties and ‘sticks’ vs. incentives and ‘carrots’ (Serrano 
Pascual). In the ‘soft’ approach the “coercive aspects (…) play a less central role than in 
the [‘hard’] approach, which uses “pressure” to re-enter labour market” (Dingeldey). The 
target group of the ‘soft’ approach needs “empowerment” , whereas the target group of 
the ‘hard’ approach is in need of “motivation, control and punishment” (Torfing 1999b, 
2004).  
The findings of the thesis suggest that the existing attempts to describe and theorise the 
varieties of transformations are at best imprecise and at worst misleading. Firstly, there 
are more than two ideas that legitimise transformations. In fact, the thesis traces and 
maps a plurality of seven ideas that are mobilised to justify changes. While some shape 
transformations more than others, this implies that the transformations are not a matter 
of selecting between two choices. Secondly, by conflating ideas and instruments, the 
existing typologies assume that there is a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ approach. However, the 
thesis shows that the use of coercion transgresses the approaches. This does not only 
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question the conceptual validity of the dichotomies as analytical tools, but has broader 
normative implications since it challenges the idea of a ‘progressive’, ‘leftist’, non-
coercive alternative within the transformation towards the active society. The thesis is 
thus motivated by providing a better and more nuanced understanding and a different 
critique that has not painted transformations in black and white and chosen sides from 
the very beginning. While the dichotomies are attuned to criticise the ‘hard’ type of 
transformations, their normative bias gives them blind spots with regards to the ‘soft’ 
side, as well as to how the two sides co-exist. 
L E G I T I M A T I O N  A S  J U S T I F I C A T I O N  
This thesis argues that if we want to understand the varieties within the transformations, 
the “what?” question, it is necessary to address the “how?”; i.e., how transformations are 
legitimised. It is only by addressing the dynamics of the processes that it becomes possible 
to understand the direction of transformations. This entails regarding the process of 
legitimation (i.e., how) as key for understanding the content of transformations (i.e., what). 
More broadly, the thesis argues that the role of ideas is pivotal. The thesis can thus be 
positioned within a broader “ideational turn” (Blyth 1997) in comparative political 
economy. This is sometimes labelled “discursive institutionalism” (Campbell and 
Pedersen 2001; Schmidt 2011b; 2011a) or “constructivist institutionalism” (Hay 2008). 
This strand (henceforth, discursive institutionalism) has emphasised that ideas matter 
not only because changes must be justified, but more profoundly, because ideas provide 
actors with the necessary “interpretive frameworks” (Blyth 2002: 11) for making sense 
of (Borrás and Seabrooke 2012), and putting value into, institutions and policies.  
At the risk of oversimplifying, discursive institutionalism has so far operated with two 
limited conceptions of ideas when it comes to addressing the interrelation between the 
what and the how. Firstly, ideas work as ideologies. This take usually goes hand in hand with 
an emphasis on (elite) actors and their capacity to “persuade” and “convince” the “mass 
public” by means of “rhetorical strategies” (Cox 2001: 498). Carstensen and Schmidt 
(2016: 312-22) term this “power through ideas”, describing the capacity of actors to 
persuade other actors to accept their views of what to think and do through the use of 
“ideational elements”. It is ideological because it emphasises the way in which ideas 
become ‘make-up’ instruments for certain privileged actors to legitimize political 
programmes.  
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Secondly, discursive institutionalism regards ideas as norms, values, sentiments, 
philosophies, etc. that are taken-for-granted (Béland 2009; Béland and Cox 2010b). A 
common denominator of this conception is that ideas work at a somewhat “deeper 
level” (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016: 329; see also Schmidt 2008). Thus whereas 
ideologies work on top of the transformations, background ideas work below. Within the 
community (epistemic or more often simply nations), ideas are shared and legitimate to 
such an extent that they are taken-for-granted. They are “public philosophies” (Schmidt 
2011a), “background ideas” (Schmidt 2008; 2016), “public sentiments” (Campbell 1998), 
“doxa” (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016: 331), “common knowledge” (Culpepper 2008), 
“society’s cultural repertoire” (Béland 2009) or a “zeitgeist” (Mehta 2011). They are thus 
“shared beliefs” (Béland and Cox 2010b). Another capacity of taken-for-granted ideas is 
that they function as “institutional blueprints” that “dictate” and “tell agents which 
institutions to construct” (Blyth 2002: 40, 43). Taken-for-granted ideas thus do not 
demand much reflexivity from either actors invoking them or from those to whom the 
ideas are communicated.  
Ideas as ideology and as taken-for-granted norms and values are combined in a 
commonly used explanation of “ideational path-dependency” (Carstensen 2010: 850): 
the influence of ideas thus depend on how they become consistent with the existing 
prevailing discourse, e.g., how “rhetorical strategies (…) connect new proposals to an 
existing value structure” (Cox 2001: 498). The legitimacy of the new idea thus comes 
from already legitimate ideas that the new ideas are somehow connected with; for 
instance, by means of “frames” which make new programmes conform with already 
existing and legitimate paradigms and public sentiments (Campbell 2004: 98f). 
Introducing new ideas is thus a job for ‘framers’ and ‘brokers’ who, in processes of 
“bricolage”, dress up the new programmes by basically making the new ideas sound ‘old’ 
and familiar (Campbell 2004; see also Carstensen 2011b). Similarly, Béland argues that 
“ideological frames” serve as “weapons of mass persuasion” related to existing social 
and institutional forces. In such a constraining environment, political actors must master 
the institutional ‘rules of  the game’ while manipulating the symbols available in existing 
ideological repertoires” (Béland 2005: 12). 
As fruitful as these theorisations have been, they have limited use for the purpose of this 
thesis. The conception of ideas as ideologies may unveil rhetoric and manipulation, but it 
also thereby underestimates a much more productive power of ideas, namely the 
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capacity that Blyth hints at when speaking of ideas as “interpretive frameworks” (see 
above). While ideologies mask reality, ideas also have the capacity to enable actors to 
qualify and evaluate it. When it comes to the conception of ideas as being taken-for-
granted, this underestimates the contemporaneousness or co-existence of a plurality of 
ideas that may be used to evaluate unemployment policies. The co-existence of ideas 
implies that all ideas are somehow in need of legitimation and cannot simply rely on 
taken-for-granted norms and values. Hence, the conceptions are limited in providing 
analytical tools for how some ideas drive transformations rather than others, and how 
this matters to the institutional and instrumental changes in the governing of 
unemployment. 
A theoretical perspective that has more to offer in the understanding of the ‘direct’ 
capacity of ideas is Foucault’s perspective of governmentality and his genealogical 
method. Here, ideas work as “governmental rationalities” (Foucault 2008: 2), “regimes 
of truth” and “veridiction” (Foucault 1980; 2008; 2012). The point of departure of the 
thesis is thus these productive capacities of ideas as well the closely related issues of 
morality and politics, and knowledge and mundane governmental techniques, that 
Foucault has drawn attention to. However, similarly to the conception of taken-for-
granted ideas mentioned above, the Foucauldian genealogical method has limitations 
when it comes to understanding the co-existence of a plurality of ideas. Foucault maps 
programmes (Foucault 1991: 75; cf. Dean 1988) rather than the tensions between them, 
and according to some he ends up “assuming too much coherence and order in the 
present” (Brady 2014: 24; see also Marston and McDonald 2006). This method thus 
tends to take the legitimacy of the programmes it studies for granted.   
Instead, this thesis has taken its primary theoretical inspiration from “French pragmatic 
sociology” – a strand founded in the late 1980s by the sociologist Luc Boltanski and the 
economist Laurent Thévenot. They initially developed a theory of the structures that 
enable people to justify and criticise in everyday situations of dispute (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 1987; 2006). However, the theory also has great, but largely untapped, 
potential for studying the interrelation of political ideas and political action (Eulriet 
2008). The theory entails a conception of ideas as well as of processes of legitimation 
that can encompass the co-existence of a plurality of ideas and the tensions and 
uncertainty that this entails. The thesis thus approaches ideas as cities of unemployment 
that are mobilised to justify and criticise policies and changes related to the governing of 
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unemployment. In these situations where there is uncertainty regarding what is the best 
way to govern unemployment, the reality of instruments, institutions and people is put to 
the test. Cities of unemployment equip actors with the means to prepare and qualify the 
reality for critique and justification.  
Each city of unemployment is founded on a principle with specific tribunals to try or test 
both those who govern and the subjects inhabiting each city. Within each city there is 
thus a permanent search for improvement and to make the governing of unemployment 
aligned with its principle, as well as a constant questioning of whether, why and how the 
unemployed behave according to the guiding principle. This entails a specific 
understanding of what emancipating the unemployed involves and what it takes to do it, 
i.e., what kind of moral subject the unemployed is with what kind of needs and 
characteristics. The cities are not ideologies in the sense that rather than hiding what is 
going on, they equip actors with the means to attach worth to it. Cities are not taken-for-
granted, because rather than providing actors with certainty at a somewhat sub-conscious 
level, they demand and work upon an uncertain reality by nourishing and formatting the 
critical capacity and reflexivity of actors. Finally, although the cities of unemployment 
have a lot in common with “governmental rationalities”, the cities differ by being 
prepared for engagement in disputes as well as compromises with other cities. The 
objects and subjects of each city can be, and are, combined in infinite ways, which also 
brings a certain fragility and instability to the governing of unemployment.   
R E S E A R C H  Q U E S T I O N  A N D  M E T H O D  
The key research questions of the thesis aim towards a better understanding of the 
transformation of the governing of unemployment into the active society by bringing 
together the what (the content of transformations) and the how (the legitimation of 
transformations) in a theoretical framework and research design. The locus of the 
research concerns neither rhetorical strategies and hidden interests nor intellectual 
thought or governmental techniques and programmes, but rather processes of 
justification and critique where the government of unemployment is put to the test. This 
requires a meticulous analysis of the dynamics between the governing of unemployment 
and the transformations of instruments and institutions, as well as the actors’ 
justification and critique of both through mobilising cities of unemployment. The thesis 
thus asks: 
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What cities of unemployment are mobilised in contemporary reform processes of the governing of 
unemployment, how are the cities mobilised to justify and criticise, and how do the cities sediment 
into instruments and institutions governing the unemployed? 
It addresses these questions through an in-depth study of four contemporary reform 
processes: two in Denmark and two in France. The thesis is the first to investigate 
systematically the test situations that unfold in the reform processes with a focus on the 
plurality of ideas that are mobilised to qualify and evaluate existing policies and justify 
changes.  
The cases have been chosen because they provide a large variety of dynamics of 
transformations by offering an analysis of two rather different countries based on 
different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990) and involving reforms that target 
both the insured unemployed and the uninsured unemployed. Although the selected 
reforms are not representative of either welfare regimes or of Denmark and France, the 
reforms are exemplary (Justesen and Mik-Meyer 2012: 127; Villadsen 2006: 101) of what 
can be at stake in the transformation towards the active society, thus challenging some 
of the assumptions of existing diagnoses and theories. For this purpose, Denmark and 
France are not chosen randomly. All the dichotomies in Table 1 (except for Serrano 
Pascual and Larsen et al.) position Denmark, or the Nordic countries, either within or 
towards the ‘soft’ approach, i.e., the one with less propensity to coerce. This makes the 
country interesting for questioning, in an exemplary way, this assumption of a less 
coercitive variety of transformations. France, on the other hand, has been positioned 
somewhere in between the two sides (Barbier and Théret 2001; Beraud and Eydoux 
2009a) due first and foremost to its Rousseauist conception of citizenship, which implies 
that the state is indebted to the citizens (to provide a secure life), which in turn is 
“inconsistent” with the idea that citizens have obligations to the state (Barbier and 
Théret 2001: 177). France is thus “bound to experience limited pressure for job search, 
and the absence of a consistent punitive orientation” (Barbier and Fargion 2004: 457; 
See also Barbier 2007: 164; Enjolras et al. 2000). However, concurrently with the 
emphasis on France’s strong path dependency, others have pointed to profound changes 
(Palier 2005) where France is gradually leaving its Bismarckian path (Palier 2010b; see 
also Vail 2008; Vail 2004). The two countries thus provide critical cases (Flyvbjerg 2011: 
307) to understand the puzzle of how coercion is legitimised as well as how 
compromises are established in the active society.  
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The four reform processes are examined through an in-depth study of statements in 
newspaper articles from when reform programmes are announced until they are 
adopted. Over 1,300 articles have been studied in two parallel steps. The first mapped 
the variety of repertoires of evaluation in order to compose a grammar of cities of 
unemployment. The first step was a prerequisite for the second, which was to study the 
dynamics of how different repertoires are assembled in compromises as well as used to 
denounce other repertoires in order to (dis)qualify and (e)valuate the governing of 
unemployment, and finally to understand how these dynamics are tied to concrete 
changes in the governing of unemployment. This perspective differs from the existing 
literature in important ways. Rather than establishing ideal types a priori, which are then 
compared to actual changes and countries, the grammar of repertoires derives from the 
reform processes themselves. 
A I M  A N D  K E Y  F I N D I N G S  
The work of the thesis is motivated by an uneasiness concerning the ongoing 
transformations. Nonetheless, the thesis deliberately abstains from any normative 
aspirations to compare the transformations to normative standards, such as “de-
commodification” (Esping-Andersen 1990) and “social investment” (Morel et al. 2012), 
unmask the discrepancy between promises made and reality, or examine the way changes 
are masked by ideological strategies, as the scholars of the ‘ideational turn’ often invoke 
(see above). Rather, the thesis adheres to an ethos of non-normative critique cleared from 
any “ought to’s” and judgements on what is best, just, legitimate, etc. (Hansen 2016b; 
see also Triantafillou 2012: 6, 26ff).  
The reasons for this are firstly pragmatic and secondly relate to the kind of critiques that 
are needed to re-politicise the transformations and their consequences. In relation to the 
former, in order to compose the repertoires of evaluation as they unfold in the reform 
processes, it is necessary to turn the focus away from what they do not do through 
normative comparison, and towards what they actually do and what realities they 
produce and shape. The same goes for the latter rationale for the critique. In focusing 
negatively on how close or how far away transformations are from a desired state, 
normative criticisms tend to neglect or underestimate the more performative capacities and 
power relations of such transformations. By showing how the transformations are based 
on fragile and non-predetermined compromises, as well as how the governing itself is 
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full of contradictions and tensions, the thesis aims to open pathways towards thinking 
about possible alternative worlds (cf. Hansen 2016b: 139f) to the ‘active society’.   
Overall, the thesis has four key findings that crosscut the French and Danish reforms. 
The first concerns the type of transformations; the second the content of these 
transformations; the third the ideational dynamics of these transformations; and the 
fourth the role of critique in the transformations as well as in research. 
- Type: The thesis confirms existing theories of gradual rather than paradigmatic 
change (Streeck and Thelen 2005). However, the thesis’ focus on the capacity of 
ideas to qualify the governing of unemployment, as well as the people partaking in 
this in some way, brings new insights into how changes come about. It shows 
how the governing of unemployment is the result of an ongoing sedimentation of 
a plurality of repertoires of evaluation. This makes the governing inherently 
composite and questions the idea of a coherent regime or set of norms that sets 
the path. When repertoires are mobilised, it is therefore more a matter of 
adjusting, strengthening and adding instruments than replacing one set of 
instruments with another. Although transformations are cumulative, the thesis’ 
attention to morality and qualification of the unemployed subject show how they 
can have profound consequences. Furthermore, transforming the composite 
governing of unemployment is a complex and gradual matter where repertoires of 
evaluation are crucial to identify problems and suggest solutions. Here, ideological 
rhetoric and taken-for-granted norms fall short. Changes are not simply 
legitimised by smokescreens (the increased use of coercive measures is not simply 
hidden, but justified), or by making transformations appear as preservative and 
continuous (there is reoccurring uncertainty as to what is wrong and what ought 
to be done with the governing of unemployment). 
- Content: The thesis identifies and maps seven distinct cities of unemployment that 
are mobilised in all debates surrounding all four reforms. In the city of Demand, 
unemployment is a consequence of economic fluctuations and stagnation. 
Governing is a matter of increasing demand for labour and increasing 
consumption. The unemployed are thus both workers temporarily on stand by 
and consumers. In the city of Redistribution, unemployment is a symptom of 
hegemonic interests groups and material inequality. Governing thus aims to 
distribute wealth and work better. The unemployed person is a citizen at risk of 
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exploitation. In the city of Insurance, unemployment is a social risk that should be 
collectivised. The unemployed are thus injured parties and entitled to 
compensation. In the city of Incentives, unemployment is caused by insufficient 
financial incentives to work. Governing aims to generate incentives for the 
economic men to choose work rather than unemployment. In the Paternal city, 
unemployment is a symptom of irresponsible behaviour and governing and it is 
thus a matter of making the unemployed take control of oneself through 
discipline and by setting requirements. In the city of Investment, unemployment is 
the result of lacking societal investments in the human capital of the unemployed. 
Governing is a matter of investing in the skills of the unemployed to enhance 
their opportunities. Finally, in the city of Mobility, unemployment is the result of 
the insufficient adaptability of the labour market as well as the unemployed. The 
unemployed are in need of activity, if not work then a job search, and risk 
becoming lazy. In this way, the mapping of the cities exposes the politics and 
morality at stake in the transformations. The analyses of the four cases show that 
reforms are particularly driven by justifications from the Paternal, Mobility, 
Investment and Incentives cities, which are all tied together in multiple ways. The 
other three cities do not vanish completely, but in the qualification of the 
unemployed they are increasingly put to the margins. In all four cases, the cities of 
Redistribution and Insurance, are criticised for not being capable of emancipating the 
unemployed, i.e., making them become part of the ‘active society’. The ‘active 
society’ thus has an imaginative dystopia, the ‘passive society’, where these cities 
are too influential. The mix of repertoires driving transformations is both far 
from what most include in the label of neoliberalism, and furthermore, far from 
the idea of the two overall approaches presented above. The cities are constantly 
tied together and the will to emancipate, as well as to use coercive measures, cut 
across all cities as well as reforms.  
- Dynamics: Although the composite governing of unemployment is not new, the 
transformations towards the ‘active society’ accentuate and intensify certain 
dynamics. This shows how the tensions between the cities that are mobilised to 
justify are mitigated in categorisations and various and continuous tests that 
evaluate the behaviour of the unemployed. The tests, such as triage, screening, 
interviews and contracts, thus continuously ask what kind of subject the 
unemployed person is (i.e., what city does he live in), how worthy he is and what 
instruments will bring him closer to emancipation (i.e., the ‘active society’). In this 
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way, the possibility of requalifying the unemployed is institutionalised. A similar 
experimentalist dynamic is identifiable in the justification and critique. Here 
unemployment is increasingly seen as a multicausal phenomenon that, in the end, is 
a matter of how to make the unemployed act in certain ways. The result is 
constant uncertainty as to how to attach particular causes to particular types of 
unemployed, i.e., how to target or ‘personalise’ the governing, as well as how the 
unemployed respond to the governing. There is thus always room for 
improvement in the ‘active society’. It will always be transforming towards it. Part 
of the experimentalist approach seems to be a demand for more intense and more 
intimate instruments, stronger incentives, obligations to invest in oneself and to 
be mobile, and a better upbringing. In this setting, the unemployed are a symptom 
of the use of wrong medication prescribed by the cities of Demand, Redistribution 
and Insurance, and the need for increasing or adjusting the doses of Incentives, 
Investment, Mobility and Paternal governing.  
- Critique: The thesis exposes dynamics of critique in the reform processes that have 
wider implications for the left and for intellectual critiques of the transformations. 
The four reforms were not uncontested. The reforms of the unemployment 
insurance systems were criticised in particular by the cities of Demand, Insurance 
and Redistribution. However, the critiques are formatted by the dynamics of the 
‘active society’. First, they tend to work within the ‘active’ problematisation that 
separates critical forward-looking solutions from ‘uncritical’ critiques that simply 
want to preserve. The criticisms thus end up confirming the ‘dystopian’ evaluation 
provided by the cities driving transformations. Second, whereas the justifications 
driving transformations deliver fierce moral criticisms, the critiques based on 
Redistribution, Insurance and Demand have resided in criticising the use of coercion 
without putting moralities to the test. Intellectual critiques with similar normative 
foundations are confronted with similar deadlocks. First, they romanticise the 
past, neglecting its technocratic and coercive history and consumerist values. 
Second, they underestimate the performative ideational infrastructures underpinning 
the active society by simply denouncing them as false, punitive and/or neoliberal. 
In conclusion, the findings of the thesis disturb the idea of a progressive, non-
coercive, emancipatory and universalistic version of the active society. It does not 
exist in practice – not because the approach has been mixed with ‘foreign’ 
elements, but because the cities driving the path towards the active society entail 
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an increasingly intense and personal control of the behaviour of the unemployed 
in order to ensure they emancipate themselves. 
S T R U C T U R E  O F  T H E  T H E S I S  
The rest of the thesis is divided into three parts and a final conclusion. Part I presents 
the progression towards the composition of a grammar of cities of unemployment. 
Chapter 2 introduces the meta-concepts inspired from French pragmatic sociology in 
order to create an analytical grid that encompass a dynamic relationship between 
governing on the one hand and the justification and critique of unemployment on the 
other. This is presented with a focus on qualification and uncertain and tense test 
situations. Chapter 3 introduces the findings from the ‘first step’ mentioned above, i.e., 
the mapping of the plurality of repertoires of evaluation that political actors in the four 
reforms have mobilised. Seven cities of unemployment are presented. Part II, 
comprising chapters 4 and 5, presents the findings of the selected reforms of the French 
and Danish unemployment insurance systems. Both reforms can be seen as tipping points 
that turn the balance of the systems in favour of and towards the active society through 
making adjustments and additions. Chapter 4 presents the reform process of the so-
called PARE (Plan d’aide et de retour à l’emploi, ‘Help plan for the return to employment’) in 
France in 2000, while chapter 5 presents the LAAP (Lov om aktiv arbejdsmarkedspolitik, 
‘The active labour market policy act’) in Denmark in 1992-93. Part III comprises 
chapters 6 and 7 and presents the findings of the selected reforms of the French and 
Danish systems governing the uninsured unemployed. The reforms are more recent than 
the ones presented in chapter 4 and 5. For that reason, the reforms are more 
exemplifying of the intensifications and displacements in the path towards the active society. 
Chapter 6 presents the reform process of the RSA (Revenu de Solidarité active, ‘Income of 
active solidarity’) in France in 2007-8, while chapter 7 presents the reform of AKGN 
(Alle kan gøre nytte, ’Everyone can be useful’) in Denmark in 2011-13. Chapter 8 
concludes the thesis and discusses the four key findings. 
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Part I 
 
Towards a grammar of cities of 
unemployment
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2  
Analytical grid 
Meta-concepts and methods  
In the following I will present the analytical grid of the thesis, that is, the key theoretical 
concepts and the methodological choices that follow from the overall aim of the thesis 
as well as from the theoretical frame. In the process of composing the thesis, the aim has 
been to develop an analytical grid that provides tools to map the plurality of moral and 
normative structures that are used to justify and criticise policies in processes that lead to 
reforms in the governing of unemployment, as well as the tensions, sacrifices and 
compromises between the normative structures. Furthermore, the analytical grid seeks to 
address the question of how normative structures are connected to the governing of 
unemployment and specifically what ideas and ideational dynamics are driving and 
shaping current transformations of the governing of unemployment. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the key theoretical 
concepts, which mainly derive from French Pragmatic sociology. There is no canonical 
‘text book’ (yet) of pragmatic sociology, but different and sometimes contesting views 
on how the theory should be interpreted and evolve. The following is thus based on my 
take on what I find to be distinct, original and productive in this sociology in 
development (Hansen 2016b; 2016a). Thus, rather than a strict adoption of a 
comprehensive framework, the concepts are, from the beginning, heuristically chosen 
and moulded to function as tools for the analytical purpose of the thesis. The key 
concepts are: 
- Reality test 
- Qualification 
- Plurality 
- Repertoires of evaluation  
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Section two further moulds the concept of repertoires of evaluation into the concept of 
cities of unemployment. The concept qualifies the thesis’ take on ideas in relation to the 
justification as well as the governing of unemployment. The section combines the 
concepts into a framework.  
The following three sections will present the key analytical concepts and finally outline a 
model that addresses the role of ideas, actors, instruments and institutions in practices of 
evaluation. The last three sections describe and justify the choices of case selection, data 
selection and coding. The final section presents some notes on how the material is read 
and analysed. 
K E Y  C O N C E P T S  F R O M  F R E N C H  P R A G M A T I C  S O C I O L O G Y  
The point of departure for pragmatic sociology is that we live in a world with uncertainty 
and tensions (Boltanski 2011; Barthe et al. 2013). However, it is not a Hobbesian state of 
nature with a basic fear of getting killed by the neighbour, but more an ontological 
uncertainty and changeability with regards to what reality consists of, or with Boltanski’s 
words, an uncertainty about “the whatness of what is” (Boltanski 2011: 75). The reality is 
regarded as fragile, heterogeneous and composite (Thévenot 2001) rather than solid and 
homogenous. It is this dynamic and insecure point of departure that informs pragmatic 
sociology’s specific attention towards the coordination between the individual person 
and the environment, which is a difficult, non-predetermined and, at times, trying, 
process.  
 
Reality test: Fragile reality and its troublesome coordination is encapsulated in one of the 
key concepts of pragmatic sociology, namely the reality test. The multiplicity of 
meanings attached to the term (in French épreuve) is important. It firstly signifies an 
uncertain and fragile situation in which reality is “put to the test” (mis à l’épreuve) or tested 
by people in something that resembles a trial. Secondly, it signifies a state. It refers to a 
hardship or something trying and testing (éprouvant). Thirdly, it is a capacity: the verb 
éprouver can be related to experiencing or sensing. In such test situations or “critical 
moments” (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999), such as disputes, the reality is put to the test 
by means of the experiences and actions of people. Whereas the starting point of a test is 
some uncertainty with regards to the ‘whatness’ of what is, it also contains moments in 
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which certainty, at least temporarily, is established and agreement or compromises are 
reached; but only “temporarily” since the ‘noise of the world’ always threatens the 
situation to “get out of hand and to lead the parties involved to conduct another test, the 
way throwing a dice or drawing a card can start a game up again” (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006: 135).    
It is these test situations or critical moments that are the privileged research objects of 
pragmatic sociology (Dansou and Langley 2012). Pragmatic sociology is “pragmatic” by 
being oriented towards practices and concrete situations and by taking its departure in 
people’s own sense-making in these situations. The test is usually used to study everyday 
situations, for instance at the work place, but the term is equally applicable to the object 
of this study. The point of departure here is the fact that unemployment, or how to 
organise the relation between those who are regarded as employed and those who are 
not, is troublesome and constantly spurs test situations in which it is not entirely given 
for the actors involved (politicians, interest groups, unemployed, etc.) what the most 
appropriate way to handle them is. 
But how are people “equipped” (Thévenot 2002) in order to handle these test situations? 
When reality is not given and people are forced to coordinate their actions with others, 
they lean on and are constrained by surrounding objects that make the situations 
comparable to other situations. Pragmatic sociology speaks of “equivalence”;  yardsticks 
that makes it possible to see differences and similarities, or simply to recognise or 
disregard what is relevant in a particular situation, (“what matters” in Boltanski’s words 
(2011)) and finally make a coordination of actions possible. These yardsticks can take a 
variety of “forms”, such as habits, conventions, statistics, technical objects or juridical 
tools (Thévenot 1986). This is where the fourth, more institutional, signification of test 
is relevant as a device for testing. People invest in these forms to enable coordination 
(Ibid.).  
“Investment” firstly signifies the binding of resources to a particular idea, thereby 
renouncing investing in something else. Put differently, investments entail “sacrifices”. 
For instance, the practice of statistics invests in categories. Categorisations are both 
simplifying, thus inevitably sacrificing nuances when generalising into categories, and 
indispensable in order to compare particular instances (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 
2f). Moreover, categories have an in-built fragility since they are constantly put to the 
test by other overlapping categories or instances that do not fit the categories (Thévenot 
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1979). Secondly, the term investment is tied to “investiture”, originally referring to the 
installation of an incumbent (the insignia can be a garment, the ‘vest’) (Thévenot 2016: 
238ff). When actors invest in particular statistical classification, it enables equivalence 
and coordination and people or things can be compared and actions can be made 
accordingly, but with this it is also clear that the classification can underpin certain 
power relations, establishing hierarchies, authorities and categories that enable and 
legitimise political actions and governing. The governing of unemployment, as will be 
shown in the coming chapters, is a case in point of being intimately tied to continuous 
investments in categories that spur ongoing tensions and ‘critical moments’.  
 
Qualification: The continuous investment in forms by actors qualify the surroundings. 
They “equip” reality with particular goods that render it possible to evaluate and value, 
or simply appraise, the objects in the surroundings as well as the actions actors carry out. 
Objects and actions are in other words ‘valorized’ (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 131). 
For example, the capability of a court of justice presupposes a number of qualified 
objects invested with value for pronouncing a sentence. Prosecutor and defender 
depend on evidence and witnesses that are qualified according to the accusations. 
However, the qualification of objects is highly dependent on the situation. For instance, 
in the court room, all objects and persons become part of a reality (of proofs, clauses, 
laws, justice, etc.) which is radically different from how they were qualified outside the 
room. The qualification, including the judicial authority of the judge, is further 
supported by invested objects in the court room, such as the judge’s robe and wig, the 
hammer and the bench, as well ceremonial practices, such as rising when the judge 
enters. 
As mentioned, the qualification also rests on particular goods, in the case of the court a 
number of principles settled in laws and legal practice. It is these goods, or moralities, 
that provide the binding material in the field of tension in the tests between people, their 
actions and the reality they act within and upon. Pragmatic sociology, in this sense, is a 
framework for understanding the qualified or ‘valorized’ relations between people and 
their surroundings (Hansen et al. 2016: 274f). Although these processes of qualification 
can be highly institutionalised (as in the case of the court), they are not simply 
structurally determined and given. They require investments in order to be established 
and maintained, especially given that the objects, or dispostifs as Boltanski and Thévenot 
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speak of them aggregately (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991), are rarely as homogeneously 
ordered and spatially delimited as they are in the court room. In the case of 
unemployment, it is much less straightforward as to what is relevant in test situations, 
such as reform debates, since the unemployed are already qualified according to a 
plurality of different and often opposing forms that constitute a patchwork of 
qualifications and actors. This means that a great many objects can be drawn into the 
test situations, from a variety of statistics (growth rate, unemployment rate, employment 
rate, consumption, poverty rate, wage levels, benefit levels, job turnover, education levels 
and so on) to a particular ‘successful’ programme and the statements and behaviour of 
individual unemployed people.  
While these objects hereby aim to fix the ‘whatness of what is’, they are also loaded with 
morality. Statistics, for instance, are on the one hand a radical requalification of social life 
into categories and numbers, and on the other they aim towards producing knowledge 
to improve society according to certain historically nested ideals of the good society 
(Thévenot 1990; 2011). Statistics, and qualification in general, fuse together the question 
of what reality is and the moral and political question of how it ought to be (Wagner 1999: 
348; Boltanski 2011: 69). This “situated” morality makes it very different from 
philosophical wrestling with abstract principles, or the way a theory of principle-driven 
justice (e.g., Rawls) is applied to reality (cf. Boltanski and Thévenot 2000: 216). 
 
Plurality: A recurring argument in studies of pragmatic sociology is to show how the 
qualifications give rise to tensions and conflicts between a plurality of moral goods that 
become visible in these test situations. Tension lurks not only because the world is in 
constant “flux” (Boltanski 2011: 58), but because the goods fail to appreciate one 
another and are ultimately incommensurable (Centemeri 2015). The name of the initial 
research group, Le groupe de sociologie politique et morale, indicates that pragmatic sociology is 
positioned in a cross disciplinary field between sociology (social actions and 
coordination), philosophy (morality and goods) and politics (tensions, power and 
conflict). Pragmatic sociology shares this focus on tension with Actor Network Theory; 
in Bruno Latour’s terminology, “controversies” (Latour 2005). However, whereas the 
pragmatic in ANT (as well as American pragmatism) mainly refers to an application- and 
problem-solving-oriented process in which objects and the social are assembled in every 
possible way, for pragmatic sociology it is first and foremost a moral practice in which 
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reality and goods are concurrently put to the test. A methodological consequence of this 
‘muddle’ of morality and objects and practices is, as positively argued for in the 
preceding chapter, that the researcher’s account remains non-normative.  
R E P E R T O I R E S  O F  E V A L U A T I O N :  C I T I E S  O F  U N E M P L O Y M E N T  
Although the plurality provides permanent scope for tests, tensions and critique, there 
are limits to the ways in which reality can be qualified and actions can be justified and 
criticised (Boltanski and Thévenot 1987; 2006). In specific places and periods there 
exists a limited number of more stable structures that enable actors to qualify reality and 
establish equivalence (Blokker 2011). These “repertoires of evaluation” (Lamont and 
Thévenot 2000) follow a systematic grammar that can be mobilised to establish 
equivalence, hereby enabling critique and justification, i.e., evaluation. Repertoires are, 
however, much more than yardsticks or common goods that are simply inadequate to 
justify actions (outside forums of philosophical wrestling). They are situated. 
To borrow another term from Boltanski and Thévenot, they could be seen as “cities” 
(cités) (Boltanski and Thévenot 1987)i. Within the walls of the city, a certain order or 
moral harmony rules based on the yardstick or principle that cherishes a particular 
worth; but the cities are also full of objects and subjects that reinsure the order of worth 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 130-37). The cities are also ‘equipped’ with tests that make 
it possible to distinguish between more or less worthy objects as well as subjects. Finally, 
cities are not anarchic, but governed. There are instruments to ensure that the inhabitants 
live in accordance with the order of worth of the city, and within the city there is a 
constant quest for improving the governing of unemployment, and hence the worth of 
the city. Cities are thus never complete. 
This implies that cities are neither ready-made prescriptions with a complete blueprint 
nor utopias. They do not simply ‘dictate’ those who govern exactly what to change or 
what policy tool to introduce. They provide them with repertoires. Cities are thus like 
Foucault’s problematisations, “turning a given into a question” (Foucault 2003: 24; 2001). 
When mobilised, cities thus connect the concrete situation to a general problem and 
                                          
i The French term cité is more illustrative since it refers to the Greek city-states and hence signifies a society. In On 
Justification, cité is translated to “polity” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
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foster the preconditions for looking for, justifying or criticising possible solutions. By 
qualifying their reality, they are pointing towards what matters while deflecting what 
does not matter, thereby making up the imagination of the political actors and providing 
them with analytical grids that will guide their quest for identifying problems and finding 
solutions. They can be mobilised in order to justify as well as criticise, thereby evaluating 
actions and arrangements. They can be used to confirm or defend as well as challenge 
given orders, and can be mobilised in reformative and corrective actions and adjustments 
within the city walls as well as in radical or “existential” critiques of other cities by 
questioning the very principles that the arrangements are built upon (cf. Boltanski and 
Chiapello 1999: 77; Boltanski 2011: 103f).  
It is possible to find different types of cities with different levels of generality. The cities 
mapped by Boltanski and Thévenot can be seen as the ‘universal’ equipment for 
engaging in disputes and controversies.i However, in order to avoid taking certain ideas 
for granted, this thesis aims to develop a more contextual and inductive typology of 
repertoires that are directly related to the topic of the thesis – that is, the problem of 
how to govern the problem of unemployment.ii I term these repertoires cities of 
unemployment. All cities thus have their own ways of qualifying the phenomenon of 
people who, for some reason or another, do not commodify their time and effort on the 
labour market (Polanyi 1944). If one tries to specify this extremely generic, though 
historical phenomenon further, one basically risks entering the gates of one of the cities. 
The cities thus qualify the phenomenon by pointing out objects that influence it, by 
attaching particular behavioural characteristics to the unemployed subject and by 
providing tests by which one can evaluate and improve the governing to make it more 
just and efficient. The equipment of the cities thus sustain processes for the 
“subjectivation” (Foucault 1982; Revel 2010: 227f) of the inhabitants of the cities. Cities 
hereby interpellate the inhabitants as moral subjects. This, of course, entails the 
unemployed, but by specifying the thresholds between unemployment and employment, 
the cities are just as much about the employed as the unemployed. Finally, the cities also 
                                          
i Boltanski and Thévenot initially mapped six “orders of worth” mobilised in everyday situations of dispute that they 
associated with canonical texts from political philosophy. The six orders of worth are: inspiration (St. Augustine), domestic 
(Bossuet), fame (Hobbes), civic (Rousseau), market (Smith), and industrial (Saint-Simon) (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
ii There are other theoretical suggestions within pragmatic sociology closer to the issue of government, such as Robert Salais’ 
“dispositifs of public action” (dispositifs d’action publique) (Chatel et al. 2005) or Vando Borghi’s “institutional regimes of 
justification” (Borghi 2011), but they neglect the moral dimension (and, thus, the subject) so crucial to the worlds, and 
instead focus mainly on ‘administrative’ effects.    
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interpellate all those who aspire to partake in the quest for governing the unemployed 
better. In other words, the cities expect particular capacities and knowledge in order to 
govern legitimately. 
Unemployment is a constant threat to employment, but at the same time it provides 
meaning for its value and legitimises particular forms of governing. The cities did not 
rise out of nowhere. They are historical constructs relating to the rise of the market 
economy whose infrastructure has been developed from tensions, tests, practices and 
struggles. Cities are thus not pure intellectual constructs. They entail laymen as well as 
experts, scientific knowledge as well as opinion and abstract as well as folk philosophy. 
Each city thus has a specific genealogy, but unravelling this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. What the thesis does do, however, is provide a detailed account of the life of each 
city (chapter 3) and explore their respective roles in contemporary transformations of 
the governing of unemployment (part II and III).    
Finally, it may be appropriate to clarify what the cities of unemployment are not. Firstly, a 
study of cities is not a study of ideologies. Cities do not operate next to, or above, 
practices that hide their real character. Cities are means of legitimation that qualify rather 
than mask reality. Their power relies not in distorting reality by means of ideological 
veils, but in their capacity to tie moral and normative yardsticks to concrete practices, 
institutions, instruments and (un)employed human beings. Secondly, studying cities is 
not a study of given norms or values. Cities do not operate in an environment in which 
they are completely taken for granted and uncontested, but in one of uncertainty and 
tensions. They instigate and format rather than exclude critique. Thirdly, cities differ from 
studying ‘governmentalities’. Governmentality studies map (the genealogy of) programmes 
(Foucault 1991: 75; cf. Dean 1988) or “arts” of governing (Foucault 2008: 2), and to a 
lesser extent how they interplay. The meta-concepts from pragmatic sociology (test, 
qualification, justification and plurality) and the concept of cities provide the analytical 
grid for studying how these tensions unfold in situations where the dynamics are 
difficult to capture through simply studying governmental programmes as they are 
presented in their ideal form by intellectuals, for example.  
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S I T U A T I N G  T E S T  S I T U A T I O N S :  C O M P R O M I S E S ,  S E D I M E N T A T I O N ,  
I N S T I T U T I O N S  
It is now possible to integrate the insights presented above into a model that deals with 
how the dynamics of the test situations in which the cities of unemployment are 
mobilised relate to the actual governing of unemployment. The question, in other words, 
is how this ‘realm’ of evaluation (in which justification and critique take place in public) 
influences and is influenced by everyday governing as well as the supporting institutions.  
The concept of compromise is key in understanding how and why the governing of 
unemployment is composed by a plurality of cities. Compromises, here, should not be 
understood as a balancing of the interests of various actors, but settlements where 
elements from several cities are concurrently recognised (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 
275ff). Compromises make two or more cities compatible by establishing arrangements 
that assuage the tension between them. Compromises are fragile since they never 
completely fulfil the logic of one city and always risk being challenged by reality tests 
based on cities that are not recognised in the compromise. 
The repeated disputes and testing of a plurality of cities in reality tests sediment (Salais 
2011). Sedimentation has at least two dimensions in this context. The first is a 
sedimentation of instruments, namely the hands-on decisions concerning how to govern 
the unemployed in laws, directives, recommendations, etc. Sedimentation here also 
points to how the policies governing the unemployed do not follow the logic of just one 
city. There is rather an often ambiguous and contradictory hybridisation and layering of 
the mobilisation of different cities over time. We can thus interpret the assemblage of 
instruments in place that govern the unemployed at a given time in a given country as 
the outcome of historical sedimentations that compromise on-going mobilisations of the 
cities of unemployment. The thesis thus zooms in on four instances of sedimentation. 
The second dimension of sedimentation is institutionalisation, where an institution is 
understood from the perspective of pragmatic sociology as a “bodiless being to which is 
delegated the task stating the whatness of what is”; i.e., “saying and confirming what 
matters” through repetitive reality tests (Boltanski 2011: 59). The tautological nature of 
institutions deprives them from basic human capacities of doubt and reflexivity. 
Institutions are thus non-human beings performing a qualification and evaluation of 
reality in a stable and repetitive manner. Institutions such as statistics, benchmarks, 
26 
categories, definitions, indicators, standards and opinion polls are thus key objects that 
are mobilised in situations of justification and critique. Their tautological nature and lack 
of self-reflexivity make them an inappropriate research object for understanding the 
normative legitimating underpinnings of sedimentation. This only become visible in test 
situations (cf. Salais 2011: 228) since, in these situations, actors are dependent on 
normative repertoires of evaluation in order to interpret and make use of institutions 
(Cruickshank 2016: 70). 
From the incomplete list of examples of institutions, it becomes obvious that debates on 
welfare reforms never work as ‘free lunches’ where political actors chose whatever 
repertoire they find appealing. In principle they can do this, but whether the evaluation 
is deemed legitimate is highly dependent on the public memory and institutions in place 
at a given time. So to return to the concept of sedimentation, institutions should be seen 
as both the outcome (sedimentation) of on-going debates, as well as informing, 
qualifying and formatting them.  
 
 
Figure 1 Situating test situations and cities of unemployment 
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Institutions, seen as stable and repetitive reality tests, provide the analytical linkage 
between the level of disputes (justification and critique) and the level of concrete policy 
changes. Institutions of this kind are an integral and indispensable part of the governing 
of the unemployed: they set the boundaries between the employed and the unemployed, 
separate the unemployed into various categories, set criteria for receiving benefits, set 
benchmarks for job centre performance and so on. Without these capacities to define 
the ‘whatness’ of unemployment and of the unemployed, rules and laws would simply 
lose their meaning and impetus. The relation between worlds, institutions and policies as 
outlined above is illustrated in the figure above.  
The main research object is illustrated as the “evaluation” bubble. The question is how 
actors respond to the questions of how we are governing and how we should be 
governing. The bubble illustrates how multiple cities of unemployment are mobilised 
when policies and policy changes are justified and criticised. However, these processes 
do not occur in a vacuum – i.e., the bubble is highly permeable. First, it is permeated by 
feedback, which is constantly used to qualify and contest arguments.i I use the term to 
emphasise how the communicated information (understood in the broadest sense) 
somehow derives from the everyday life of governing.  Feedback can take numerous 
forms: some of the feedback is highly institutionalised, such as statistics, measuring the 
achievement of objectives, benchmarking and multiplying ideas and perceptions in the 
media etc., whereas other forms find less institutionalised ways to reach the ‘realm’ of 
evaluation, such as the everyday affairs and experiences of unemployment and the 
instruments governing it that sediment into the (public) memory (cf. Berger and 
Luckmann 1966). 
The arrows pointing right in the figure above illustrate the sedimentations of on-going 
debates and evaluations. Sedimentations are not only changes in policies, but can also 
lead to institutional changes; for instance, classification systems are modified or new 
strategies are launched which then have implications for the feedback. Institutions 
equally play a huge part in the everyday governing of the unemployed; for example, with 
the classification and screening measures and targets for local agencies (cf. dotted arrow 
pointing right). The sections below will clarify how the theoretical meta-concepts 
presented above have been operationalised into a methodological strategy. 
                                          
i I borrow the term from John W. Kingdon (1995), who attaches similar meaning to the term (see also Béland 2005: 6f).    
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S E L E C T I O N  O F  C A S E S  
The cases have been selected with the aim of operationalising the research question of 
the thesis. There are two overall aims of the thesis, and the former preconditions the 
latter. The first aim (what cities of unemployment are mobilised in contemporary reform 
processes of the governing of unemployment?) is to develop a typology of cities of 
unemployment that has relevance beyond this specific case study. The second aim (how 
are the cities mobilised to justify and criticise, and how do the cities sediment into 
instruments and institutions governing the unemployed?) is to apply this typology in 
order to analyse the dynamics and tensions surrounding the transformation of the 
governing of unemployment in contemporary European societies. The thesis works with 
a comparative case-study set-up on two dimensions: country and ‘type’ of reform. The 
purpose of comparing is not to trace the most decisive factors in a causal explanation of 
the phenomenon, but rather to “cast different perspectives on a problematized 
phenomenon” (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 207). It is in this latter sense that the 
selection of cases aims towards ‘maximum variation’. The choice of France and 
Denmark satisfies this aim since their systems of governing unemployment are 
predominantly seen as, at least since Esping-Andersen (1990), belonging to different 
welfare models, namely the Continental Bismarckian vs. the Nordic Social Democratic. 
Nonetheless, they are subject to resembling transformations, and this provides an 
interesting comparison of how these play out in rather different environments. If it is 
possible to trace a resembling plurality of repertoires in both countries, the typology 
cannot be reduced (or denounced) as simply French, Danish, Corporatist or Nordic.  
Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 1, the countries serve to test some of the 
analytical as well as normative assumptions of the typologies of transformation 
mentioned in chapter 1.i In this sense they are critical cases (Flyvbjerg 2011: 307), 
especially in relation to the question of the co-existence of ideas and to the question of 
coercion.  Their corporatist, republican (France) and social democratic, universalist 
(Denmark) institutions should make them less prone to change in the direction of the 
use of coercion. Furthermore, they are exemplary cases for studying the varieties within 
the active society.  
                                          
i See pp. 4, 10.  
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The thesis analyses two reform processes in each country (see Figure 2). All reforms are 
justified as “active” and as deriving from a centrist or centre-left position. The reforms 
provide variation in at least two ways. Firstly, they involve the insured and uninsured 
unemployed. Both France and Denmark operate with a dual system for insured and 
uninsured unemployment, and reforms therefore usually only entail one of these groups. 
The two reforms in each country thus cover a substantial part of the spectrum of 
unemployed people in each country. This is mainly relevant in terms of developing a 
typology with the greatest variety of repertoires. It is clear, for instance, that historically 
the city of Insurance has sediment predominantly in the systems of unemployment 
insurance. Secondly, the selected reforms are chosen because they are significant by, on 
the one hand, resulting in substantial changes in the governing of the unemployed and, 
on the other hand, by being recognised as a significant reform by political actors at the 
time. If the transformations took place below the public radar, it would take another 
methodology to map the normative repertoires that underpinned them. The selected 
reforms of the insured system are also the earliest and can be seen as tipping points where 
the changes in the balance between the repertoires place a new dynamic into the 
governing of the insured unemployed. In France, the reform of PARE (‘Help plan for 
the return to employment’) in 2001 introduced an individual contract that designated the 
actions and measures that would make the unemployed return to the labour market. If 
the contract was not fulfilled, the unemployed would be financially sanctioned. The 
reform also strengthened obligations to accept the offers of the job exchange services. 
In Denmark the reform of LAAP (‘The active labour market act’) in 1993 introduced a 
similar contract while introducing a variety of instruments: leave schemes to ease access 
to the labour market, job training for the unemployed and job offers that the 
unemployed, after a period of time, would have to accept in order to continue to receive 
compensation. By installing the obligatory contract, both reforms would institutionalise 
a permanent testing of the behaviour of the unemployed.  
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* Unemployed people as a percentage of the labour force, seasonally adjusted. Source: OECD (2016), 
Harmonised unemployment rate (HUR) (indicator). doi: 10.1787/52570002-en (Accessed on 01 July 
2016)  
The selected reforms of the uninsured unemployed have both occurred within the last 
ten years. They are thus examples of intensifications of dynamics that are already 
extensively in place. Rather than tipping points towards the ‘active society’, the thesis 
analyses the reforms as cases of tensions and displacements within it. In France the 
reform of RSA (‘Income of active solidarity’) in 2008 introduced a negative tax scheme 
to increase incentives for recipients to take low-paid part-time work while introducing a 
number of instruments and obligations that aim to increase the mobility of the 
unemployed. The reform also introduced an intensified control of the financial 
behaviour of the household of the recipient. In Denmark the reform of AKGN 
(‘Everyone can be useful’) introduced obligatory workfare schemes to all able young 
recipients and increased sanctions and obligatory education. 
S E L E C T I O N  O F  D A T A  
The choice of data is justified in the aim of the thesis to study the dynamic conflicts and 
legitimation process surrounding the reform proposals. I chose to analyse the public 
Figure 2 Harmonised unemployment (percent) in France and Denmark 1983-2016 
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debate in newspaper articles since this is a genre where the tensions and dynamics 
between ideas, actors and the reforms are most visible. The data thus has a high degree 
of intertextuality (Justesen and Mik-Meyer 2012: 122) where actors constantly make 
references to, and are confronted with, other statements. This dynamic is something that 
I would not be able to analyse to the same extent by means of, for instance, a 
genealogical study of selected ‘monumental’ documents (Villadsen 2006: 101). Since the 
articles present actors’ views on what is and what should be, the data provides a linkage 
between the actors’ qualification of the phenomenon and the institutional changes that 
the reforms are about. Hence, although I do not study the micro-level practices of 
governing the unemployed, the data can say something about the moral content of the 
sedimentations, i.e., the concrete instruments targeting the unemployed.  
However, how the governing plays out locally in practice, as well as the conflicts and 
processes of evaluation and sedimentation that never reach the public, are beyond the 
scope of this method; these would demand more ethnographic approaches (See e.g. 
McDonald and Marston 2005; Serrano Pascual et al. 2012; Boland and Griffin 2015; 
Nielsen 2015a; Garsten et al. 2016). Of limitations, one should mention how newspaper 
articles tend to have less ‘specificity’, as well as the fact that the statements of the actors 
are filtered by the newspapers. I collected articles (in the national databases, 
Europresse.com and Infomedia) from the three largest national non-tabloid and non-
specialised newspapers in each country (Le Monde, Libération, and Figaro in France, 
Jyllandsposten, Berlingske Tidende, and Politiken in Denmark).i The tabloid formats are 
disregarded primarily because they tend to favour rhetoric and sensationalised reporting 
rather than the justifications and criticism which are the object of analysis in this thesis.  
The specialised media are disregarded because they target a smaller public.  
Articles are collected from the day a reform is announced until one month after it was 
agreed upon (280-450 articles per case), which all in all gives a broad selection of the 
most important voices in the debate, but also makes it possible to study how the reform 
process evolves; for instance, how the mobilisation of particular cities leads to changes 
                                          
i Although ranked high in terms of number of daily issues, this is why L’Équipe (specialised in sports), Le Parisien (regional) 
and Les Echos (specialised in business and finance) are not considered in France, and BT and Ekstra Bladet (tabloids) are not 
considered in Denmark. 
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in reforms.i  Seeing cases as a “bounded occurrence of a phenomenon” (Miles and 
Huberman 1994), I temporarily limit my case analysis to the period from it is announced 
until it is officially and legally decided upon. For an overview of details of the cases 
(period, number of articles and search words), see Appendix A.  
C O D I N G  
The coding of the data was a process of simultaneously developing and mobilising the 
typology of the cities of unemployment. In order to be able to begin coding, a tentative 
‘grammar’ and typology of different worlds of unemployment was produced. In order to 
do this, I searched for conceptions of unemployment in the history of economic and 
welfare state ideas in normative literature on the welfare state and current debates. I 
chose the history of ideas and the normative literature since these are suitable places to 
find ordered, ‘pure’ and concise conceptions of my phenomena. The result was a 
tentative model of seven worlds of unemployment qualified through the construction of 
a common grammar (e.g., their conception of societal goods, the unemployed subject, 
how to govern best and how to test and evaluate policies).  
On the basis of my tentative typology, I developed a coding scheme that was gradually 
reconfigured throughout the coding process. When coding each case, a detailed timeline 
was constructed, noting controversies, changes in reform proposals etc. The coding 
units are statements that can consist of very short sentences or sequences of sentences, 
if these build an argument. I coded both direct and indirect quotes since the point is not 
whether the actor said precisely this or that, but how the reality of the governing of 
unemployment is qualified. The criteria for coding a statement was that it had to be 
somehow related to the specific reform and had to involve some kind of qualification 
that can be either descriptive or prescriptive. This entails that the statement explicitly 
qualifies one or more of the instruments that are part of the reform. When in doubt of 
whether a statement was to be coded to a certain code, the statement was still coded. 
This procedure assured that all relevant data was coded, including that which did not 
                                          
i Since the database of Infomedia had not registered Jyllandsposten electronically for the period of the first Danish case, it only 
contains articles from two newspapers However, since the reform was heavily debated over a long period of time, it 
nonetheless has the biggest sample of articles. Since, Jyllandsposten does not differ radically in its political position on welfare 
matters from Berlingske, it would most likely not lead to any new repertoires or qualifications.  
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immediately fit the tentative coding scheme. Hereby, incoherence is not disregarded, but 
treated as an occasion for adapting and revising the categories of the coding scheme.  
In the coding scheme, I distinguish between descriptive, interpretative and pattern codes 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). The descriptive codes describe who is enunciating and what 
the enunciation is about (solutions, evaluation of existing policies and how to organise 
governing between actors). The interpretive codes refer to the cities of unemployment that 
actors were mobilising to justify or criticise, as well as the cities they were denouncing. 
Initially a tentative grammar of seven cities was developed according to readings of 
normative literature and secondary literature from the history of ideas regarding 
unemployment. The idea was to establish the largest variety of repertoires in order to 
bracket the many qualifications of unemployment. The codes were defined according to 
the established grammar and operationalised with inspiration from Boyatzis’ five 
elements (label, definition, description, in/exclusion, and examples) (Boyatzis 1998). The 
often subtle difference between the repertoires of the cities called for a very contextual 
and attentive reading of the statements, in which the question is always whether and how 
there is a qualification of reality that prepares it for evaluation. Terms like “rights”, 
equality”, “inclusion”, and “active” may appear in several of the cities, but with 
significant differences in their meaning. This implies that methods of automatic and 
quantitative coding on the basis of lists of key words or “semantic descriptors”, which 
has gained popularity in studies applying the original orders of worth framework (See 
e.g. Boltanski and Chiapello 1999; Patriotta et al. 2011; Taupin 2012) would be 
misleading and at best superficial. 
Furthermore, every city was accorded an additional code documenting instances in 
which the worth of the world is denounced. The fact that repertoires can be mobilised in 
order to be denounced is again something that an automatic analysis of “semantic 
descriptors” would not be able to catch. The process of coding was characterised by 
“constant comparison” (Strauss and Corbin 1998) between the definitions of the 
interpretive codes and the coded material, sometimes causing changes in the coding of 
statements and sometimes changes in the definitions of the codes. The method ensured 
the internal coherence in each interpretive code (cities of unemployment) and overall 
consistency in the coding (Justesen and Mik-Meyer 2012: 36). All changes in the content 
of the codes, which were substantial, were documented in a logbook. Changes in the 
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coding scheme thus led to revisiting and sometimes re-coding the cases according to 
changes in the scheme (see Appendix B).  
Finally, the coding scheme comprised a number of pattern codes that related to the cross-
cutting grammar of all cities (common good, (un)employed subjects) and instances 
where the issue of coercion and the categorisation of the unemployed appeared. The 
pattern codes were partly informed by theory and partly evolved through the coding. 
The importance of coercion and categorisation became particularly clear in this process.  
The final coding scheme can be seen in Appendix B, which also includes some notes on 
the revisions the scheme underwent in the process of coding. Appendix C contains 
some concrete examples of how the data has been coded.  
The inductive and highly explorative development of the coding scheme made it difficult 
to operationalise ideals of intercoder reliability (Boyatzis 1998; Campbell et al. 2013) 
since the definitions of codes were constantly modified, making it difficult to engage 
others in the process. Instead, I ensure reliability – not in the sense of objective 
knowledge, but rather a coherent and consistent method  (Justesen and Mik-Meyer 2012: 
36) – in two alternative ways. Firstly, I have maintained intra-coder reliability by the 
abovementioned approach of clear and concise code definitions and constant 
comparison between coded material and the codes throughout at least three readings. 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, I ensure reliability through transparency (Ibid.) 
by exposing how the concepts came about and by presenting the findings in a form 
where the connection between the coding and the raw data is made visible to the reader. 
The following chapters thus contain more than 800 quotations from the coded data. 
A N A L Y S I N G  
The analysis, whose findings are presented in the following chapters, is based on two 
readings of the coded material, which consist of more than 3,000 statements. In the first 
reading, of which the outcome is presented in the next chapter, the content of the 
individual interpretive codes (the cities of unemployment) was analysed in order to 
present a grammar of each city of unemployment. Coding, categorising and finally 
presenting the grammar of the cities resembles the art of composing (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006: 158). It involves picking out those objects that are in “harmony” and 
confronting incompatible harmonies (Ibid.). Furthermore, it is not a simple and 
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objective matter of ‘documenting’ findings, but rather hermeneutically thinking along the 
harmonies and exploring the (infra)structure of each city. Part of this thinking involves 
integrating reflections of what I consider to be ‘grammarians’ of the various worlds. The 
composition and presentation of the coded data is thus supplemented by the normative 
literature and secondary literature from the history of ideas that was initially used to 
provide a tentative grammar before the coding process was initiated.  
Following the ethos of a non-normative critiquei, the reading and presentation of the 
material adheres to a principle of acceptability (Hansen 2016b). The principle entails 
practicing a “descriptive pluralism” (Bénatouïl 1999: 382), which is encapsulated in the 
following quote: 
[The] researcher is obliged, in her description, to adhere as closely as possible to the 
procedure the actors themselves use in establishing proof in a given situation; this 
approach entails paying careful attention to the diversity of forms of justification. 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 12).  
Thus, the operations of actors are not reduced to something hidden (e.g., intentions and 
interests) or unconscious (e.g., false consciousness) (Lemieux 2008), meaning that the 
researcher’s reports should, in principle, be acceptable to the actors (cf. Boltanski 2011: 25; 
see also  Gros 2012: 157).  
The second reading of the material adheres to the same principle, but with a completely 
different objective. The focus is no longer harmony, but rather tension and conflict. In 
other words, it looks into the mobilisation of the cities of unemployment in test 
situations within each of the four cases, of which the findings are presented in chapters 
4, 5, 6, and 7. It thus asks the question of how the co-existence of the seven cities of 
unemployment result in test situations and compromises.  In this reading I first of all 
look for justifications and critique of the reforms. Secondly, I look for the ways in which 
specific instruments are evaluated. Thirdly, I look for test situations in which there is 
uncertainty as to how instruments should be qualified. Fourthly, I look for 
compromises, i.e., ways in which elements from several cities are put together. Particular 
attention in this regard is placed on categorisations and comparisons of the unemployed. 
In order to carry all this out, I depend on other types of data. In order to understand the 
historical context of the reform, I rely heavily on secondary literature on the history of 
                                          
i Cf. chapter 1, p. 11. 
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Danish and French labour market policies, and more specifically the history of the 
systems that each reform transforms. The historical context also supports the argument 
of the thesis that the ideas mobilised in the reform processes do not come out of the 
blue; most have played a part in shaping the ongoing changes. The historical co-
existence of a plurality of contradictory ideas is thus visible in the highly composite 
government of unemployment. 
However, this contextualisation proved insufficient to fully understand what was going 
on in the reform debates. Debates are heavily influenced by the public memory, 
including slang-like lingua and implicit references to past affairs. The reading, especially 
of the French cases that I am less familiar with, involved a lot of ‘snowballing’: back-
tracking the meaning of these historically loaded colloquial references that were 
obviously important to the actors’ qualification and evaluation of existing instruments 
and reforms. The importance of understanding the historical and institutional context of 
the reforms is accentuated by the fact that the justification of the reforms is as much 
about criticising ‘what is’ as it is about justifying ‘what should be’. Finally, in order to 
engage more directly with the question of sedimentation, the legal output of the reforms 
was analysed in detail. 
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3  
Cities of unemployment 
A grammar of tests, governing and subjects 
In the following, the grammar of seven “cities of unemployment”, which are mapped 
and composed on the basis of condensing the coded material of the four cases, will be 
presented. The cities are:  
Demand 
Insurance 
Redistribution 
Incentives 
Paternal 
Investment 
Mobility 
The chapter is structured around four key dimensions. Firstly, I outline the overall 
principle and normative foundations of a city. Secondly, I describe how the city qualifies 
the reality of unemployment and how policies are put to the test. Thirdly, the role of 
governing in the city is presented: what does it take to govern best and what kind of 
governing should be avoided, and when is it necessary (and legitimate) for the ‘governor’ 
to exercise his authority by means of coercion? Lastly, I show what it implies to be 
unemployed in each city. In other words, what characterises the unemployed subject and 
what is his path towards a state of emancipation, and on the other hand, what conduct is 
making him less worthy?  
While all the cities provide answers to the abovementioned questions, their radically 
different qualifications imply that they sometimes (prefer to) operate on different levels, 
from macro-economic policy and taxation to workfare schemes and the counselling of 
the unemployed individual. Along this line of reasoning, the cities may appear 
‘incomparable’ and, hence, unfit for a typology like the one that will be presented. 
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However, as will be shown in the following, the cities all induce different moral subjects 
that are mutually exclusive. This means that although it is possible to identify more or 
less stable compromises (such as the Golden Age compromise) with what appears as a 
stable division of labour between various cities, they are exactly compromises with in-built 
tensions. To understand the tensions and compromises, it is initially necessary to bracket 
and categorise the processes of justification and critique into various normative 
yardsticks forged by a city of governing, tests and subjects. 
The primary source of the statements from the four cases is occasionally supplemented 
by secondary literature from canonical texts of ‘grammarians’. This serves mainly two 
purposes. Firstly, it makes clear that the cities do not respect the epistemic boundary 
between technical and layman discourses. Secondly, and somewhat relatedly, it provides 
the basis for the examination in parts II and III of how the abstract transcendental 
principles face dilemmas and tensions in the ‘muddy’ practices of governing the 
unemployed; something which grammarians can (and often do) neglect, but which those 
engaging in the justification and critique of the instruments are forced to deal with 
somehow.  
The rest of the chapter presents a condensed extract of what ‘goes on’ inside the cities 
of unemployment in the selected debates on Danish and French reforms of the 
unemployment system. Short quotations from the data, which appear several times, are 
cited with reference to the case they derive from, whereas longer quotations are 
referenced with the specific article.    
All cities have been present in all cases, but with varieties between reforms and countries 
that will be addressed in parts II and III. I hence treat the cities as transcendental, or at 
least European rather than national. Although the governing of unemployment has been 
and remains primarily a national question where national policy makers are held 
accountable, the occurrence of all cities of unemployment in both countries confirms 
that ideas do not respect national borders to the same extent. Governing unemployment 
has always been a comparative endeavour where policy makers, since the very first 
insurance scheme in Ghent in 1900, have sought inspiration from other countries  
(Edling 2008; Rodgers 1998). The Open Method of Coordination in the EU and the 
OECD has provided such fora in recent times (De la Porte et al. 2001; Triantafillou 
2011; Hansen and Triantafillou 2011; Esmark 2011). 
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Finally, the chapter is concluded and a condensation of the grammar of the cities is 
presented (see Table 2). 
C I T Y  O F  D E M A N D  
The grammarian par excellence, though not the inventor, of the city of Demand is 
evidently John Maynard Keynes. The starting point here, then, is that market 
mechanisms, even in equilibrium, do not lead to full employment (Galbraith 1987: 233). 
In the city of demand, unemployment is firstly a question of where the economy is 
situated in the business cycle between “upturns”1 and downturns. “In a free market 
economy, the economic trends fluctuate (in more or less good times) – and with them so 
does employment”. However, secondly, unemployment is not to be considered 
“inherent in nature”2. It can and should be minimised politically. The state is the primary 
actor since, being subject to the market mechanisms, neither the unemployed nor the 
employers have the capacity to exit economic stagnation by themselves “when the 
market mechanisms do not work”3. If the economy is in a recession, resulting in a lack 
of demand for labour, it is the responsibility of the state to intervene more or less 
directly in the economy in order to balance the supply and demand for labour by either 
raising demand, or reducing the supply. Conversely, if unemployment is low, the 
governmental interventions should either decrease demand or increase the supply of 
labour.  
The common good is centred around the benefits of a society where “full employment is 
re-established”4  and where the “wheels are turning”5. It is a place where “everyone who 
wants to can get a job”6 and do “useful work”7.  Everyone has a “right to work” as it is 
“unworthy to begin life by being brushed aside as a redundant”8. In this way, the city of 
Demand ensures an ever “growing economy”9, which “restores trust”10  and promotes 
“progress”11, “enterprise”12 and “optimism”13 . It is also a society in which people 
consume since consumption is “the main engine of growth”14. 
 
Qualification and Test: Although the city of Demand tends to take actions outside what is 
normally considered part of the unemployment system, it does have the means to qualify 
and evaluate certain parts of the system and the unemployed. First of all, unemployment 
benefits have an “impact”15 on consumption or the “purchasing power” 16 of the 
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population. In Keynesian language, benefits thus serve as counter-cyclical “automatic 
stabilisers”i. They “maintain consumption”17 in times of high unemployment, and are 
“automatically” reduced as unemployment decreases18. Benefits, thus, also mitigate the 
effects of stagnation on the level of unemployment.  
Although governmental intervention is needed at both ends of the business cycle, it 
most often justifies its relevance in “recessions” and “crises” since these are the 
situations in which the common good of the city is really put to the test. In the city of 
demand, it is therefore important to qualify the reality as a situation with little or no jobs 
offered in order to justify intervention. Tests vary in abstraction, from observing the 
“the ever thinner job advertisement supplement”19 in a newspaper and personal 
experiences, such as the “150 rejections I have received during the last two years”, “the 
number of vacant positions must be no more than a few thousand” 20, “where are the 
jobs? (…) There are simply no jobs to get”21, to references to “such a difficult economic 
situation”22; the “recession”23, the “stagnation of the job market”24 and “the absence of 
job offers constitutes the principal obstacle”25. More statistical evidence is also brought 
in: “65,000 young people under 30 have lost their job in the first two years of the 
crisis”26.  
Policies are tested according to whether they “create jobs”27, or “stimulate the demand for 
jobs”28.  
Without job creation all politics is uphill.29 
In other words, the policy test asks whether a given policy benefits jobs creation and 
employment. “Economic results” should not be “assessed on their own”; they are rather 
the “basis for fighting unemployment”30. Likewise, rather than caring about benefit 
expenditures, one should “spend the energy on creating jobs, then the unemployment 
benefit expenditures will decrease automatically”31.    
 
Governing: Governing hence comes with a responsibility for countering the negative 
tendencies of the market. This is first and foremost the responsibility of the state:  
                                          
i Cf. Zimmermann (2006: 33). 
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The state must accept its responsibility for the high unemployment levels. Only the 
economic policy influences whether consumption and, hence, production must be raised 
or lowered.32 
Governing also implies being “pragmatic” beyond the disturbances of “ideology”33. 
Governing should “learn” from history’s previous recessions, such as carrying through 
new “New Deals”34 and being efficient and effective. Countering also means spending 
when few have the means to spend (and vice versa).  
We have to ‘lift the lid’ and invest, even if it is with borrowed money.35 
Likewise, the government should “courageously” hire when businesses do not.36 
Governing in the city of Demand means being cautious with timing and adjusting the 
policies according to the phase of the business cycle.i A particular phase calls for the 
“right medicine”37 at the right dose since too much can cause “overheating of the 
economy”38. Policies therefore tend to be “temporary” and are supposed to act on the 
situation “right now”39. It is, for instance, unwise to reduce benefits in “a period of 
feeble growth”40 or when the economic situation is “unfavourable to long term 
saving”41. On the other hand, one can “profit from the prosperous economic 
situation”42.  Once the business cycle reverses, e.g., “once growth comes”43, the counter-
cyclical actions will be unnecessary. These changes in action can be built into the policies 
so that expansionary actions will “automatically” decrease once exiting the current 
phase. Government should then “pull back, because the hole will be filled up by 
businesses”44.  
There is, however, also a lot of bad governing that is not discretionary, but based on an 
“ideological doctrine”45, “blunted by overspending46, “unreflective”47 and only addresses 
“symptoms”48. In situations of recession, inappropriate actions include “austerity 
policies”49 and “cuts in government spending”50, which do nothing but “strengthen the 
supply of labour, i.e., creating more unemployed people”51. In the same manner taxation 
that decreases the disposable income of the population “has a negative impact on 
consumption, and hence on growth”52.  
Coercion against the unemployed is generally considered inappropriate in downturns:  
It is not fair to punish them for the fact that there are no jobs at the moment.53 
                                          
i It is in this sense that Keynesians speak of a “discretionary policy” (Sandmo 2011: 419). 
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By contrast, “it is the duty of the municipality to find a job for the individual”54.  
Private and public employers must be compelled to solve the unemployment problem.55 
However, governing the unemployed is dependent on the economic situation. In times 
of no demand, the “number of whiplashes”56 and “sticks” and “carrots”57 are 
inconsequential. In downturns there might be a “negligible group of unemployed who 
do not want to work. And as long as there aren’t jobs for everyone, these people should 
be left alone”58. However, “if there is labour scarcity, one can always tighten the rules so 
that the jobless are once again on standby.”59  
 
Subjects: Who inhabits the city of demand?  As in Keynes’ theory of effective demand 
(Keynes 2006), the population is both a variable in the production and in the 
consumption function. This creates a kind of janus-faced subject: on the one hand a 
consumer, on the other a worker. In terms of the unemployed individual, he is a 
potential worker since “there is no need for people at the moment”60. He is unemployed 
“as a result of the crisis”61 and “actually wants to work”62 and would “almost take any 
kind of job”63, which, however, is “practically impossible, even if one offers oneself at a 
bargain price”64. He should “be put to work” but only by creating demand65, which 
makes employers less “picky”66. The unemployed person is thus a worker that is 
involuntarily put on standby and remains “prepared”67 for better times. Concurrently 
with being a potential worker, the unemployed is valued as “purchasing power (…) with 
no propensity to save”68. 
When it comes to the employed individual, he is in a desirable state both in terms of 
contributing to growth and is, usually, “ameliorating his purchasing power”69 compared 
to the unemployed. Most problematic in terms of unemployment is when the prospect 
of unemployment leads the employed into “fear-motivated saving of money that could 
have been used for consumption”70. In this sense, and in general, it is important to 
strengthen the interest of the employed “in getting the unemployed employed”71.   
C I T Y  O F  I N S U R A N C E  
The inhabitants of the city of Insurance are bearers of social risks that, in a Durkheimian 
sense, make them dependent on one another. Unemployment involves the risk of losing 
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the economic means of self-support. When these risks occur, they are treated as 
accidents:  
No one can say that wage earners are responsible for their dismissal. (…) A dismissal on 
economic grounds is a serious occupational injury.1 
Since risks in this city are considered inherently social, the question is not who is 
responsible, but how the (insured) unemployed should be compensated.i Insurance is, 
therefore, not about charity, but about sharing burdens collectivelyii (Ewald 1991: 205f). 
Unemployment benefits are a substitute for missing earned income, not alms or poor 
relief.2 
The “social safety net”3 provides individual security or “protection”4, which is the basic 
common good in the city of Insurance. The least worthy are situations of 
“precariousness”5 in which the economic situation is characterised by “insecurity and 
stress”6. The principle of insurance is hence about “ameliorating unemployment benefits 
and noticeably increasing the number of indemnified unemployed persons”.7 
The collective sharing of risks, however, does not exempt the individual from any 
responsibility, since he has to recognise a priori his belonging to a community of shared 
risks, and hence his own partaking in collective responsibility. He, in other words, has to 
show solidarity with those who are hit by the accident of unemployment. This implies 
that the principle of compensation is underpinned and preconditioned by a principle of 
solidarity that is qualified by a set of membership rules. “Indemnification” is thus “an 
outstanding debt (dû), that is, the counter demand of the paid membership fees”.8  This 
sets the criteria for what it takes to be a member with a right to compensation and for 
moral conduct, implying that the right should only be exercised if the situation is that of 
an accident, that is, if the event of becoming unemployed is “involuntary”9. In the city of 
Insurance, the possibility of abuse always lurks, which again leads to issues of control 
and sanctions to ensure that only those who are technically entitled to benefit from the 
insurance are granted the compensation. However, employers can also infringe on the 
                                          
i On the social character of risks in insurance, see Ewald (1990: 136). The origins of the insurance principle is closely tied to 
the problems of handling work accidents in the late 19th century (Defert 1991; Ewald 1986), providing the techniques that 
were later used to establish the first unemployment insurance schemes (see e.g. Zimmermann 2001)  
ii Cf. Ewald (1991: 205f).  
44 
principle of Insurance by “speculating” on the compensation by temporarily laying off 
people.10   
 
Qualification and test: The city of insurance does not engage with the causes of 
unemployment. Rather, unemployment is an inevitable consequence of the collective 
striving for goods,i such as “technological advances”11. What matters is how these risks 
are managed and whether risks are “securitised rather than casualised (precarisé )”12. This 
takes vigilance since “precariousness has a tendency to aggravate”.13 The qualification of 
unemployment is a combination of moral critique and technical solutions. Regarding the 
former it is, for instance, “scorn against (…) [the] unemployed to claim that 
unemployment is a problem they created themselves.”14 
Workers are casualised by part time constraints or temping jobs: our social security 
system no longer protects against the risks of poverty. This risk (…) generates the social 
insecurity reflected in the current pessimism among Frenchmen.15  
Regarding the latter, the city of Insurance is dependent on actuarial sciences to calculate 
risks and fees and grant rights of membership and compensation.ii This is only possible 
because the distribution of accidents follow certain mathematical laws which can be 
calculated by means of statistics;iii for instance, how to distinguish between different risk 
groups accruing to industries?16 Or what are the consequences when the earning rights 
are modified?  
The extension of unemployment rights to workers having worked at least 4 months 
during the last 14 months (as against 4 months during the last 8 months) is considered to 
be ‘pretty poor’. The proportion of compensated unemployed people, only 42 pct. today, 
advances only 0.2 pct.17  
When policies are tested in the city of Insurance, the question is to what extent there is 
(economic) compensation for the social risk of unemployment. Contrary to the city of 
Redistribution, the aim is not equality in the population, but that the transition from 
employment to unemployment is insignificant with regards to the “conditions of life”18, 
leading to an equality between the unemployed and employed with similar social risks 
                                          
i Cf. Lehtonen and Liukko (2011: 35) 
ii See Ewald (1986); Lehtonen and Liukko (2011). 
iii See e.g. Defert (1991). 
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and hereby “preventing comedown” for the individual.19 The Insurance test thus 
pertains to both the levels of compensation and levels of coverage. Although the prime 
instrument is evidently unemployment insurance schemes, the test potentially applies to 
all kinds of accidents and illnesses related to the labour market, such as compensation 
for reduced working capacity due to disabilities:  
Their compensation will be reduced by several thousand kroner (DKK).20  
Further, the test also applies to the general conditions of the labour market, for instance 
in terms of employment conditions, asking whether the unemployment instruments 
promote “precarious” or more “durable” employment relations.21 
 
Governing: Governing is a matter for all those who contribute to social risks. While the 
city of Redistribution points to certain classes or privileged and exploiting groups, there 
is a shared responsibility in the city of Insurance. On the one hand, the co-responsibility 
of social risks naturalises the causes as mere accidents. Since the risks are collectively 
constructed, no one is essentially to blame. Hence the “alarming criminalisation of 
unemployment”22 as well as the “suspicious attitude of unemployment as self-inflicted”23 
is denounced.  
It is out of the question to blame the unemployed.24 
On the other hand, the co-responsibility also leads to constant uncertainty with regards 
to the distribution of responsibility in terms of contributions from employees as well as 
employers. The co-responsibility also induces a common interest in reducing the risks, 
for instance, instances of fraud or the levels of unemployment. Whereas the latter 
provides scope for compromises with other cities (e.g. Demand), the former issue of 
fraud and “speculation”25 provides scope for coercive measures of control, such as 
“regular control of abuses”.26  
 
Subjects: The subjects in the city of Insurance are beings who feel either secure or 
“insecure” and “uncertain”; always with a preference for the former. 27 The feeling is 
dependent on whether and to what extent the chances for the risk of unemployment are 
compensated. The unemployed are therefore in principle “unlucky”28. While the 
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unemployed are “victims”29, the solidarity in the city can only be upheld by a certain 
spirit of solidarity, or temperance, ensuring that rights are only claimed when needed. 
Subjects must therefore know and act according to the intentions behind the rights. If 
people are not to abuse the rights, which may appear as “cheating” or “fraud”30, then 
they must “understand the nooks and corners of the unemployment benefit system”.31 
However, there are also those who know this, but “cheat” anyway: it is, for instance, a 
“moral” problem when “people make demands that they are well aware the social 
assistance act is not designed for”.32  
Who, for example, does not know of a woman who lives together with the declared father 
of her son, who nevertheless does not carry his name in order for the mother to receive 
single mother benefits?33  
Returning to the issue of coercion, this sets up a delicate tension and threshold between 
two subjects of the city. On the one hand, the solidary (insured) unemployed subject 
holds a right to compensation and hence to be left alone. Adding further duties (apart 
from paying fees) equals “rendering the unemployed responsible for his situation”:  
It is implicit. Threatening the unemployed with sanctions if they don’t accept the offered 
job clearly makes them solely responsible for the situation they find themselves in.34 
On the other hand, there is the un-solidary “speculative” subject who takes advantage of 
the rights without being exposed to an accident, or chooses not to subscribe and 
contribute to the compensation of those exposed.   
C I T Y  O F  R E D I S T R I B U T I O N  
The dystopia of the city of Redistribution is a society of various groups with conflicting 
economic interests. The hegemony of certain groups and the domination and 
exploitation of others leads to material inequality. Material equality is thus a common 
good that is both the desired end and the primary means to counter domination and 
exploitation. Contrary to other cities for which some degree of redistribution may be 
recognised, it is not subordinated to other principles, such as the ability to play the game 
of the labour market (Incentives), the compensation of risks (Insurance) or equal 
opportunities (Investment). Inequality is, in other words, the independent variable that 
ensures a well-functioning and just society (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).  
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If you do not want to share, the consequences are increasing inequality, anger, frustration 
and despair, and in the end insecurity. These are mechanisms we know from other 
societies that went down this path and the result is always the same: The weakest are 
affected adversely.35 
The material inequality is directly tied to various reinforcing dynamics related to 
capitalist societies, such as the concentration of profit and property (Piketty 2013) or 
commodification (Polanyi 1944; Esping-Andersen 1990). Intervention is, therefore, 
needed to limit employers and other elite groups in “imposing the dictum of the 
demands of the market”.36  
Redistribution is the prime means to counter-balance these dynamics so “capital is 
genuinely harnessed”37 to ensure that all groups benefit from the wealth produced. In 
relation to unemployment, redistribution is not only a matter of balancing the relative 
strength between capital and labour through taxes and wages; it is also a matter of 
distributing work and redistributing wealth through unemployment benefits. Whereas 
solidarity in the city of Insurance implies the sharing of risks, here it is about “sharing 
out” the production of wealth as well as the “sharing of time in life”.38 Unlike the city of 
Insurance, this involves a more direct confrontation with the “economic logic”39. 
Unemployment is hence not an evil in itself. The possibility of more leisure time can be 
a good that comes with being unemployed. Hence it benefits both the working 
population and the unemployed to “distribute work and leisure time better”.40 People do 
“commit suicide due to unemployment – however not because they had psychological 
problems or had problems with killing time, etc. but solely because of economic reasons 
owing to too low benefits”.41 In the city of Redistribution, “there is not necessarily work 
for everyone”, which is why it ought to be possible not to work, for example through 
absence of leave-of-absence schemes.42   
 
Qualification and test: Evidence of the need for redistribution surrounds the identification 
of (increasing) impoverishment and “pauperisation”43, such as the “number of young 
homeless people”44. When policies are qualified and tested in the city of Redistribution, 
it is a matter of whether they lead to a concentration, or rather, privatisation of property, 
or a socialisation. Redistribution is a way of socialising property to the benefit of the 
non-owners (Castel 1995). This results in an inherently critical attitude towards “unsocial 
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cutbacks”45 and “gigantic cost-saving programmes providing tax reliefs for the employed 
and with an extra profit for those with the highest incomes and largest houses.”46 
Embedded in the issue of socialisation is not just the distributional effect of policies, but 
also the way they are financed and what role they play in budgetary struggles:  
Financing the RSA by collecting income taxes from low-incomes seems to me to be a 
serious political mistake. It has to be seen in conjunction with an increasingly polarised 
redistributive system [in which] some contribute massively, whereas others benefit 
massively.47 
Unemployment benefit claimants, recipients of cash benefits and early retirees have their 
conditions of life deteriorated in order to make room for reliefs in top taxes.48 
Qualifying policies are hence a question of who gains and loses in a zero-sum game. The 
reduction of fees for employers “is 40 pct. higher than the anticipated reduction for 
workers”.49  
They dare handing over resources intended for social protection to the hungry financial 
institutions.50 
The zero-sum game also qualifies the issue of the distribution of work. Getting a job for 
the insured unemployed will result in “the cuckoo in the nest effect pushing the 
marginalised on cash benefits even further back in the queue of unemployment”.51 
Likewise, “inciting the unemployed to accept a job will only rob Peter to pay Paul.”52  
Whereas the city of Insurance sees the negative consequences of a capitalist society as a 
shared responsibility, the city of Redistribution blames agents with egoistic interests for 
abusing and exploiting their privileged position, such as employers “forcing down wages 
outcompeting those that play by the rules”.53 This can also result in disloyal behaviour 
among workers.  
If we firstly take a pay cut, it will spread to the rest of society leading to a society with far 
greater inequality.54 
The same goes for the unemployed person if his labour (by means of subsidies) starts 
competing with the regular labour force.55 Not only is he then exploited, he becomes a 
“scab”.56  
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Governing: The influence of private interests often manifests itself in “secret reunions”57. 
There is a certain civic demand of representation that suspects the governors of 
considering particular interests rather than the general interest.  
A political elite, on paper representing millions of people, has lost the ability to receive 
reports from below. The elite has become rootless.58 
In the same civic spirit, the city grants more legitimacy to those representing the many as 
opposed to those representing the few. However, representing the many can also be 
denounced by the unmasking of unions engaging in the “betrayal of unemployed 
persons”.59 The clash of interests between the many and the few sometimes leads to a 
confrontational struggle in which, contrary to the city of Investment, for instance, 
employers can never be found in “the same boat as the workers”.60  
We are not social partners. We are social adversaries.61  
In order to politically change things, employers should “fear that workers lift their 
heads”.62 
There is a tension in the city of Redistribution between, on the one hand, the 
abovementioned mistrust towards governing authorities for serving the interests of the 
few, and, on the other hand, that the government of the state “should pursue a 
redistributive policy”.63 Unlike Insurance, where measures are based on shared social 
risks that favour the members, it is only the state that can “warn against a two speed 
system”.64 The state is “the guarantor of social cohesion and the common good.”65  
However, to ensure support for redistributive policies, it is inappropriate to simply 
distribute from rich to poor and disregard the layer in between.  
The more benefits one removes, the larger the risk that substantial parts of the population 
loses ownership (…). One risks short-circuiting the acceptance of the middleclass to 
contribute to the community, if it does not experience getting a little back.66  
The question of whether the benefits and services provided should be “targeted” or 
“universal” is thus key in this city, leading to a preference for the latter (cf. Korpi and 
Palme 1998). Ultimately, the city of Redistribution, in a classic social democratic way, 
imagines a city in which class struggles and private interests are suspended. In line with 
the universal spirit, the city of Redistribution denounces the “division of unemployed 
persons in groups”67 while advocating a “unified system”68. The use of coercion against 
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the unemployed is problematic because it tends to make people accept the exploiting 
structures that produce inequality:  
Within the new logic of rights and duties there will be more pressure on the candidates to 
accept pauperising jobs.69 
Sanctions, however, can be introduced against those who benefit from those structures, 
such as “employers that will profit from the [scheme] in order to multiply the number of 
unworthy (indignes) jobs”.70 Further, the important function of taxation as the 
prerequisite of redistribution legitimises the need for control, for instance of people 
(including the unemployed), who “earn their money from moonlighting”:71 
If you introduce a tax, you also introduce control, otherwise it does not make sense. If 
there is a speed limit on the motorway, someone has to see if it is respected.72   
 
Subjects: The universal preference fits with the overall aim of less material inequality in so 
far as the unemployed are neither considered subjects of alms (Paternal) nor victims hit 
by chance (Insurance). They are rather citizens that, due to power struggles, have 
become exploited, oppressed or “indignant”.73 Echoing T.H. Marshall, it is a citizenship 
which is not simply liberal, but social (cf. Marshall 1964). Inequality is “unworthy against 
our fellow citizens, making their existence more economically miserable and humiliating 
for them”.74 Redistribution thus plays the role of restoring “dignity”75. By being “equal 
fellow citizens”76, the city of Redistribution grants the unemployed a legitimate political 
voice.  
Many organisations and experts were asked about their opinion. But did they listen to the 
ones that each day feel their self-esteem go down while watching longingly all those 
taking the train or the car to the ‘heavenly’ job?77 
The voice is, however, restricted by the overall goals of material equality and the fight 
against private and market interests, spurring a tension within the city of what is a proper 
political voice. Nevertheless, the issue of dignity opens up scope for criticising “control 
of the way of life of claimants”78, as well as for instruments that “disenchant”79 the 
unemployed.  
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C I T Y  O F  I N C E N T I V E S  
The principle of the city of Incentives is perhaps the most straightforward and directly 
applicable of all the cities: it “believes in economic incentives”1 and aims to “render the 
return to employment more incentivising”2 and “attractive”3. Hence, it seeks to ensure 
that every unemployed person has an incentive to work so there is no longer the “absurd 
moment in which one regrets working because it implies losing revenues”4. With its 
roots in neoclassical thinking (e.g., Pigou, 1933), labour supply always tends to generate 
its own demand in this city.  A lack of incentives decreases the disposable supply of 
labour, which again increases wage levels, thus decreasing productivity and the 
competitiveness of firms. Being unemployed must be “costly, in order to settle for a 
dynamic of employment”.5  
Not only do incentives reduce unemployment, they also “reduce public expenses for 
public assistance”6 by moving people from “passive assistance to actively contributing to 
the national economy”7. More incentives do increase inequality, “but we all become 
richer when people enter the labour market”.8  
It is only by allowing the rich to become richer that one gives the poor the desire to 
become rich one day too.9 
As much as they are targeting the unemployed, the incentives also send signals to the 
employed that guarantee the incentives to remain in the job. In a system with a lack of 
incentives, “one is punished” if taking a job will “undermine trust to the system, and 
create undue suspicion towards the recipients”10. If incentives are back in place, “there 
will be nothing to worry about, since you know you will gain more money when 
working.”11 
 
Qualification and test: The lack of incentives is qualified in a number of ways. For instance, 
every third single parent earns “500 DKK or less by going to work” and “every fifth will 
lose money” 12; or, it is a “sign of failure” that immigrant workers are taking the “least 
attractive jobs, despite having thousands on benefits”13. But a single person can also be 
exemplary:  
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The special thing about him was that he openly admitted that he said no to all jobs with a 
salary of less than 130 DKK an hour [because] the pay was lower than the daily 
allowance.14  
The city of Incentives does not approach unemployment benefit as such in absolute 
terms; what matters is the relationship between benefits and the productive city 
(Oliviennes 1994). It addresses “problems of interaction” between benefits and the 
labour market”15, asking whether “it is more profitable to work than staying on 
benefits”.16  
One of the earliest guides to test policies in accordance with the city of Incentives was 
written by the French economist Lionel Stoleru’s in Vaincre la pauvreté (1974). In 
responding to the question “how to avoid idleness”, the solution is to “make work 
profitable” (Ibid: 143), and the book contains a detailed cross-country analysis of various 
ways in which policy makers can establish continuous incentives to work by means of a 
so-called “negative tax”.i  
Although the benefits are always regarded with suspicion, they are not to be eradicated 
completely. Poverty is generally considered inappropriate since it hinders people from 
even responding to incentives.  
Reducing cash benefits only has a motivational effect on those with nothing but 
joblessness as their problem. For the rest it only has poverty-creating effect that 
demotivates participating actively. Hence, a sanctioning policy should take into account 
that economic sanctions must never have the consequence that people are put on the 
street and hereby further societal exclusion.17 
In hindering them from playing the economic game of the labour marketii, the city of 
incentives thus identifies “poverty traps”18, “inactivity traps”19,  “financial brakes”20 or 
“perverted effects”21  that “disable the poor by confining them in ‘traps’”22 .  
 
Governing: It is hence the responsibility of the governor to strike the right balance 
between the monetary thresholds of ‘poor vs. able to get along’ and ‘unemployed vs. 
employed’, with the latter always getting first priority because the benefit itself so easily 
                                          
i The negative income tax plays a key role in the case of RSA in France. See chapter 7. 
ii On the game metaphor in relation to the negative tax, see (Foucault 2008: 201). 
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becomes part of the problem. The governor hence acts upon the “motivation effect”23  
of each individual. This makes the governing in the city of Incentives much more 
complicated and active than a matter of (neoliberal) deregulation. 
The city of Incentives is suspicious when evaluating the governing of the unemployed 
since it always has a potential effect of being too “generous”24 and hereby “excluding 
people from employment”25. The city of Incentives thus denounces all “measures that 
reduce the supply of labour”.26 “Unemployment-inducing system errors” (levels of 
benefits or high taxes on wages) are “our time’s cynical crime”27. Not only can they 
become a “pretext for doing nothing”28, they also risk putting the country on “the city 
map of attractive countries for immigrants who do not want to contribute to society”29. 
Another barrier can be the complexity and opacity of the system caused by “interrelated 
rights”30. If “the accumulation of benefits remains complex it does not incite people to 
resume work.”31 
The use of coercion in the city of Incentives is limited since whether the individual 
wants to behave rationally and respond to incentives is “optional” and based on 
“voluntary adherence”32 and “voluntariness”33. It is in this sense, and only in this sense, 
that the city of Incentives is liberal, since it formally leaves the choice of working or not 
open to the unemployed.i It does not formally “oblige” the unemployed to work (Stoleru 
1974: 140f).  
However, while direct coercion is excluded from the city, governing through incentives 
nonetheless works upon the threshold of pleasure and pain, and whether instruments are 
considered “carrots”, “bonuses”34 or “monetary stimuli”35, or “sticks”, “whiplashes”, 
“sanctions”, “nudges”36 or “squeezing the wallet”37, this really only depends on what 
side of the threshold it addresses. Regardless of whether the unemployed chose to act 
accordingly to the incentivising environment, it is not supposed to be pleasurable for 
those who “do not play the game”.38  
 
                                          
i See also Foucault (2008: 207): The negative tax “leaves possibility of not forcing [the unemployed] to work if they have no 
interest in doing so”. 
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Subjects: The subjects in the city of Incentives are all homines oeconomici who are responsive 
to and act on economic stimuli. They seek out where the monetary reward is highest 
with as little effort as possible. This is, in the end, what will “motivate”39 them to take a 
job or do nothing. The reasons for being unemployed thus lie outside the individual.  
One cannot blame the persons involved for thinking economically rationally.40 
If it implies being unemployed, “why should one work?”41. The unemployed person 
simply says “if I resume work, I lose”42, which means that people would be “idiots if 
they go from an economically safe life (based on support and benefits) to a more 
doubtful situation on the labour market”43. The unemployed must “never be tempted to 
depart from the right track”44. Hence it is important that the unemployed know about 
and “appropriate” the incentivising schemes.45  
The “motivation effect” is not only targeted at the unemployed subject; if there are no 
incentives to work, the employed “feels foolish”46:  
I get up every day and make an effort every day: one could almost wish to become a 
social security claimant.47 
Why slave when there is nothing to strive for? We might as well wallow in misery.48 
Incentivising is the guarantee for those who “get up early to work” as well as a message 
to those who don’t: “one does not work for nothing”49. Incentives to work thus 
“moralise” the labour market,50 which, on this subject, make them a compliment to the 
city of Mobility’s appreciation of activity. As with the negative tax scheme, it means that 
the city of Incentives does not make a clear threshold between the unemployed and 
employed. There is more of a continuum throughout in which the incentive to work 
(more) should be encouraged economically. 
T H E  P A T E R N A L  C I T Y  
The paternal city aims towards “larger personal responsibility for the welfare of each 
individual”1: 
Everybody must be able to support oneself.2 
The capacity to support oneself must be promoted because it strengthens people’s 
satisfaction with their lives – and that is more important than the economic bottom line.3  
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The alternative is “the risk of creating a large assisted population.”4 Moving people away 
from a state of assistance (assistanat) equals moving people from “survival to life”5.  
We must transfer the responsibility of people’s lives back to those who can carry that 
responsibility. We must dare to demand that everybody contributes and takes 
responsibility for themselves and the community.6 
“It is no good lugging a big and growing group of people incapable of taking care of 
themselves, let alone others”.7 
Taking responsibility is hence a precondition of becoming worthy and competent in the 
behavioural sense of the term.  
 
Qualification and Test: Being (ir)responsible is closely linked to the inner characteristics and 
self-perception of the individual, but there is, however, heavy influence from external 
factors. Following this logic, unemployment is an outcome of a lack of responsible 
behaviour by the unemployed, which again can be influenced by political intervention. It 
is thus a question of whether policies “responsibilise”8 or ‘de-responsibilise’ the 
behaviour of the unemployed and the labour force in general that policies are tested: 
What the blazes can be done to give more people a real opportunity to regain their 
authority (myndighed)?9 
This is a test that is applicable to the overall “system” governing unemployment:  
We must get rid of the social system’s stifling effect that works counter to self-worth, 
participation and initiative, which are exactly the qualities that make a human being 
capable of fending for himself.10 
But it can also qualify policies beyond the system, such as the reduced liability to 
compulsory military service:  
Society has hereby deprived half of the lost generation, the eligible young men, from the 
possibility of (…) learning order, precision and cooperation. Virtues that are valued on 
any labour market.11 
Although the Paternal city shares the problematic of inner behavioural characteristics 
with social Darwinist ideas (e.g., Spencer), it differs in recognising that the characteristics 
can be changeable and politically produced, for instance, by the “practitioner’s 
language”.12 Since the city is behavioural, it has a direct interest in how the perception of 
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unemployment is qualified culturally and by the governing authorities. The attitude and 
culture surrounding the phenomenon, which is often related to the socialisation of risks 
in the city of Insurance, is part of the problem.  If there is a social risk in the Paternal 
city, it is the “social risk (…) of dependence”.13  
It was the attitude of ‘We feel so sorry for ourselves’. We were victims and hence had a 
right to help. No one said that it could one’s own fault that you had troubles. But the 
truth is that these people abdicate the responsibility for their own life.14 
The societal acceptance of such attitudes hence bears the risk of spreading a “culture of 
dependency”15 or a “provision culture” (forsørgelseskultur)16. In the Paternal city, one is 
“appalled by a new generation of young people that experiences no connection between 
work and honey (yde og nyde) [and by] the way the breadwinner has become such a vague 
concept”.17 
 
Governing: Governing unemployment in the Paternal city, that is, being the pater, always 
involves the danger of misguided kindness and “playing good Samaritans”18. This 
resembles the city of Incentives, but in the Paternal city it is not a matter of leading the 
economic man in inappropriate directions, but simply a matter of inhibiting the 
unemployed from becoming competent in the same way a child becomes an adult. 
Contrary to a ‘maternal’ education, the pater educates by providing “structure”19 and 
“making demands”20 in order for the unemployed to “learn or learn again the rules of 
the world of work”21. The Paternal city is hence characterised by scepticism towards this 
particular ‘maternal’ state intervention, which serves as a key explanation of 
unemployment: 
The current system, in which the state pays the bill and initiates some polite services, is in 
reality a weakening of responsibility. It deprives the labour market parties their natural co-
responsibility. And it deprives the individual from creating his own existence.22 
It denounces the “all-powerful nannies of the unemployed – employment arrangements, 
activation services, wage subsidies.”23 The same goes for simply allocating money to the 
unemployed: 
We do these people a disservice (bjørnetjeneste), because you do not get a happier life by 
being on cash benefits. You do not get more freedom, you do not get more responsibility, 
you do not get the basis for uprooting your own life in order to move on.24 
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The employment system is therefore “not supposed to be a comfortable place to be.  It 
is a misunderstanding that employment initiatives should involve lemon pies (citronmåne) 
and wickerwork.”25 An effect of this misunderstood care is that people who would 
otherwise be able to provide for themselves remain provided for.  
I would gladly carry for someone who cannot. However, when I look around, I feel too 
often that I carry, in fact drag, for a lot of people who, from this point, can do just fine by 
themselves.26 
Benefits should therefore be restricted to “he who cannot provide for himself and who’s 
provision does not lie with anyone else”.27 Rather than redistribution or compensation, 
benefits are seen as charity depending on the threshold can/cannot provide, ensuring 
those who cannot a “worthy and adequate provision”.28  
However, the governing in the Paternal city has no laissez faire intentions for the 
unemployed. This, firstly, is because it is never really worthy to be on the ‘cannot’ side of 
the threshold, and secondly because people will not automatically or voluntarily pass the 
threshold. Incentives, for instance, “have not shown much power to alter the behaviour 
of the unemployed” (Mead 1997: 24): 
You can neither wave financial carrots nor kick them into work or education by reducing 
or completely removing their benefits since a lot of people in this group have not the least 
idea of how to administer money.29 
Hence, it proposes a variety of instruments that are enacted to (re)install the responsible 
behaviour of the unemployed to make the unemployed leave the system “with a 
straightened backbone”30. Governing, in other words, aims to correct the lack of 
upbringing and virtue of the unemployed. On the one hand, this process necessitates the 
participation of the unemployed: 
We know it from bringing up our own children. It is not right to not include our children 
in the cleaning and cooking in our homes.31 
Most people become proud when their children bring in a Christmas tree they have cut 
down themselves.32 
On the other hand, the use of coercion is completely integral to bringing up the 
unemployed. The use of coercion and discipline is firstly a means of making the 
unemployed pass the threshold of incompetent/competent. The instruments of the 
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Paternal city thus have “an upbringing effect, which makes it clear the municipality is not 
a gift shop.”33  
 
Subjects: The justification for the use of coercion relies on the subjectivity of the 
unemployed. The lack of competence of the unemployed implies that the hierarchy 
between the unemployed and the authorities is not simply a matter of who is 
responsible, but a matter of who knows what is best for the unemployed. The 
unemployed, in the words of one of the contemporary grammarians of the Paternal city, 
Lawrence M. Mead, have a “gap” between behaviour and intention and are thus in need 
of direction and supervision (Mead 1997: 6). “We think it’s what you need, and you 
probably will too”.34 The unemployed person is therefore someone who is to be 
“persuaded”35. 
I think that coercion can be good and necessary. Some people need a kick, to be forced to 
try new things, to test their possibilities in new contexts. We know that pacification can 
be invalidating and if a person has arrived at the conviction about herself that she is not 
good at anything, we cannot simply accept that and say: Well!  That’s up to you! And we 
cannot simply leave behind all those people who cannot find meaning and quality in their 
lives of public assistance and TV shows. Being one of these experts I actually think that I 
sometimes know best and must try to stop an unhappy comedown which the person 
considered cannot see right now.36 
In the Paternal city, coercion is part of the process of persuasion: 
One has to realise that changes only come if you make an effort yourself. How can such a 
change of attitude be implemented? How should the citizens (that is those who are 
leaning too much on the state) learn this? The answer is: the requirement of quid pro quo 
in order to receive public aid. (…) The individual must get an offer he can’t refuse (if he 
wants to survive). With such a Sicilian offer, well-known from the mafia, the beneficiary 
will, at the same time, experience the dignity that comes from making demands on 
someone.37  
It is the same behavioural gap or false self-consciousness of the unemployed that 
behavioural economics have applied to evaluate labour market policies (e.g. Babcock et 
al. 2012; Holmlund 2015). Behavioural economics sees policies of incentives as relying 
on the capacities of economic man and thus inadequate since the lack of self-control of 
the unemployed leads to “inconsistent preferences”, which makes them “procrastinate 
(…) against their own, long-run self-interest” (Babcock et al. 2012: 4). The result is 
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“potential conflicts between an unemployed individual’s current and future selves”, 
which again “generate a situation where stronger work and job search requirements that 
appear overly paternalistic in the usual model of homo economics may actually benefit the 
program participants themselves by helping them overcome self-control problems” 
(Ibid.).  
Hence the use of coercion is a means to emancipate the unemployed from their 
behavioural deficiencies, which, evidently, are especially predominant among young 
people:  
The youth unemployment is one of our greatest societal problems and now we have 
come to a point where we have to put the whip into service. There are some young 
people who need a caring push in order to get away from the computer screen, and, after 
all, we would like to avoid that they end up as long-term unemployed, as we saw in the 
80s.38  
Now, secondly, besides being a means, coercion (and the discipline it implies) is also a 
kind of common societal good in the Paternal city in the sense that a stable society 
necessitates respect for the authorities and discipline since “requiring something from 
people is the implication of respecting them. The day we don’t make requirements, we 
don’t respect people.”39 This relational good is currently lacking:  
The young ones are not at all geared for school, they have no discipline, no respect and a 
wrong perspective on the teacher; for them, the teacher is the enemy.40 
Governing in the Paternal city hereby becomes a signal to the rest of the population that 
exemplifies the authority and worthiness of the responsible employed, and a sign of 
respect of this hierarchy by “sending a signal that requirements are imposed.”41  
The citizens see that the young do something for their cash benefit. At the same time, the 
young see that it is worth doing something for the municipality. There is mutual respect 
in this.42 
Governing is also about teaching the unemployed a set of disciplined skills that are 
recognised on the labour market (and in society), such as “learning to get up on time”.43 
Being responsible, autonomous and independent is thus not a free state in which the 
individual does as he pleases. This latter type of behaviour, often associated with ’68, is 
criticised and almost ridiculed, for instance as representing the guy who “deep down was 
the happy, carefree and bright bohemian, who just wanted his benefit without doing 
more than strictly required.44 Likewise “there is plenty of independence in Maren and the 
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other young ones; by contrast, they all miss the consciousness of the necessity of 
working in order to survive.”45 The worthiness of being disciplined and respectful is also 
what provides the right to become a citizen: 
There are no longer any bounds, one touches here the limit of ‘forbidden to forbid’ 
(interdit d’interdire) which my generation had showcased. Today, when the unemployed 
topple into the minimum income support system, they are provided with the means to 
survive, not to be a citizen. Since Tocqueville it is well known that assistance leads to 
enslavement. Society must provide the means, possibly by coercion, to put them back in 
the domain of citizenship.46 
Citizenship is, then, not an a priori right as in the city of Redistribution, but something 
that is acquired by showing competence and respecting what is forbidden. In a 
democratic setting, this installs a peculiar dynamic where the citizens, i.e., those behaving 
responsible and supporting themselves, can on the one hand criticise (and govern) those 
who do not, while on the other hand be inclined to respect the way things are. The 
paternal subjects “don’t ask for help”47, they rather say, “It’s okay because it’s my own 
fault so I have to learn it the hard way”48. 
While the virtues of the Paternal city may appear archaic, the basic premise of a 
behavioural gap and a subject with no self-control can also be found in contemporary 
techniques of social work that aim at ‘empowering’ or encouraging the ‘self-mastery’ of 
the unemployed.i For example, it is important that the unemployed are “met by positive 
demands and expectations, which can strengthen their self-esteem and ambitions.”49 
Further, the self-perception of the unemployed in these techniques is crucial:  
I was walking around feeling terribly sorry for myself. (…) Once I defeated my fear of 
flying and made the parachute descent with the others, I said to myself that if I could do 
this, I could do anything. I want a job as quickly as possible and now I also believe I can 
get one.50 
The Paternal city hence provides room for the identification of a variety of behavioural 
“gaps” that load the unemployed with incompetence. 
                                          
i For analyses of such techniques in social policies, see Cruikshank (1993); Villadsen (2007). 
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C I T Y  O F  I N V E S T M E N T  
As in the city of Incentives, unemployment in the city of Investment is structural. 
However, it is not (primarily) an issue of a lack of incentives to work, but is rather 
caused by historical changes in the economy, which is becoming knowledge-based and 
changing the conditions of the labour market and society in general.i In the city of 
Investment, “skills” are predominantly the precondition for accessing the labour market, 
i.e., to become “employable”.51  
This raises a problem of justice permeating this city. The necessity of education and 
skills tends to “exclude” a number of people and groups in society from participating in 
the “community” of the labour market.52 The aim then is to ensure that everyone has the 
possibility to acquire the skills needed and in this way create a “society in which together 
we strive for equal opportunities for all.”53 It is a “collective responsibility” that “the 
nation must invest in order to enable all those who live from benefits or odd jobs to 
finally get their heads above water, to make up new projects, to rediscover their 
dignity.”54 In the city of Investment, “human beings are able to do more than we get to 
see immediately”55 and investing is really about showing “that there is a need” for the 
unemployed; “a believe that [he] can do more than we get to see just now”56. Rather 
than a logic of “assistance”57 composed of a “safety net”, governing should be based on 
“emancipation”58 in the shape of a “trampoline”59 or a “stepping stone”60, “enhancing 
people’s life chances”61.  
The guiding principles are not far from Rawls’ maxim that “those who are at the same 
level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the 
same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system” (Rawls 
1999: 63). These ideas tend to align with Giddens’ “social investment strategies” 
(Giddens 1998) that have paved the way for a vast literature that addresses how and 
when to invest in “human capital” in order to enhance opportunities and capabilities of 
the population (e.g. Esping-Andersen 2002; Esping-Andersen 2007; Abrahamson 2010; 
Jenson 2010; Taylor-Gooby 2008; Morel et al. 2012; Bonoli 2013). Key to this literature 
is also the diagnosis of a post-industrial society in which knowledge plays a pivotal role 
in a globalised economy (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1999). In the city of Investment, this 
                                          
i Cf. Andersson (2009) 
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results in a labour market in which “almost no jobs are created for people without 
education”62 and with “intensified requirements to the qualifications of the labour 
force.”63 Even the “big bosses recognise that if oil and raw materials rarefy, their 
principal concern will be to find and fasten human resources.”64 Hence, the biggest 
problem of “tomorrow’s society” is a “lack of education”.65 This demand for improving 
skills is “lifelong”, so working life must “oscillate” between periods of work and 
education.66  
Enhancing the opportunities and employability of the marginalised results in a win-win 
situation for society: socially, it hinders the “polarisation between groups” and “society 
from breaking down”67  by replacing “the class struggle” with a “struggle of ranks” (lutte 
des places).68 It “finally effaces the social division that undermines national cohesion.”69 
Economically, upskilling “strengthens employment and competitiveness in the long 
run”70 since “competitiveness is not just about taxes and wages but also about a good 
primary school, education for the children of blue-collar workers, research that makes us 
smarter, an efficient public sector, training of the jobless”71. Furthermore, although 
investments are “costly, the investment is small compared to a life on benefits and 
enhanced risk of disease and social problems”72, since the “the B-team” may not “put up 
with being invisible”73. Without any viable opportunities, they may “mark society by 
means of vandalism, violence or threats”.74 
 
Qualification and test: Another dimension in which the city of Investment is sociological is 
in its qualification of the reality of unemployment. Society is generally taken to be 
divided between those that are included (in the labour market) and those that are more 
or less permanently excluded while living “alongside society”75. Hence society “does not 
live up to (…) the principle of equal opportunities”.76 It is an “hourglass society in which 
the dividing line between those on top and the lost generations that are expelled in the 
bottom becomes more and more pronounced”77 and a “waste of a lot of resources, both 
human and economic.”78  
The fact that certain groups have not acquired the skills needed and hence have become 
more or less permanently “excluded” or “marginalised” from the labour market can be 
explained by the undesirable cumulative dynamics within and between social groups. 
The groups located outside the labour market are both excluded by other groups and by 
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the governing of the welfare state, while they also unwillingly exclude themselves. With 
regards to the former, the division between an “A- and B-team”79 has created a dynamic 
of a “two speed society”80  in which the A-team (those partaking in or are close to the 
labour market) prevent the B-team from accessing the rights and means it takes to 
integrate.81  Part of this dynamic is also the ability of the labour market (and employers) 
to include these groups; what is sometimes referred to as the “spacious labour market”.82 
For instance, the recruitment strategies of corporations (“the perpetual couple of CV 
and job interview”) tend to invoke certain “stereotypes” of the unemployed as 
“unemployable”.83  Further, if there are investments, a “long term stay on benefits can 
be restraining as well as marginalising”84. Concerning the latter, marginalised groups or 
individuals are the product of dynamics and “laws of social heritage”:  
Children of winners rarely become losers. Children of losers rarely become winners.85 
Echoing Bourdieu and Passeron’s findings in Les héritiers (1964), this implies that there is 
a recognition of the inadequacy of (formal) access to education to ensure equal 
opportunities. 
In relation to the issue of social heritage evidence, “40 pct. of all young recipients of 
unemployment benefits are children of parents having themselves lived on benefits and 
when it comes to immigrants the share is even higher.”86 Those “with ‘benefits parents’ 
have a 3.6 times higher risk of themselves becoming recipients of benefits.”87 Particular 
groups thus form particular risks, which means that the city allows for an immense and 
plural categorisation of the unemployed (see below, Subjects). 
Another way of proving the lack of equal opportunities is by showing a relation between 
a lack of skills and risk of unemployment.  
The number is way, way too high when every tenth young person is without job and 
education. They are wasting valuable years of their lives by sitting at home.88  
Young people who do not get an upper secondary education have a significantly higher 
risk of ending up far from the labour market. The risk of ending up on benefits is ten 
times higher.89 
The “spaciousness” of the labour market is also documented by, for example, showing 
that “only one third of corporations have hired people in subsidised jobs”90, or by 
showing the degree of “the reluctance to deal with” the way the labour market 
“disqualifies” particular groups such as people with disabilities or the aged.91  
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The qualification in terms of risks and opportunities prepares the governing of 
unemployment for tests. Whereas the notion of “active” also plays an important role in 
the city of Mobility in the sense of movement and work, it relates to the question of how 
to prioritise and “activate expenses” in the city of Investment.92 It is in this sense 
governing is either “passive” or “active” and always aims towards a “utilisation that is 
more effective and active”.93  In these cases, government expenditure should no longer 
be “considered expenses but investments”.94 In the end,  
they won’t cost society a thing, among other things because the preventive strategy 
against long term unemployment works and saves a lot of money – in other words, there 
is no longer the need for spending as much money in order to raise people up from the 
swamp.95 
The policy test is thus essentially asking whether a given arrangement or policy is active, 
that is, whether it “enhances the opportunities for the unemployed to become 
employed.”96 Is the unemployed person “given better opportunities for perfecting her 
skills and hereby improving her position on the labour market”?97  
The question one absolutely has to ask is: has the instrument “improved their 
employability?98 
The test can be mobilised to compare the effect of various instruments, for instance, 
what does an enrolment to a particular up-skilling programme do to “the chances of 
finding a job in the 21 months following his enrolment?”99, but also to compare 
countries, such as France vs. the Nordic countries, in how much of the labour force 
participates in training.100   
 
Governing: What does it take to govern in the city of investment and “combat against 
exclusion”101? First of all, the governor must know the risks and opportunities, that is, 
the employability of the population, in order to “prevent”102 these negative dynamics 
from growing. The “hard core of unemployment” must be attacked by getting the long 
term unemployed people’s “feet back on the ladder in order to avoid the core from 
forming by detecting very fast the least employable.”103 Secondly, the governor must also 
be able to disregard (and sacrifice) immediate effects of instruments, whether these are 
redistributive or budgetary, and think “long-term”, just “like when investing in 
shares”.104  
65 
Thirdly, since each unemployed person has a particular set of (or lack of) skills, 
governing must “personalise”105, “individualise”106, “target”107 and “tailor”108  its 
instruments.  In the city of Investment, there “is no standard menu, no fast-food for 
returning to employment, but a personalised action plan”109.i The governor, embodied in 
the social worker, hence “listens to the needs of each individual.”110 This takes a 
“systemic effort” in which “all good capacities work together.”111 Accordingly, the effort 
must not only be “specialist” based on “genuine social work”, but also 
“interdisciplinary” across “occupational groups and administrative departments so that 
case workers, teachers and health visitors are not sitting in each their silo speaking each 
their language.”112 Finally, the governor, when listening to the needs of the unemployed, 
should have his eyes on opportunities and “resources rather than limitations”.113 It is 
about “making the dreams come alive”.114 Hence, although, the unemployed are not 
really to blame, the social worker ought not to “feel sorry for” them.115 
Bad governing is “unproductive”116 public social spending. Although it does not exclude 
the possibility of insurance and re-distributional instruments, these should always be 
subordinated to “active” spending.117 Inappropriate governing does not respect these 
priorities. Government should “invest in human resources rather than repair.”118 
Attempts of “cutting the cake in more equally sized pieces”119 are hence faced with great 
scepticism, since it is a “delusion to think that the public sector can pick up and give the 
excluded a decent and full life if only they gave them sufficiently high benefits.”120 
Likewise, the city denounces the way unemployed people are “sluiced from one futile 
activation offer to the other without any education or life qualifying perspective.”121  
Since the problems of unemployment lie in the way society is divided, and because the 
city of Investment is one of win-wins, it is also sceptical towards the role of unions and 
employers’ organisations since they do not care much about the marginalised. 
What calls for an even more multifarious governing is the variation in potential. Whereas 
the necessity of a “personalised” treatment makes the city sceptical towards perspectives 
that do not pay attention to the individual situation of the unemployed, it is intuitively 
open towards compromising with cities in order to target and tailor whatever is needed 
for a particular group. The tailored treatment may involve rights that are universal in 
principle, but whether the unemployed individual is granted those rights is conditional 
                                          
i This resembles what Robert Castel has termed a “logic of positive discrimination” (Castel 1995: 676). 
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on her specific needs and situation. This is why the first obligation of the unemployed is 
often to “participate in the evaluation of her professional capacities.”122 
The right to investment hence takes a peculiar form. Whereas, for instance, in the city of 
Insurance the right is conditional on the duty to pay a membership fee, the duty is not 
really a duty in the city of Investment. It is taken as self-evident that the unemployed will 
take advantage of the right (to investment), for the sake of society as well as for the sake 
of the unemployed since, as noted earlier, helping the unemployed to realise their 
potential is in essence emancipatory. When governors speak of “rights and duties” in the 
city of Investment, the two things are aligned, or rather fused and rectified towards the 
joint emancipatory goal of increasing the employability of each unemployed person and 
the population in general:  
This is the essence of right and duty. We give them an obligation to get an education. 
Conversely they get the right to complete an education.123  
From society we must meet them with the clear message that our expectations are high. 
They must begin an education. This is what we will introduce a right and duty to.124 
In this sense, the investment in human capital establishes a creditor/debtor relationship 
in which the unemployed is indebted, also morally, to the investor and “expected” to act 
accordingly.i This is perhaps why coercion is not alien but rather integral to the 
governing, and statements like the following seem self-evident in this city:  
We are doing the young a disservice if we are not hard on them. It is disabling in itself 
being on passive benefits. As a young person, your competences and opportunities are 
weakened by being on benefits.125 
The Paternal city also speaks of competence; however, it does not refer to the 
acquisition of skills (necessary to compete on the knowledge-based labour market), but 
rather the capacity of self-control. Hence, coercion answers a different problem in the 
city of Investment. It is a necessary means to make sure the unemployed firstly accept, 
and secondly manage, the investment properly. For instance, the authority has the 
possibility of “suspending the unemployment benefit, if the jobseeker does not pursue 
the training that is offered to him with diligence.”126 
The coercive measures are not only targeted at the unemployed individual:  
                                          
i This point is inspired by Lazzarato’s work on debt (Lazzarato 2011: 15ff; Charbonneau and Hansen 2014). 
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Too many young people are decoupled from the machinery of society. Therefore, we 
think that it is necessary to introduce mandatory youth education programs for all young 
people.127 
They are mandatory in order to “send a signal to the young and their parents that you do 
not get around getting an education.”128 A “penal action” thus “may be used to give the 
very young who think the benefit system is a municipal cash dispenser a quick fright so 
they understand the value of education.”129 
 
Subjects: The subjects in the city of Investment find themselves with various degrees of 
potential that are also realised to various degrees. For society there is the problem of 
how to handle the unequal distribution of potential, but for the unemployed it is really 
only about realising these potentials by “learning”130 and acquiring skills. The 
unemployed as well as the employed should always “become smarter”, and hence it is 
wiser, in the long run, “to work for a low salary in a place where you learn something, 
than working for a high salary with something that is of no use later.”131 A worthy 
individual is thus not only someone with skills and employability, but also someone with 
an inexhaustible will to “acquire new skills”.132 
The term is rarely uttered in the cases, but human capital (cf. Giddens 1998: 117) is 
nonetheless illustrative of the value of skills in the city of Investment.i Investing in any 
kind of capital implies an expectation of accumulation that is sacrificed in the present 
but gained in the future; in this case the development of skills. It also illustrates the way 
the investment is two-fold. The investor, either the state or a company, comes from the 
outside, but it is up to the person being invested in to activate the investment. The 
unemployed person should thus see herself as a kind of enterprise constantly “seizing 
chances”133 for accumulating capital and improving the chances of selling its commodity, 
namely her skills. It is in this sense that the unemployed individual is turned into “an 
actor in the construction of his own project.”134 
The individual and personalised governing of the city of Investment is closely related to 
the way the degree of potential as well as the degree of realisation varies. The 
unemployed “constitute a more and more fragmented population with a variety of paths 
                                          
i The equivalent term of ”human resources” is, however, widely used in RSA, and LAAP 
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and needs.”135 This includes “young people that have missed the beginning of their lives, 
professionally unqualified people 50 years old and above, mothers solely raising their 
children, former inmates who want to start a new life.”136 Some are capable of getting an 
education, others “have substantive abuse problems or mental illnesses”.137 The 
fragmentation of unemployed people entails that in order to ensure equal opportunities, 
they should be treated differently, and ideally as differently as possible. The city of 
Investment is hence more willing than any of the other cities to divide and classify the 
unemployed according to the immense variables that may have hindered the realisation 
of their full potential.  
C I T Y  O F  M O B I L I T Y  
The city of Mobility concentrates all attention to the question of (in)activity. It 
“encourages activity”1 while denunciating everything that “keeps [persons] in inactivity”.2 
The ‘I’ (Insertion) in RMI is passive, while the ‘A’ (Activité) in RSA is active, and this is 
what makes all the difference.”3 The city of Mobility hence echoes and reignites the 
Calvinist ethic to whom “[n]ot leisure and enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase 
the glory of God”i; however, ‘god’ is replaced here with the aim of society’s needs, such 
as “maintaining social cohesion, that is, avoiding the whole of harmful consequences of 
inactivity: the despair, the social violence and the insecurity.”4  The most worthy state of 
activity is work. “The exit route is work, again work, always work.”5 Regaining activity is 
a matter of “getting a place within the community of workers.”6  
The principle idea […] is that as few young people as possible must take root on public 
benefits, that everybody can contribute with something, and that it would do every child 
good to experience their parents saying ‘I am going to work’ with pride in their voices.7  
Mobility underlies the common good of activity as the necessary capacity of the labour 
force to move itself to where the work is located.  
 
Qualification and test: This precondition of mobility qualifies and problematises the labour 
market, and the policies surrounding it, in terms of flexibility and barriers. A policy 
                                          
i (Weber 2003: 157). On the protestant view of the unemployed specifically, see Zoberman (2011: 89f).  
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could hence be justified for “accelerating the flow of resumptions of employment by the 
unemployed.”8 The mobility of the labour force is deemed increasingly important due to 
structural changes affecting the labour market. For instance, “globalisation does not kill 
jobs, but it imposes changes and adaptations.”9     
The full employment we promise does not resemble the one of ‘les trente glorieuses’, with 
permanent contracts and working full-time. It is becoming much more precarious along 
with the development of temporary contracts and, recently, of part-time work.10 
The mobility and “flexibility of the labour force” can be limited by a number of barriers, 
such as “means of transport, health condition or difficulties of childcare”.11 Policies are 
hence tested in terms of their ability to enable flow, or “rotation”12, in the labour force 
and thus reduce “frictional unemployment”13 while avoiding “bottleneck problems”14.  
The goal is to galvanise the labour market by privileging the adjustment of offer and 
demand.15 
However, contrary to the city of Incentives, mobility is not a simple matter of making 
work pay, but of “making transitions pay” (Schmid 1998: 10). Hence, one cannot “rely 
on the market to resolve the dysfunctions mechanically.”16 
 
Governing: Due to the variety of barriers, it takes government intervention to match the 
supply and demand of labour effectively. One example is the labour exchange services, 
where the unemployed were brought into contact with employers.i Governing, in this 
case, aims to “match businesses’ and public authorities’ need for labour.”17 This entails 
providing job offers to the unemployed, accelerating the job searching process and 
making it more efficient, and knowing the needs of employers to avoid “mismatches”.18 
Secondly, governing implies ensuring flow among those already on the labour market, 
hereby making it accessible, for example, by means of “job rotation arrangements”19, 
“leave-of-absence schemes”20, promoting temporary work arrangements and child care 
provisions, as well as investments in transportation and infrastructure. Finally, governing 
implies making sure that the unemployed are “at the disposal (stå til rådighed) of the 
labour market”21. A prerequisite for this is that the unemployed are “active”. This is 
important because of a kind of self-reinforcing dynamic that relates to being passive: 
                                          
i On the historical origin and dissemination of the exchange services, see Edling (2008); Garraty (1978: 130). 
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There is a great risk that they are left to themselves and get stuck on cash benefits. The 
idea with the cash benefit system was to create a springboard for people, but we have to 
recognise that some of the threads in this trampoline have become tripwires. We have to 
get people off cash benefits as soon as possible, otherwise there is a risk they take root.22 
For this reason it is imperative “to stir the cooking pot of unemployment.”23 
“Activating” the unemployed involves making sure they are “active”24, “positive”25 or 
“serious”26 in their job searches and “efficiently and permanently looking for a job”27. 
However, if there are, for whatever reason, no jobs for the unemployed, being active 
might as well entail working in “artificial jobs”28 within the benefit system.  
For the citizen this makes more sense than mandatory job applications that are never 
read. It’s the opportunity for including, qualifying and creating an active citizenship.29 
Whatever the instrument, the governing of the city of Mobility thus aims at 
“rehabilitating work”.30 
Whereas, for instance, the explanatory logic of the city of Incentives is predominantly 
structural and the Paternal logic predominantly individualistic, the city of Mobility, like 
the city of Investment, is unsettled on the question. However, as in the city of 
Investment, the handling of the structural causes inevitably magnifies explanations that 
point towards the unemployed individual since below the structural barriers lurks the 
issue of idleness; the (often hypothetical) question of whether an unemployed person “is 
willing to take on a job”31. If he is on the right side of the threshold, i.e., one of “those 
who want” a job, governing is a matter of “more targeted actions in order to find the job 
openings”32 and reinsure him that “society is held liable to provide [him] a job.”33 
However, if he is not, then the inactivity of the unemployed person becomes an 
occasion for punishment since it breaches society’s common good of activity and work:  
The necessity of accepting a job returns to the central measure of national solidarity.34  
The rules concerning being available (rådighedsregler) must be tightened so as to make it 
impossible to avoid work and hereby avoid solidarity (fællesskabet).35 
Coercion thus becomes a means to “fight the attitude: ‘I don’t want to take a vacant 
job”36. Hence, it is “normal to sanction unemployed persons (…) who’s job search is not 
genuine and serious.”37 The threshold marking the possibility of forcing the unemployed 
to work for his benefit here serves a double purpose. It both punishes the unemployed 
for inadequate job search efforts, and it emancipates him by making him active: 
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It has fundamental value to work. We meet people with trust and, to begin with, we give 
them half a year to find a job themselves. After that, they must work for their benefit.38 
As in the ‘protestant ethic’, work in the city of Mobility has this ambiguous character as 
both emancipating and a sacrifice of (immediate) pleasures, such as relaxation or even 
pay.  
 
Subjects: The least worthy of all subjects is the idle – the antithesis to the active. He is 
struck by “the danger of relaxation” and as such his “unwillingness to work is 
symptomatic of the lack of grace”.i Although the idle person, who “is not set for work”, 
may be a minority, “it’s a minority that shocks.”39 They are those who “prefer to laze 
around at society’s expense (regning).”40 He also “lacks professional flexibility as well as a 
desire to travel to where the job is.”41 He can, in other words, be “recalcitrant”42; but in 
general his laziness results in immobility.  
Too many recipients live their lives as Robinson Crusoe stranded in a two-roomed 
apartment with TV dinners and shitty TV.43 
If the unworthy unemployed are lazy, the worthy unemployed person is in fact not 
“unemployed”, but a “job seeker” (chercheur d’emploi)44 or “available” (ledig)45. As opposed 
to the subjects of Insurance, he is a “risk taker” (riscophile) rather than a “riscophobic”46. 
This implies that although there may be structural dangers and limits to the mobility of 
the unemployed, these matters should not occupy the mind of the unemployed subject, 
since it can do nothing but making him less flexible. The worthy unemployed person is 
above all someone who is willing to do (whatever kind of) work.  
I like it, it gets me moving.47 
It is almost of no importance what I do as long as I have my hands full. I don’t want to 
laze the day away.48 
The unemployed should be “proactive” by “searching uninvited”49 and by “appearing in 
person”50 at the potential employer, as well as “flexible” by “being ready to move to 
another part of the country to get a job and take a job in a supermarket even if you want 
to work in a clothes shop.”51 The governor in the city of Mobility, hence, becomes 
                                          
i (Weber 2003: 157, 159) 
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“steely when someone questions whether a jobless academic should clear up the woods 
or whether an immigrant woman give a hand in a public kitchen”: 
I have nothing but scorn for those excuses. If you are prepared for the labour market 
(arbejdsmarkedsparat) you must have a job that is of use for society.52  
In the city of Mobility, there is thus very little sympathy with the city of Investment’s 
respect for skills.  
C O N C L U S I O N :  A N A L Y T I C A L  G R I D  A N D  C R I T I C A L  M A P   
The grammar of the seven cities is condensed and structured in Table 2 below. It 
outlines the key principles, their ways of qualifying unemployment and testing policies, 
how it should be governed and when and why coercion can be necessary and legitimate; 
and, finally, what the qualities of the unemployed subject are and towards which state of 
emancipation he should be led.  
What can be concluded from the grammar of cities of unemployment presented above? 
First of all it implicates that there is a plurality of repertoires of evaluation that share 
some degree of legitimacy in contemporary debates in France and Denmark in the sense 
that they can be mobilised in criticism and justification. This says little, if anything, about 
the content of the transformations that the governing of unemployment is undergoing. 
However, in itself, it says a lot about the dynamic of the legitimation of reforms. It 
indicates that ideas in public debates do not simply work as a coherent set of norms, 
paradigms or “background ideas” that are taken-for-granted throughout society and 
hence inform and shape policy changes in a quasi-unconscious manner.i Furthermore, it 
challenges existing typologies of transformationsii by firstly showing there is a greater 
plurality and a larger degree of co-existence and tensions in the processes of 
transformations; secondly that the repertoire of ideas is present in both France and 
Denmark and is thus indifferent to national borders and does not designate a specific 
deterministic path for a country; and thirdly that the justified use of coercion cannot be 
confined to a singular approach, but rather appears in all cities.  
                                          
i See chapter 1, p. 6f. 
ii See chapter 1, p. 4. 
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The second conclusion is that the grammar of the cities bring to light the politics and 
morality embedded in the justification, as well as the governing, of the unemployed. It 
shows that there is a lot more at stake in the debates than masking interests and dodgy 
intentions, or simply finding pragmatic solutions to existing problems. What is at stake 
are substantially different ideas about what society and people are made of and in what 
direction both should be heading in terms of governing and behaviour. The morality of 
the cities therefore not only leads to seven right and most rational ways to govern 
unemployment, it also leads to seven paths towards the emancipation of the 
unemployed. However, the politics and morality of the cities is not confined to the 
phenomena of unemployment; by qualifying unemployment and the unemployed, the 
cities simultaneously qualify the worthiness of the labour market and the engagement of 
the employee.  
The third conclusion the grammar highlights is how emancipation and coercion are not 
necessarily contradictory, but rather reciprocal. Coercion, in the many forms it takes in 
the governing of unemployment, is perhaps increasingly seen as integral to governing. 
Coercion, in other words, is not a phenomenon that is hidden behind ideologies – it is 
legitimised – and this is one of the reasons why immanent critiques of current reforms for 
being coercive simply tend to miss their mark. In no other place is the issue of coercion 
more clear than when actors are forced to evaluate concrete problems, instruments and 
situations, which is the case when it comes to the data used in this thesis. By contrast, 
‘grammarians’ or intellectuals are usually decoupled from hands-on and everyday 
governing and are therefore not forced to deal with the issue of coercion. For the same 
reason, an analysis of the intellectual history of ideas or ‘governmentalities’ of 
unemployment would have difficulties grasping this issue. Furthermore, they would 
most likely overlook cities that do not currently have strong intellectual support, such as 
Mobility, Insurance, Paternal and Demand, even though they play an important role in 
practice.  Finally, the grammar is a tool, or rather a tactical map, for “those who want to 
struggle” (Foucault 2007: 3). A map that can be used to navigate within the ‘map’ or to 
clarify what it takes to think beyond.  
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Part II 
 
Tipping points 
 
 
  
76 
 
The preceding chapter skewed how the cities of unemployment, as repertoires of 
evaluation with a distinct grammar, provide the equipment to qualify unemployment and 
the unemployed and for justifying and criticising the governing of unemployed. In 
general, the preceding chapter, for the sake of presenting the grammar most concisely 
and systematically, disregarded the dynamics between the cities; the way they are tied 
together in compromises and integrated into concrete instruments and institutions. In 
the coming chapters of parts II and III, I analyse the relative weight and worthiness of 
cities in contemporary transformations. I thus re-read the material of the four different 
cases of key contemporary reforms in France and Denmark to address how the cities 
have been used by political actors to put policies to the test and to justify changes, and 
how these tests result in compromises and finally sedimentation in the form of concrete 
changes in the institutions and instruments governing the unemployed.  
The grammar of the seven cities is indispensable in the sense that it enables me to bring 
to light the complex dynamics and tensions that are unfolding in the debates and 
sediment into governing instruments. This is not a matter of displaying complexity 
simply for the sake of nuance – a quest that is currently haunting the social sciences 
(Healy, 2016). Rather, the aim is to show how the dynamics between the cities is, in itself, 
key to understand how reforms are legitimised and what the consequences are for the 
governing of the unemployed. I show how the reforms cannot be understood from the 
dominance and replacement of one paradigm or set of ideas by another, but only by the 
way a plurality of repertoires interrelates, i.e., the co-existence of a plurality of ideas as 
well as of instruments. This not only provides a more nuanced overview of how ideas 
shape and transform the governing of unemployment, but a clearer one too. Since the 
first welfare typologies (Esping-Andersen 1990), policies and instruments have been 
conflated with ideas. The concepts of repertoires of evaluation and cities of 
unemployment analytically forces us to not take the presence of an idea for granted by 
the identification of a certain instrument. For instance, just because unemployment 
benefit levels are (relatively) high in Denmark, this does not necessarily imply that the 
city of Redistribution is dominating. This conclusion is based on a static view that 
overlooks how ideas gradually shape the governing by qualifying in a certain way. Rather 
than providing blueprints, it says that if we want to improve the governing, we should 
add this, do more of this, less of that, adjust this, include those, etc. This will be shown 
in the following chapter, but to illustrate the conceptual problem with existing 
typologies, the cities of unemployment can be compared to Bonoli’s “four types of 
77 
 
active labour market policy” (Bonoli 2013: 24). Bonoli distinguishes between 1) 
Incentive reinforcement (e.g., strengthening work incentives, participation in work 
schemes), 2) Employment assistance (e.g., job subsidies, placement, job search 
programmes), 3) Occupation (e.g., job creation schemes, work experience programmes) 
and 4) Upskilling (e.g., vocational training). This static categorisation, however, has 
difficulties in explaining how transformations take place. Instead, it assumes that 
Continental countries such as France follow the ‘occupation’ path and the Nordic 
countries such as Denmark follow the up-skilling part. The following chapters show that 
this is a rather substantial simplification that neglects the co-existence of all these 
instruments as well as how the use of coercion plays a crucial role in both reforms.    
Part II will zoom in on two exemplary reforms that mark what that one could term 
tipping points in the governing of unemployment in France and Denmark. The reform of 
PARE in France has been described as “the most significant reform of French 
unemployment insurance since 1958” (Vail, 2008: 344), causing an “inversion of logic” 
in the system  (Villiers, 2003: 110) and generalising  the “logic of activation” (Clegg, 
2007: 607; Palier, 2005: 139), while the reform of LAAP in Denmark has been 
characterised as a “track change” (sporskifte) (Torfing 2004), setting the scene for future 
reforms. The reforms mark tipping points since they attune the overall problematisation 
of unemployment and coming reform process towards the ‘active society’, although this 
has been running more smoothly in Denmark than in France, which will come as no 
surprise after reading the following two chapters.  
While the changes from both reforms are more cumulative than paradigmatic, they 
nonetheless mark tipping points by requalifying the unemployed as soon as they are 
entitled to unemployment insurance. With the adjustments and new instruments of both 
reforms, the unemployed subject is henceforth only a victim, in the sense given by the 
city of Insurance, at the margins and basically only at the moment he becomes 
unemployed. This is clear in the way both reforms introduce continuous testing of the 
behaviour of the unemployed, qualifying, disqualifying and requalifying him in the 
Paternal, Investment, Mobility and Paternal cities. This paradoxical marginal position of 
the city of Insurance in governing the unemployment insurance system in both France 
and Denmark makes the system more similar to the governing of the uninsured 
unemployed. Once entitled, the insured unemployed are basically unemployed like 
everyone else.  
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Thus, along this path, it seems no coincidence that since the reforms both the French 
and Danish unemployment insurance schemes have become increasingly aligned with 
the systems of the uninsured. In France, the local offices (Assedics) managed by the social 
partners were merged in 2009 with the state governed offices (ANPE) into a one-stop 
agency for all the unemployed; the so-called pôle emploi (Eydoux and Béraud 2011: 41). 
One of the goals with the merger was precisely to reduce “segmentation” in the 
treatment of the unemployed (Ibid: 53). One of the implications was that all 
employment subsidies and activation programmes were to be provided by pôle emploi to 
every jobseeker according to her personal characteristics and needs, rather than to her 
“compensatory status” (Ibid.: 131). Furthermore, since 2008 the unemployed, whether 
insured or uninsured, have been subject to the same system of categorisation that took 
its departure in the instruments introduced by the PARE. All unemployed people would 
thus be assigned a job search profile that divided them up into “type 1” with an 
“accelerated job search” for immediately employable people, “type 2” with an “active 
search” for those with an intermediate profile and “type 3” with an “accompanied job 
search” for not (immediately) employable people (Beraud and Eydoux 2009b: 8-9). In 
Denmark, the job placement offices (Arbejdsformidlingen) for the insured unemployed 
were merged in 2007 with the local municipal offices for the uninsured unemployed in 
jobcentres (Christensen and Petersen 2014). The reform thus decoupled the social partners 
(most notably the unions) from the organisation of the governing of the insured 
unemployed (Larsen and Mailand 2007: 122-123). Similar to France, the merging has 
resulted in aligning rules and categorisations of the insured and uninsured  (Christensen 
and Petersen 2014: 631) 
The chapters in parts II and III all follow the same basic structure. Each chapter begins 
by providing a historical presentation of the context of the reforms. Through readings of 
secondary literature, the aim of these sections is to understand the previous 
sedimentation of cities of unemployment in the French and Danish contribution-based 
systems of unemployment insurance. Despite their brief character, the sections clearly 
show that even before the reforms, a plurality of cities of unemployment was found in 
the systems. The ideas justifying changes, in other words, did not appear like a bolt from 
the blue. The sections are followed by a systematic analysis of the coded data material 
from French and Danish newspapers, with a particular focus on the mobilising of cities 
of unemployment. The mobilising, including critique of cities and compromises in 
between them, are emphasised in the margins. The use of statements and quotations are 
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based on different criteria than in the past chapter. The presented statements are 
exemplary of the test situations that unfolded during the reforms. By deliberately 
abstaining from normative judgements of the statements, I aim to present the plurality 
of ways the governing of unemployment is qualified, justified and criticised. In light of 
the analyses of tests and compromises, all the chapters end with an analysis of the 
sedimentation into the actual regulatory changes in the texts (laws, conventions, decrees) 
that were adopted. 
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4  
‘Help plan for the return to employment’  
The French unemployment insurance system put to the test 
The process and controversies leading up to the reform of Plan d’aide et de 
retour à l’emploi (‘Help plan for the return to employment’, henceforth 
‘PARE’) was officially launched in early 2000 by the major French 
employers’ organisation Medefi and coincided with the upcoming 
negotiations of the next three-year convention of the unemployment 
insurance system. Figure 3 below provides an overview of the key events 
during the debate up to the passing of PARE. 
The instruments of PARE included an individual contract that would oblige 
the unemployed to engage in “personalised” job search activities while 
getting access to support such as training courses. Further, PARE 
strengthened requirements to accept job offers from the job exchange 
service as well as sanctions upon refusals and contractual infringements. 
The trade unions were divided in their stance towards this, causing intense 
debate, which in the end resulted in the adoption of the reform with the 
support of the government. The instruments of PARE did not replace the 
existing scheme, but by installing various tests they fundamentally changed 
the way the unemployed were qualified. Hence, PARE marks a tipping 
point in the governing of the French insured unemployed. With PARE, the 
unemployment insurance system is first and foremost a wheel in the 
machinery of the active society. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first two sections introduce the 
historical creation and development of the French unemployment insurance 
system.  The aim is to provide a brief picture of what cities have shaped the 
                                          
i Mouvement des entreprises de France 
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system and have sedimented in its institutions and instruments. The 
sections thus also pay attention to the intellectual movements qualifying the 
problem of unemployment. The next four sections present the 
justifications, test situations and compromises in the reform debate. Finally, 
the last section analyses the institutional and instrumental changes in the 
adopted legal convention. 
Figure 3: Timeline PARE 
  
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
C R E A T I O N  A N D  R E F O R M S  O F  A S S U R A N C E  C H Ô M A G E  
It was not until 1958 that a nationally governed system of unemployment 
insurance was established in France. Since the end of the 19th century, 
unemployment was handled by local insurance funds organised by workers 
and employers and delimited by professional borders alongside local, but 
publicly funded, schemes of assistance involving extensive control and 
workfare schemes to counter “voluntary idleness” (Daniel and Tuchszirer 
1999: 85, 161). Even though the insurance schemes had been subsidised by 
the state since 1905, they played a marginal role (Ibid.: 89).  
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Although the post-war reforms initiating the French welfare state were 
heavily based on the principle of Insurance (cf. Palier 2002: 55f), the 
governing of unemployment was not. The major reform of Sécurité sociale in 
1945, marking the beginning of the trente gloriouses, can be seen as a 
compromise between Demand, Mobility and, to a lesser extent, Investment, 
emphasising a strategy of full employment. According to Pierre Laroque, 
the founding father of Sécurité sociale, it “permits the constant and as perfect 
as possible adaptation of offers and demand of labour, by a coordinated 
policy focused on professions, occupational training and placement” 
(Laroque in Palier 2002: 94; see also Daniel and Tuchszirer 1999: 162f). The 
strong corporatist beliefs at the time resulted in a system orchestrated by the 
employers and employees’ representatives where entitlements were 
contribution-based and hence tied closely to the worker (in practice, the 
male breadwinner), rather than the citizen (Palier 2005: 136-137). 
Accordingly, Redistributive issues were subordinated to that of guaranteeing 
full employment (Palier 2002: 73f).   
The success of this compromise pushed demands for a nationally 
coordinated system based on Insurance into the background (Daniel and 
Tuchszirer 1999)i. In 1958 the compulsory system of Assurance chômage 
(unemployment insurance) was established by the employers’ organisation 
CNPFii and the labour unions FOiii, a reformist defector fraction of the 
revolutionary labour union the CGTiv, the Christian labour union CFTCv 
and finally the CGCvi, who represented the particularly French managerial 
class of cadres. The system was created under a shared fear of a recession 
(Ibid.: 185). The aim was both, in accordance with Insurance, to provide 
employees with “stable resources” and, in accordance with Mobility, to 
“facilitate redeployment” (Ibid.: 187). 
                                          
i The introduction of a scheme based on insurance was also challenged by the actuarial problem of 
predicting the risk of unemployment (Daniel and Tuchszirer 1999: 187) 
ii Conseil national du patronat français 
iii Force ouvrière 
iv Confédération générale du travail 
v Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens 
vi Confédération générale des cadres. Cadres are a (legally recognised) group of skilled managers and 
executives such as engineers, technicians and consultants. On the historical formation of the class, see 
(Boltanski 1982). 
Demand / 
Mobility / 
Investment 
Insurance / 
Mobility 
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The scheme was institutionalised in the corporatist body of Unedici in 
which the employers and employees’ representatives negotiated the 
convention of Assurance chômage every second or third year. Below Unedic, a 
number of local offices, so-called Assedicii, were set up to collect 
contributions (from employers and employees, and since 1979, also from 
the state (Tuchszirer 2001)) and pay out compensation. Although Unedic 
was established outside the system of Sécurité sociale, the state was always 
involved as a third party with authority to intervene in the negotiations 
(Daniel and Tuchszirer 1999: 185-86). In 1967, the close ties with the state 
ware intensified when the government established the ANPEiii, who worked 
alongside Unedic with the specific aim of facilitating the transmission of 
information between employers and unemployed people (Ibid.: 225f), 
hereby complementing Insurance with Mobility.  Until the early 1980s, the 
involvement of the state resulted in a constant improvement of social rights 
attached to Assurance chômage (Tuchszirer 2001), reaching a rate of coverage 
of 76 percent in 1976 (Daniel and Tuchszirer 1999: 249). 
In the 1980s, well past the trente gloriouses of close-to-full employment, the 
rising number of unemployed put the Unedic under financial pressure. This 
led to a number of reforms of Unedic itself: within Insurance thinking, 
contributions were raised in order to increase resources and balance the 
funds, which, however, made it too expensive for some to pay the fees and 
were thus excluded (Ibid.: 257ff). However, the financial difficulties also 
spurred more radical criticisms of Insurance.  
The so-called Deuxième gauche, a movement within the Socialist party and the 
labour union CFDTiv and led intellectually by Pierre Rosanvallon (Béland 
2007: 132).v In the 1970s and 80s, the Deuxième gauche was anti-statist (as 
opposed to the CGT and FO), advocating governing beyond the welfare 
                                          
i Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce 
ii Association pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce 
iii Agence nationale pour l'emploi 
iv Confédération française démocratique du travail. The CFDT was the newest of the five trade unions 
legally recognised by the state and emerged in 1964 from the Christian CFTC as a secular non-communist 
alternative to the CGT 
v The five recognised unions participating in the negotiations of Unedic are hence the FO, CGT, CFTC, 
CGC and CFDT. 
Insurance 
Investment 
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state with a key role for the labour market parties (see e.g.Rosanvallon 
1981). Later, the critique turned into a critique of a “passive” way of 
spending resources while advocating an “active welfare state” (Ètat actif-
providence) (Rosanvallon 1995). In the 1980s and 90s, Investment inspired 
policies  were introduced along these lines to “activate the expenses” of 
Assurance chômage, such as the Conventions de conversion, offering vocational 
training, internships, and preparation for job interviews for people hit by 
lay-offs for economic reasons (Daniel and Tuchszirer 1999: 320-24). 
In 1982 the criteria for compensation were changed. In line with the city of 
Mobility’s appreciation of work and activity, compensation was made to 
depend on the period of contribution rather than the circumstances related 
to the event of unemployment (Tuchszirer 2001). Out of these institutional 
changes, combined with increasing unemployment, a new group of 
unemployed came to the fore. These people were not entitled to 
compensation because they had not contributed sufficiently as a result of 
long-term unemployment. In 1984, this group was separated from Unedic 
and included in a state-governed régime de solidarité (Ibid.; Eydoux and 
Béraud 2011: 44-45). 
In the same period, a number of policy evaluations mobilised the city of 
Incentives to problematise the “generosity” of the compensation as 
disincentivising work (Béraud and Eydoux 2011: 132) as well as highlight 
the negative impact of (employers’) contributions on employment (Palier 
2005: 136). As a result, entitlement conditions were hardened and the 
duration of compensation was reduced (Béraud and Eydoux 2011: 132). 
The most important change was the introduction of AUD (Allocation unique 
dégressive), reducing the level of compensation every four months while the 
entitlement was reduced to 30 months (Palier 2010a: 84). While AUD was 
supported by the employers and the CFDT, the CGT, together with the 
FO, refused to sign the accord, thus marking a line of tension that would re-
emerge in the debate on PARE.  
AUD succeeded in balancing the budget of the funds of Unedic, but it also 
reduced the share of unemployed being compensated, which bolstered the 
demand for policy reform to target the groups that were not entitled to, or 
Mobility 
Incentives 
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had lost the entitlement to, unemployment insurance due to long-term 
unemployment, as well as the rise of work-forms (such as fixed-term 
contracts) which did not grant the same entitlements as traditional 
permanent contracts  (Palier 2002: 224-225).  Importantly, this, alongside 
inspiration from the ideas of the Deuxième gauche, led to the creation of the 
RMI (Revenu minimum d'insertion, ‘Minimum income benefit of insertion’) in 
1988. The RMI replaced the old system of social assistance and aimed to re-
include the rising group of people hit by the dynamics of social exclusion.i  
Another outcome of the increasing number of unemployed who found 
themselves outside of the shield of Assurance chômage was the mobilisation of 
the unemployed in various protest movements and organisations (Chabanet 
2012). Some were supported by labour unions such as the CGT-chômeurs 
and AC !ii, while others, importantly, MNCPiii and Apeisiv, came from civil 
society movements. None of the organisations were, however, legally 
recognised by Unedic. 
L A U N C H  O F  T H E  D E B A T E :  M E D E F ’ S  R E F O N D A T I O N  
S O C I A L E  
It was the French employers’ organisation that launched the debate leading 
to the introduction of PARE. The initiative grew out of the major 
restructuring of CNPF in the late 1990s, renaming itself Medef, and a large-
scale political programme named Refondation sociale (Social restructuring). 
The offensive new strategy arose from a profound discontent with the 
government’s decision to pass the so-called “Aubry law”, named after the 
then socialist minister of Employment and Solidarity, which, within 
Redistribution thinking, aimed to create jobs for the unemployed by 
reducing the working week to thirty-five hours.  The passing of the bill was 
seen as authoritarian and as harmful to French enterprises because it was to 
                                          
i On the particular discourse of ”social exclusion” in France, see Béland (2007). The trajectory of RMI will 
be described in more detail in the case of RSA (see p. 86f). 
ii Agir ensemble contre le chômage 
iii Mouvement national des chômeurs et précaires 
iv Association Pour l'Emploi, l'Information et la Solidarité des chômeurs et des précaires 
Redistribution 
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be partly financed by the social protection funds of social partners (Palier 
2002: 404).  
At the beginning of 2000, Medef convinced the other social partners to 
gather and discuss the eight “building sites” (chantiers) of the refondation 
sociale. The first ‘site’ concerned Assurance chômage (Ibid.: 407). The ideas 
behind Refondation sociale were created by Medef’s new vice-president Denis 
Kessler together with his ‘right hand’ Francois Ewald, Foucault’s former 
assistant, whose work on insurance and the welfare state (Ewald 1986) had 
somehow curiously led him into the private insurance industry (Behrent 
2010).  
The Refondation sociale has a lot in common with the Deuxieme gauche. It 
shares, and probably accentuates, its scepticism towards state intervention, 
seeking to reclaim some of the initiative from the state to the social partners 
(Vail 2008: 343). The choice is between “reorganisation (refondation) or 
stratification (étatisation)” (Medef in Palier 2002: 405). The programme of 
Refondation sociale was also qualified according to the city of Investment in 
order to qualify the critique of the state. In particular, this resulted in a 
denunciation of the city of Insurance. In a city of globalisation, the national 
state, according to Medef’s president Ernest Antione Seillière, “does not 
function as a reducer of risks (…), but as a producer of risks” (Seillière in 
Ewald 2000: 4). Similarly to the diagnosis of Rosanvallon, Kessler and 
Ewald criticised the current system for being incapable of adapting to the 
“new risks”, which are not social risks but “risks of existence” such as social 
exclusion (Ewald and Kessler 2000: 61):  
Today’s biggest injustice relies less in the unequal distribution of revenues 
than in the inequality when confronted with risk. Traditional social risks 
(…), the risk for an employee of finding himself deprived from revenue 
(accident, illness, old age) is progressively substituted by the risk of not 
being ‘employable’, of not being able to integrate. (Ewald and Kessler 2000: 
71) 
At the same time, Refondation sociale had clear references to Mobility. It was 
concerned with “dismantling French rigidities”, causing “labour shortages in 
certain sectors, which, at some point, can be an obstacle for growth.”1  
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Developing the suppleness of companies, Medef hopes to remove the 
recruitment obstacles and provide the persons far from the labour market 
with an experience.2 
Refondation sociale hence aimed to ”galvanise the labour market by favouring 
the adjustment of supply and demand”.3 Lastly, refondation sociale also had a 
particular Paternal aim to install a “new culture of responsibility” where 
social protection is about giving people a “second or a third chance, and not 
taking responsibility definitively, in a de-responsibilising way, for people” 
(Kessler 1999: 620, 630). 
T H E  E M P L O Y E R S ’  P R O P O S A L  
The policy proposal of Medef coincided with the negotiations concerning 
the renewal of the convention of Assurance chômage for the coming three 
years, which were about to expire July 1st 2000. Because Medef threatened 
to leave Unedic, the whole institution of Assurance chômage was therefore put 
to the test. Without a renewal, Unedic would have no mandate to manage 
the system.  
Medef’s calls for reform were supported by the two other (minor) 
employers’ organisations, the craftsmen’s union UPAi and the small and 
medium-sized enterprises’ CGPMEii. The corner-stone of the proposal was 
the so-called CARE (contrat d'aide au retour à l'emploi) contract, an individual 
arrangement specifying “the reciprocal commitments of the regime of 
compensation and the job-seeker”4 that each unemployed person would 
sign, and keep, in order to be compensated. The elements of the contract 
combined the cities of Investment and Mobility while clearly privileging the 
latter. The contract includes an “assessment of competences and aptitudes” 
of the unemployed person ending in a “plan for personalised support”, 
outlining the job categories corresponding to his competences or the 
training needed to access an available job.5  After signing the contract, the 
unemployed individual will meet for an interview every two weeks to follow 
                                          
i Union professionnelle artisanale 
ii Confédération générale des petites et moyennes entreprises 
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up on the plan and check whether he participates in “the effective and 
permanent search for a job”.6 From the other side, Assurance chômage 
commits itself to proposing job offers, or if necessary, a qualifying training 
course. In order to further favour mobility, the unemployed individual 
would get an additional benefit if he took a job in another business area 
than his own. If the unemployed “within a certain period” has not received 
any job offers, his integration into a company will be privileged by Unedic, 
contributing to the salary paid by the employer”.7  This also had an element 
of Investment: 
One jobseeker out of two does not have an education. We will offer jobs 
with short-term training programmes.8 
When launching CARE, Medef was very explicit on the binding and 
ultimately coercive nature of the contract. While Medef promised to “adjust 
the degression of the allowance” of AUD, it would have “consequences for 
the terms and conditions of the compensation, which would be revised” if 
the obligations of the contract were not met.9 This was basically to 
strengthen obligations related to Mobility: 
There are vacant jobs. The job seekers have to take them.10 
This would be the case if the unemployed person does not show up for the 
assessment, it he refuses to take the training course he was offered or does 
not follow it “with diligence”, if he practices non-declared remunerated 
work, and, finally, if he refuses a job offer “even though they correspond to 
his professional competences and are remunerated in accordance with a 
salary normally practised in the profession and in the region.”11   
Despite the details regarding the obligations of the unemployed, many 
questions were left unanswered in Medef’s proposal, such as who would 
undertake the authority to sanction as well as train (Assedic, governed by 
the social partners, or the ANPE of the state?); how to fund the cost for 
training as well as adjust AUD; and what the content of sanctions would be 
in case of non-compliance with CARE.  
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I N I T I A L  E V A L U A T I O N S  O F  A S S U R A N C E  C H Ô M A G E  A N D  
C A R E  
The sentiment surrounding the negotiations was characterised by optimism 
with regards to the performativity of the economy and its impact on 
unemployment. After the last round of negotiations, unemployment had 
been decreasing, approaching the symbolic threshold of ten percent.i 
Qualifying the situation according to the city of Demand, Unedic 
consequently anticipated a correlation between growth, job creation and 
decreasing unemployment in the coming years: 
Growth in 2000 (3.6 percent) ought to allow for the creation of 405,000 
positions (+ 2.7 percent) and a decrease of 319,000 unemployed. In 2001, a 
growth of 3.1 percent creates 396,000 more jobs (+2.6 percent) and 294,000 
fewer unemployed.12 
However, the government also explained the decrease as a consequence of 
the “Aubry law”, which reduced working time (Redistribution), and the 
“fights against exclusion” (Investment)13. 
For the trade unions, the decreasing unemployment, and as a result of this, 
the surplus of the unemployment insurance funds, provided a justification 
for using the surplus to, in accordance with the city of Insurance, “better 
compensate the employees who are subject to precariousness”, as well as 
increasing the “proportion of unemployed benefitting from an allowance 
from Unedic currently limited to 40 percent”.14  The CFDT thus proposed 
to extend the period during which compensation entitlement accrues from 
the existing criteria of four months’ work during the last 8 months.15 
In addition to modifying the compensation criteria of Assurance chômage, the 
city of Insurance was mobilised to criticise Medef’s CARE. The FO stated 
that “Unedic is not the property of the employers. It is financed by social 
contributions from employees and businesses and it is those contributions 
that are constitutive of the right to compensation.”16 The CFDT argued that 
“there are already sanctions when only 41 percent of unemployed are 
                                          
i  Cf. Figure 2, p. 30. 
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compensated by Unedic”.17 The communists criticised CARE for being 
Paternal by resting “on a logic of suspicion through which the unemployed 
are once again considered responsible for their own situation.”18  
But criticisms were also found in the city of Redistribution. The previous 
statement thus continues: 
Masked as modernisation, Medef reinvents the old conflation: unemployed 
= 2nd class citizen (sous-citoyen) = social delinquent.19 
According to the communists, CARE represented “social racism against the 
unemployed and poor”20 and used the wealth of Medef’s president as an 
example of a problem of inequality: 
You know, when five million people have trouble reaching the Smici , Mr 
Seillière, and when you earn more than 55 times the Smic, when you have 
2,200 times the yearly Smic in stock options, you understand, Mr Seilllière, 
that inequality is something that exists.21   
The redistributive qualification in the case of the CGT led to calls for 
“guaranteeing a decent revenue for all unemployed” through a better 
compensation of precarious contracts22, removing AUD, and a “modulation 
of employers’ contribution in order to better responsibilise businesses.”23 
The CGT’s critique of the interests of businesses was also based on a 
critique of Mobility:  
The employers seek to instrumentalise a system that responds uniquely to 
the needs of business (…) You have to be young, pretty, dynamic, 
intelligent, in good health and qualified.24 
Similarly, from the city Redistribution, AC !, one of the organisations 
representing the unemployed, criticised the employers for wanting to “take 
control of the placement of the unemployed and impose its own terms on 
the workforce.”25 The FO called CARE an “unconscionable contract” 
(contrat léonin) and accused Medef for wanting to base Unedic on a “logic of 
profitability intensified by the labour market”.26 
                                          
i The Smic (Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance) is the minimum wage guaranteed and set by the 
state. 
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Although critical of CARE, trade unions also invested in the 
Mobility/Investment qualification. To the CGT, for instance, “reforming 
the conditions of security and mobility from passive protection to active 
security is an inspiring programme”.27 However, the CGT criticised CARE 
on these yardsticks for not being a “process of integration but an additional 
instrument of exclusion and selection”.28 In place of CARE, the CGT 
proposed to limit the recourse to fixed-term contracts while developing 
qualification contracts for people under 25 years without an education.29 
Likewise, while the CFDT predicted “many frictions with Medef” it also, 
ironically, accused it of “hi-jacking the ideas that CFDT [had] defended for 
a long time”, notably “the active policies against unemployment” needed to 
avoid the risk of a “hard core of unemployed subsisting like a cyst in the 
society of full employment”.30 Not all opposed the use of sanctions though. 
An unemployed person ironically noted: 
They want to reduce allowances? It’s all the same to me because I don’t 
receive them! If I have to sign a contract for someone to offer me a job, 
that’s all I ask for.31   
Curiously, trade unions, when evaluating AUD, also mobilised the city of 
Incentives. According to the CFDT, “compensation should play an active 
role to redeploy the unemployed, and degression is one way, among others, 
to encourage it”.32 Although the CGT wanted to put an end to AUD, they 
proposed to use the surplus of the funds to let every unemployed person be 
compensated at 85 percent of the Smic in order to “make unemployment 
expensive”, hereby “settling on another dynamic of employment”.33 Thus, 
the city of Incentives was never put to the test, nor did it later play a 
significant role in justifying any changes.  
A N  O F F E R  Y O U  C A N  R E F U S E ?  S A N C T I O N S  P U T  T O  T H E  
T E S T  
In the negotiations in May 2000, trade unions appeared to unite around a 
critique of Medef’s CARE. Firstly, all of them refused “to enter a process of 
sanctioning the unemployed”.34 In a first attempt to reach a compromise, 
the CFDT, CFTC, CGC and FO jointly proposed to rename le Care to la 
Incentives 
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Care by replacing “contract” with the less binding “convention”.35 Whereas 
the contract was seen as defining the basic relation between employer and 
employee, as well as between insurer and insured, a convention would be 
voluntary to subscribe to.   
Underneath the compromise, however, different qualifications seemed to 
underpin the engagement of the coalition of unions. The CFDT thought 
that unions and employers “could converge” if the aim with CARE was to 
“put everyone’s feet back on the ladder”, but not if it was “to sanction the 
unemployed”.36 The union criticised CARE by mobilising the cities of 
Investment and Mobility. Testing the population in terms of Mobility, the 
president Nicole Notat “knew of few unemployed people who did not 
aspire to work. (…) In the rare opposite cases, these tendencies are 
anticipated in the current system”.37 On the contrary, most unemployed 
people were regarded from the city of Investment as beings with potential:  
The interest of everyone is to seize new chances, not to settle oneself in 
unemployment.38 
Similarly, the CFTC criticised CARE for being Paternal by installing an 
“automatic and generalised instrument which does nothing but introduce 
suspicion towards the unemployed”.39 Hence, they wanted CARE to be a 
“supplementary instrument offered voluntarily” and built on the existing 
scheme of Convention de conversion.40  
A way of circumventing the problem of sanctions, according to the 
coalition of unions, was to legitimise the Mobility elements of CARE by 
installing the logic of Incentives to mark the threshold of when to engage in 
CARE and when not to. CARE could be accepted “when it is not simply a 
matter of cutting the allowances of the recalcitrant unemployed, but a 
matter of ameliorating those for the unemployed who are making the 
necessary efforts to find a job”.41 CARE should thus be “an optional 
convention that the unemployed are incited to subscribe to”.42 By 
introducing a “bonus” for the unemployed engaging in CARE, “the 
coercive dimension is eliminated”.43 In this way, CARE was not seen as 
sacrificing the Insurance logic, but simply adding an extra, optional layer 
and category of unemployment next to those “solely being compensated”44:    
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The question to ask oneself is whether Assurance chômage must be strictly 
oriented towards cold (sec) compensation or if, on the contrary, it should be 
combined with accompanying rights oriented towards the return to 
employment. (…) However, what is regrettable is that the combination of 
the two missions are judged as social decline.45 
Meanwhile, the FO, who co-authored the joint statement, took a much less 
accommodating stance towards the Mobility element of CARE, calling the 
fact that “the unemployed must engage in an ‘active’ search for a job, at the 
risk of suspension or removal of allowances” “STO” (service du travail 
obligatoire)46, a term that was used for the French workers who were forced 
by the Vichy government to go to work in factories in Germany during the 
Second World War.  
A similar stance could be found in the CGT, the only union not part of the 
joint statement, as well as the various organisations of the unemployed. 
Unlike the CFDT, the CGT saw CARE as a sacrifice of Insurance since 
requiring the unemployed to accept a job proposal in order not to lose their 
allowance is “making the contributor pay for what ought to be paid by the 
contributions of businesses and employees”.47 Thus, CARE would be the 
“death certificate of the system of Assurance chômage from 1958”.48 The 
Insurance-based critique was backed by a redistributive element of the 
critique relating to interests and representation. Medef was accused of greed 
since the surplus in the funds was not used to extend the number of 
compensated unemployed, but rather to reduce contribution levels: 
The employers collect 42 billion Francs by lowering the level of 
contributions. You could say: Medef 42, unemployed 0.49 
Allying themselves with the CGT, the associations of the unemployed 
organised protests around the country, “making the voice of those affected 
by the debate heard” and calling the trade unions to “turn down the accord 
of shame”.50 One of the associations, the CGT-chômeurs, accused the 
CFDT of “declaring war on the unemployed”.51 Denouncing Mobility and 
mobilising Insurance and Redistribution, they argued that Unedic “will no 
longer be a system of compensation but a system that hunts delinquents, 
that is, the unemployed, so as to punish them if they do not accept the jobs 
that businesses propose whatever the social conditions of those jobs”.52 The 
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movement had support from several intellectuals. among others, Pierre 
Bourdieu, who greeted the protests, and Robert Castel, another prominent 
sociologist who supported the protests by giving his view on CARE: 
It implicates a complete transformation of the conception of 
unemployment. Until now, even though compensation was imperfect, it 
allowed you to touch a deferred wage when you were unfortunately 
deprived of unemployment. When he was thrown out, the employee was 
not held responsible for his situation. The logic of the system of 
unemployment compensation came close to the [logic] of retirement: by 
working you acquire rights which allow you to continue a decent life, even 
though you quit the professional city because of age or because of a 
dismissal. PARE radically calls this logic into question.53 
Another sociologist saw Medef’s project as part of a “global tendency to 
recommodify what struggles and the welfare state (État social) had achieved 
to withdraw from the market”.54 
Also, the MNCP argued that “if the battle against unemployment is won 
without twisting the neck of precariousness and poverty, it will be a Pyrrhic 
victory”.55 The MNCP called for the government to intervene in order to 
restrict Medef’s ambition to “impose the dictum demands of the market”.56  
The negotiations ended in an agreement between the employers and the 
CFDT and CFTC, only two of the five unions, and in terms of 
representation, only around one third of union votes. To accommodate the 
criticism of the CFDT, CARE was renamed PARE (Plan d’aide au retour à 
l’emploi). The unemployed no longer had to engage in a “contract” but a 
“project” named PAP (Projet d’aide personalisé), which was considered less 
obligatory since it no longer derived from civil law.57  
Despite the semantic change, the content of PAP remained more or less the 
same. PAP would still be based on a “contractualisation” and sanctions 
would be enacted upon refusals to take a proposed job; from a 20 percent 
reduction in the first case to a complete removal of entitlement after the 
fourth refusal.58 Although the parties agreed to suspend the periodic 
reduction of AUD for those engaging in PAP, it was still uncertain whether 
the scheme should be facultative or what the role of ANPE would be 
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(Lyon-Caen 2001: 379). Finally, the CGC joined the non-signatories (the 
FO and CGT), calling the new scheme “an electroshock of the poor”.59 
T E S T I N G  L I M I T A T I O N S  A N D  A U T H O R I T Y  T O  C O E R C E  
Despite opposition from the non-signatories, the agreement was sent for 
approval in June to the government, who had to ratify the convention in 
law.i However, the government, represented by the minister of Employment 
and Solidarity Martine Aubry, was highly critical of the proposal (see e.g. 
Aubry and Fabius 2000). Finally, after three weeks of intense debate, the 
government disapproved the accord. The government’s refusal was 
celebrated by the FO, CGT and organisations of the unemployed as a 
“victory of democracy”.60 In a letter, about fifty leading figures from various 
factions of parties, unions and civil society from the leftii urged the 
government to ensure better compensation for the unemployed, “the 
effective equality of rights for everyone” and the “freedom to choose 
employment and training in place of a principle of imposed employment”.61 
They also recommended the government to include all concerned actors in 
the debate, including the organisations for the unemployed and 
“democratically elected representatives”.62 
Part of the criticism was supported by the government. Aubry questioned 
the agreement based on the already existing Insurance demand regarding 
increasing the number of compensated unemployed. The agreement’s 
extension of the period during which compensation entitlement accrues 
from the existing four months’ work during the last 8 months to 14 months 
was judged as “weak” and only cost 4 billion out of the expected surplus of 
75 billion francs.63 The minister reminded everyone that the proportion of 
                                          
i The negotiation and voting procedures are extremely complex and follow more or less official codes of 
conduct. While it initially demanded the signatory from all social partners, after 1989 a minority can sign 
an accord. However, non-signatories can demand a new round of negotiations. Further, regardless of 
whether the accord is unanimously agreed upon, the state (the Conseil d’État) ultimately has to approve the 
accord (Lyon-Caen 2001: 378-79).  
ii The figures came from the socialist party, PCF, LCR (La ligue communiste révolutionnaire), CGT, CGC, 
SUD (Union syndicale Solidaires), a minority from the CFDT, and the organisation of the unemployed 
(MNCP, Apeis, CGT-chômeurs and AC !). 
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those compensated had dropped from 52 percent to 42 percent over the 
last ten years, and that the extension would cause an increase of only 0.2 
percent.64  
However, it quickly turned out that not all of the government’s criticism 
coincided with the alliance of the left. While the government strengthened 
the weight of Insurance in the financial allocation of the convention, it did 
not mobilise any substantive critique based on Redistribution. Rather, it 
stressed the importance of Investment vis à vis both Mobility and Insurance 
in the conditions of PAP. Aubry had earlier expressed her concerns with 
CARE: 
If the accord is in accordance with the interests of the unemployed, I have 
no reason to oppose it. If it’s a question of, in a period of recovery, to help 
the unemployed, especially the ones in the most difficulty, integrate and 
educate themselves, I can only be pleased. It will be a more effective and 
active utilisation of the spending of assurance chômage. By having this role, the 
public utility of employment could be mobilised even more. However, if it’s 
a question of setting up a private placement office only for for the 
unemployed ‘in shape’, I can obviously not agree. If it is also a question of 
offering a contract that puts a lot of pressure on the unemployed while 
leaving the fragile to the ANPE, which will become a social office, it’s out 
of the question. This will result in removing the ANPE and its beneficiaries 
away from the labour market, confining them within a logic of assistance 
and subsidised jobs.65 
While qualifying the instrument as an extraordinary measure of Demand 
relating to a “period of recovery”, the evaluation based on the city of 
Investment led to two different critiques: one criticising PARE for being 
unequal and another for it being too equal. In the former case, which is 
visible in the quote above, PARE was creating a system “in two speeds” 
where the Investment and Mobility related services are only accessible to 
those entitled to Assurance chômage thus problematising Insurance’s 
membership criteria as it inhibits the Investment principle of equal 
opportunities: 
On the one hand, the unemployed who are the least cut off from the world 
of work are benefitting from the best job offers in virtue of the new 
agreement by the Assedic (until now, only the ANPE, a public organisation 
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and guarantor of equal opportunities before the return to employment, had 
the monopoly of employment offers). And, on the other, we have the long-
term unemployed who, in large numbers, tip into the [systems of] solidarity 
and assistance of the state.66 
Along the same lines, the government criticised the agreement for removing 
existing successful Investment schemes run by the ANPE, such as the 
Conventions de conversion.67  
The latter critique of PARE of being too equal, in a sense, denounced 
PARE for not subordinating the demands of Mobility to what makes people 
worthy in the city of Investment, that is, skills. The agreement referred to 
“competences” and, after 12 months of unemployment, “aptitudes”, which, 
according to Aubry, would “oblige the unemployed to accept certain jobs 
that do not correspond to their qualifications”.68 “Under these conditions”, 
Aubry remarked, “tomorrow, was fit for being a cashier”.69 For the same 
reasons, the CGC, representing the cadres, wanted to insert the notion of 
“classification” in order to be certain that one cannot “move an employee 
down the scale (déclasser)”.70 Whereas the critique founded in Insurance and 
Redistribution of the FO and CGT had questioned the use of coercion as 
such, the question for the government and CGC was when it was legitimate. 
Aubry reminded people that as a minister in 1992 she had already 
introduced the possibility of sanctioning the unemployed if their job search 
was inadequate or if they refused a job proposal, and hence saw it as 
“normal to sanction the unemployed”.i However, in order for the 
sanctioning to be “impartial, the decisions should remain the responsibility 
of the state”, i.e., the ANPE.71  
In July, as a response to the government’s disapproval, the signatories 
(employers, the CFDT and CFTC) decided to leave the institutions of 
Unedic. Meanwhile the government had provisionally extended the 
                                          
i Ibid. In practice, however, the sanctions were rarely used, and when they were, it was in cases of non-
presence because the unemployed had found a job without giving notice. According to Le Figaro, the rare 
use of sanctions was a result of their disproportionate severity, and hence the opposition to the sanctions 
of PARE from the FO and CGT was to be found in them being “graduate and less tough”, hereby 
becoming “realistic and applicable”. Taupin, B. (2000, June 14) ‘Des sanctions depuis 1992 Contrôle des 
chômeurs : des textes à la réalité’. Le Figaro. 
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convention of Assurance chômage to the end of 2000. Despite the symbolic 
act, the signatories also engaged with the government’s criticism. While 
Medef led bilateral negotiations with the government (Lyon-Caen 2001: 
380), the CFDT justified PARE and the stance of the signatories in public. 
To accommodate the Insurance-based criticism, the signatories emphasised 
the significance of removing the degression of AUD.72 Yet, Insurance in 
itself was problematised as completely inadequate, and almost inhuman, 
leading to a situation where “the unemployed were left alone with their 
difficulties”.73 Hence, assurance chômage could not simply be a “counter for 
allowances”.74 The idea that Unedic should be limited to compensate “was a 
static conception of the mission of assurance chômage that contributed to 
exclusion”.75  
Regarding the authority to decide on sanctions, the signatories simply 
agreed that this ought to be the responsibility of the ANPE. However, the 
signatories completely dismissed the criticism of PARE, leading to a system 
with “two speeds”. Rather, the French system of unemployment insurance 
had “in fact” been running in two speeds for the last twenty years, and 
PARE allowed people to combat this rather than expand it.76 The 
signatories stressed that PARE was also intended for the long-term 
unemployed within the state-governed regime of solidarity, provided that 
the state would contribute (financially).77  
Another important element of PARE that countered the danger of a “two 
speed” system was in fact its obligatory character. The CFDT’s justification 
and response to previous criticism mobilised a Paternal qualification of the 
unemployed person as someone who perhaps does not know his own true 
interests: 
Many doubts would be raised if PARE had been optional. If guaranteeing 
compensation and services at the same time is good, it’s good for everyone. 
(…) We think that offering the two at the same time is an advancement for 
the unemployed, not a step back. It is by leaving PARE optional that one 
approaches a system in two speeds: On the one side, the well educated and 
well informed unemployed profit from all their rights; on the other, those to 
whom entering a training course is not self-evident, or those who are already 
on the road to exclusion, continue to lose hope of their chances. But the 
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content of PARE is adapted to the needs of each individual. There is no 
standard model for everyone.78 
The obligatory nature of PARE hereby forces those who, irrationally, would 
not sign it if they had the choice. Hence, the need for a coercive element in 
the “emancipatory approach” of PARE, an approach that “turns the 
unemployed person, by the help of professionals, into an actor in the 
construction of his own project”.79  The Paternal qualification is in this case 
closely tied to the city of Investment’s need for a targeted (i.e., unequal) 
treatment in order to ensure equal opportunities. This also accommodates 
the criticism of PARE that it leads to excessive Mobility.  
Everyone knows that the [personalised] plan of a qualified computer 
engineer, a laid-off worker in the textile industry or a young person without 
a professional project will not be identical. There will only be a presentation 
of job offers for the first, an evaluation of the level of competences (…) 
perhaps followed by a complementary training course for the second, and a 
complete assessment of competences for the third.80 
This leads to a composition where the Paternal qualification underpins the 
use of coercion in relation to Investment, ensuring that the unemployed 
make use of the rights which will provide them with better opportunities.  
But the Paternal qualification has the same potential in relation to Mobility. 
This was clear in Henri Vacquin’s, a sociologist and consultant with close 
ties to the CFDT, justification of PARE.   
Sanctions imposed on those who refuse a job within their qualifications are 
already better than a gradually decreasing allowance which punishes all the 
unemployed indifferently. And the instrument will make visible to the 
jobseeker that they often have capacities that they didn’t expect. Regardless 
of personal preference for a profession, who knows whether the required 
qualities for practicing it are not similar to other professions? Who knows if 
a hairdresser would make a good assembly-line worker of electronic chips? 
(…) PARE is an act of mediation. If an employer seeks an assembly-line 
worker of chips, it’s up to the mediator, ANPE, to get the hairdresser to 
understand that he is qualified for that position and will benefit from it. It 
all depends on the way of presenting it. If tomorrow I am obliged to take a 
job of one million francs per day, I’m up for it.81   
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While Vacquin denounced sanctions based on Incentives as too ‘equal’, they 
were legitimate when based on qualifications (Investment) and the aim of 
‘getting the unemployed to understand’ (Paternal), which again would make 
them more flexible (Mobility).  
During the final negotiations, the Paternal qualification was integrated into 
PARE, which ultimately made the CGC join the signatories. Besides 
replacing “competences” and “aptitudes” with “validated qualifications” 
and “professional capacities”, PARE would also take into account the 
“degree of autonomy” of the unemployed.82  
The accord was finally approved by the government in October, involving 
several modifications and concessions accommodating the critique of the 
government. The FO and CGT, however, were excluded from the 
negotiations and remained in opposition to the final accord, condemning 
“the obligatory PARE” for “preparing for forced underpaid work” and 
being “social eugenics”.83 
S E D I M E N T A T I O N :  T E S T S ,  S U B J E C T S  
Having mapped the qualifications and justifications of the changes that 
PARE makes to the French contribution-based system, it is now possible to 
identify the sedimentation of the various cities into the assemblage of 
instruments governing the unemployed. The result is a complex patchwork 
of institutionalised tests that (e)valuate and categorise the unemployed 
according to a number of cities. Some of the tests set clear thresholds 
between being worthy or not worthy, whereas others set up continua. Some 
look backwards in time, some plan ahead, and some do both. They also 
appear at different moments in the unemployed person’s trajectory in the 
assemblage. The tests are visible in the accord of the new convention of 
Unedic, which describes all the criteria for receiving an allowance, including 
PARE (Unedic 2000). 
Initially, when addressing Unedic the unemployed individual is evaluated 
both according to the city of Insurance, that is, as a victim in need of 
compensation, and according to the city of Mobility, as someone who’s 
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worthiness depends on his past level of activity. Regarding the former, an 
instance of unemployment is tested with a focus on a number of criteria 
that define what “involuntary” unemployment is (art. 2). Furthermore, it 
checks whether the individual concerned has paid his contributions to the 
scheme. If the first criterion is not met, the regime of social assistance will 
take over (at the time RMI, today RSA). If the second is not met, he may be 
eligible for an allowance in the regime of solidarity. When it comes to 
Mobility, the unemployed person is tested with respect to his past 
“affiliation periods”, which is calculated by the number of working hours in 
the period leading up to the event of unemployment (art. 3). In the new 
convention, the basic criterion of 4 months of work during the last 8 
months was changed to 4 months during the last 18 months, hereby 
accommodating the Insurance-based criticism of extending the number of 
compensated persons. The test determines whether the unemployed person 
is eligible to compensation, or, instead, should address the regime of 
solidarity. However, while passing the threshold, the “duration of 
compensation” is dependent on how many hours the unemployed person 
has worked. The more working hours and the longer the period, the longer 
the duration of compensation (a five-step scale from 122 to 1825 days) (art. 
12). Finally, if the unemployed individual passed the foregoing tests, he is 
once again evaluated in the city of Insurance by a number of rather complex 
tests based on past wage levels (the ‘damage’), which govern his entitled 
compensation (art. 21, 22, 23, 24).  
However, once eligible, the qualification of the unemployed person as a 
victim falls into the background as a number of tests related to the 
instrument of PARE requalify him.i With PARE, the unemployed individual 
must sign the ‘personalised project for action’ (PAP), which establishes a 
new set of “rights and obligations” while he receives his compensation. The 
PAP is dependent on a test, the “in-depth interview”, which evaluates the 
unemployed according to three cities. The first is Paternal. The interview, is 
                                          
i In the document the change is almost symbolically identifiable. While the first part, defining the initial 
criteria, the unemployed person is named an “employee deprived of employment” (salarié privé d’emploi) 
within the first paragraph introducing PARE, he is henceforth named a “jobseeker” (demandeur d’emploi) 
(art. 14, §1).  
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“the occasion” for the agent from the ANPE to “appreciate the degree of 
autonomy of the jobseeker in his search” (art. 14, §2). The PAP must “take 
account of the degree of autonomy” (art. 15). It is not specified how, but 
seeing it in the light of the past debate, it is likely that a low degree involves 
more rights and obligations. Meanwhile, the interview must also “take stock 
of his qualifications and compare it to available or potential offers on the 
labour market” (art. 14, §2).  
The unemployed person is hence firstly tested in the city of Investment in 
terms of his employability. If it is sufficiently high, he can remain in the city 
and the PAP will describe the job types that correspond to his qualifications 
(art. 15). However, if it is low (again this is a continuum) the PAP includes 
two paths: one based on Mobility, which suggests “the job type(s) towards 
which he may like to convert”, or one based on Investment, which outlines 
the “services and training” that are necessary to “access a job in compliance 
with the project” (art. 15). Finally, the PAP must also take into account the 
“personal and family situation” which will set limits to the “potential 
geographical mobility” of the unemployed (art. 16, §3). While this test sets 
limits to the city of Mobility, it also legitimises demands to move if the 
personal situation does not inhibit it.  
Throughout the whole period after signing the PAP, the unemployed 
person must be active in the city of Mobility. He must “carry out positive 
actions of job search” and be “available and genuinely involved in the move 
towards the return to employment” (art. 16, §3). On the other side of the 
threshold, one faintly sees the idle subject who does not search “genuinely”. 
All non-compliance is followed up by sanctions (as described above in the 
signatories’ proposal).   
The period after signing the PAP is characterised by a continuous 
intensification of evaluation as well as of rights and obligations.  
Concurrently, as time passes, the ‘degree of autonomy’ of the unemployed 
decreases. In the first phase, the unemployed person is qualified as capable 
of finding his own job.  It is not until six months after signing that the 
“actualisation” of the PAP is carried through (art. 17, §1). In addition, the 
balance between Investment and Mobility changes as time passes. While at 
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the beginning the unemployed person is obliged to accept an offer that 
“corresponds to his professional capacities, his qualifications as a result of 
his diplomas, knowledge and professional experience”, after 6 months the 
offers should only “be part of the field” of the same professional capacities 
(art. 17, §1,2). Finally, after twelve months, the ANPE should “accentuate 
their efforts in order to redeploy those concerned or favour his 
occupational integration and ensure that he acquires a professional 
experience”, possibly by means of “regressive assistance” (aide dégressive) 
allocated to the employer (art. 17, §3). In addition, in order to broaden the 
‘field’ of interests the unemployed person is offered an “in-depth 
assessment of competences” (art. 17, §1). Finally, “if, despite all these 
measures, the beneficiary still has not found a job, his allowances will be 
retained within the duration of the rights” (art. 17, §4).  
By bracketing what was previously, first and foremost, a homogenous group 
of ‘victims’ with a legitimate need for compensation into a variety of 
subjects that may change as time passes, but whose primary goal is to 
somehow once again become part of the ‘active society’, PARE marks a 
tipping point. As shown above, it does not wipe out the Insurance 
instruments, but rather works upon them and limits their capacity to qualify 
the unemployed. Furthermore, it consolidates that the primary aim of 
Assurance chômage is to bring the unemployed back into ‘active society’.  
The same confrontational lines between actors have continued to influence 
the reform processes. However, and again similar to the unfolding event of 
PARE, the criticism has been able to postpone or bring to a halt some 
reforms, but has not managed to provide an alternative path. The criticism 
thus remains defensive. Subsequent reforms have consistently focused on 
the flexibility of the labour force (Mobility). Whereas massive protests in 
2006 managed to bring to a halt the Contrat première embauche that aimed to 
make it easier to hire and fire young employees (Cole 2008), the 
controversial “El Khomri law”, loosening working time and layoff 
regulations, was adopted as recently as 2016 by the socialist government 
despite massive protests. Thus, although changes seem to happen at a 
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slower pace than in Denmark, for instance, there seems to be no sign that 
they will be rolled back or take a radically new path in the near future.  
  
 106 
 
  
 107 
 
5  
The ‘Active labour market policy act’  
The Danish unemployment insurance system put to the test 
The reform process ending with Lov om aktiv arbejdsmarkedspolitik (‘The 
active labour market policy act’, henceforth LAAP) began with the adoption 
of an experimental law in 1992 that was set to expire at the end of 1993. 
Whereas PARE took its root in an explicit call for reform which was clearly 
confined to the unemployment system, namely Assurance chômage and the 
negotiation of its convention, LAAP is an example of a more disordered 
process with a variety of parallel test situations of a number of instruments 
that somehow became tied together. Figure 4 provides an overview of the 
key events during the debate up to the passing of LAAP. 
Figure 4: Timeline LAAP 
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LAAP introduced an individual contract quite similar to PARE while 
combining it with a number of different instruments: leave schemes to ease 
access to the labour market, job training for the unemployed and job offers 
that the unemployed, after a period of time, would have to accept in order 
to continue to receive compensation. Further, it changed the rules of 
entitlement. While the PARE reform was mainly driven by the unions and 
employers’ organisations, the LAAP reform was orchestrated by the state.  
This different dynamic is the result of a particular history of the Danish 
unemployment insurance system that will be presented in the first two 
sections. As in the first sections of the previous chapter, the historical 
sources are read with a view to understand the tensions and compromises 
between cities of unemployment that have sedimented into the governing of 
the insured unemployed, and hence provided the context for the process of 
LAAP. Hereafter follows four sections that each present a test situation 
concerning a specific problem relating to the governing of the 
unemployment insurance system: wages, financing, subsidised jobs and 
leave schemes. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
changes that the LAAP law entailed.  
T H E  C R E A T I O N  A N D  R E F O R M S  O F  D A G P E N G E S Y S T E M E T  
Unlike in France, where the creation of a national unemployment 
contribution-based system was initiated by the state, the Danish equivalent 
was a direct result of pressures from the labour movement, which from the 
beginning was much more homogenous than in France, and closely allied 
with the Social Democratic Party. The establishment in 1907 of the 
unemployment insurance, commonly called dagpengesystemeti, followed the 
recommendations of a governmental commission which was set up to 
satisfy the demands from the growing Social Democratic Party (Christensen 
2011). Whereas the French system was orchestrated in a tripartite 
corporatist manner with equal representation of employees and employers, 
                                          
i “Dagpenge”, literally ”daily money” and is the common term denoting the compensation that the 
unemployed receive. 
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the employers only played a marginal role in the Danish set-up. They did 
not initially contribute to, or partake in the control of, the so-called 
abejdsløshedskasser (unemployment funds) either; these were financed by 
workers, municipalities and the state. The funds, despite being legally 
independent, were in reality closely tied to the labour unions that would 
control the solidarity of Insurance, organise the placement service (Mobility) 
and also exercise pressure towards workers to enrol in the voluntary 
scheme. To strengthen Mobility, the funds and placement offices were 
delimited by professions rather than local borders (Ibid.: 517). The scheme 
was only intended to be a short-term instrument to compensate for the 
shortage in labour demand due to economic crises (Demand). The 
maximum period of compensation was hence only 70 days annually (Ibid.: 
519).  
Similarly to the French ‘regime of solidarity’i established in the 1980s, the 
economic crisis of the late 1920s resulted in the establishment of so-called 
hjælpekasser (‘help funds’), which compensated the unemployed whose rights 
had expired. Like in France, the problem with the insured unemployed 
losing their rights to compensation was a reoccurring issue in the numerous 
reforms of the Danish dagpengesystem. The help funds, which were financed 
by a special fund with contributions from the unemployment insurance 
fund as well as the state and the employers, would prevent the insured 
unemployed from entering the system of poor relief (fattigvæsen) (Ibid.: 535). 
The insurance scheme had a marginal Investment element since the help 
funds involved the possibility of training at the folk high schools 
(folkehøjskoler) (Ibid.: 557).  
Up until the end of the Second World War, a number of tensions and 
reforms unfolded within the city of Insurance. Venstre, which at the time 
was an agrarian party, and the employers’ confederation DAii pushed for the 
use of individual control cards (arbejdskort), popularly labelled “dog tags”, to 
ensure that people did not receive dagpenge while working (Christensen 2011: 
                                          
i See chapter 4, p. 85. 
ii Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Confederation of Danish Employers) is the umbrella organisation that 
represents  most private employers’ industry associations. 
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555; 2012b: 487, 499). Further, while in government, Venstre decreased the 
state subsidies while increasing the membership fees. The government 
justified the cutbacks as a way of strengthening the “principle of insurance” 
in the scheme (Christensen 2011: 552). Finally, the help funds were 
increasingly aligned with dagpengesystemet. Previously, the help funds were 
conditioned on a definition of “extraordinary unemployment”, i.e., the 
Demand crisis, and had lower compensation rates. The definition of 
“extraordinary” was gradually loosened and compensation rates increased, 
and finally the help funds were integrated in dagpengesystemet in 1958 
(Christensen 2011: 563f). 
While the post-war period was characterised by expanding rights of 
compensation, the city of Insurance was simultaneously challenged from 
other cities. Like in France, Keynesian Demand policies focusing on state 
initiated job creation were on the rise in the decades after the war  
(Christensen 2012b: 505-7). While these policies reduced financial pressure 
on the insurance scheme, they also gave rise to the idea that unemployment 
was the responsibility of the state (Christensen 2012a: 523), which in turn 
legitimised further financing by the state. The state financing peaked in 1967 
when membership fees were reduced to a symbolic contribution. The 
compensation improved, more groups were covered and the compensation 
period gradually increased (Christensen 2013: 538-43, 547). However, the 
transition from a compensation to a tax based scheme also decoupled the 
financing from the risk of unemployment (Christensen 2012a: 520-22). 
The decoupling provided further space for Mobility and Investment uses of 
the funds and further involvement of the state in the organisation of the 
instruments. This is partly why the unions and employers’ organisations 
were marginal players in the reform of LAAP. The developments were also 
fuelled by criticism of Insurance; for instance, by the influential economist 
and social democrat Bent Rold Andersen, for not bringing people back into 
the labour market. The solution, according to Andersen, was to further 
integrate the contribution-based system into the welfare state (Christensen 
2012a: 515). In the 1950s, Mobility strategies such as travel support, help 
finding accommodation and moving jobs to the rural areas, combined with 
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Demand strategies of regional investments, were introduced to address so-
called “unemployment islands” (arbejdsløshedsøer) (Christensen 2012a: 500-1). 
In conjunction with enlarging the set of mobility enhancing instruments, in 
1967 the state took over the placement service and control of the 
unemployed in the so-called Arbejdsformidlingen (the Placement Service) that 
had hitherto been in the hands of the unemployment funds, that is, the 
unions (Christensen 2012a: 526-7). The post-war period moreover spurred 
the idea that the labour market, as a result of the increasing mechanisation 
of the agrarian sector, would need fewer unskilled workers, which resulted 
in apprenticeship and training schemes targeting unskilled, unemployed 
workers (Christensen 2012b: 505-9).  
The oil crises, rising energy prices and inflation, a huge deficit on the 
balance of trade and rising unemployment provided the context for the 
debate and reforms of dagpengesystemet in the 1970s. However, unlike in 
France where the funds were mainly contribution-based, the predominantly 
tax-based funds in Denmark were not put under the same immediate 
financial pressure. Even though dagpengesystemet had lost a key Insurance 
component, it was still qualified and problematised by means of the city of 
Insurance. However, just like the state’s improvement of compensation 
provided space for other qualifications and instruments, the Insurance 
debates and sedimentations in the 1970s and 80s would later come to serve 
as a kind of Trojan horse. 
Two examples of this dynamic are worth noting since they came to set the 
scene for the later reform of LAAP. The first example relates to the 
possibility of the abuse of rights in the city of Insurance. In the 1980s, 
criticism of speculative behaviour of both employees and employers soared. 
On the one hand, employers were accused of strategically laying people off 
during vacation periods and bad weather conditions. On the other hand, 
employees were suspected of permanently working part-time with a 
compensation supplement, while those serving a notice period were 
suspected of only subscribing to the unemployment insurance once the 
notice was given (Christensen 2013: 552-4; see also Jensen 2008: 262). As a 
response, the period of membership required to be eligible for 
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compensation was extended. Also, contributions from both employees and 
employers were again raised (Ibid.: 552-564). However, the problem with 
speculative behaviour also provided scope for Mobility’s critique since they 
accentuated the obligation to work a priori and be at the disposal of the 
labour market in order to receive dagpenge (unemployment benefits)  
The second example illustrates an instrument that was mainly justified in 
accordance with the city of Insurance, but could also be glimpsed in other 
cities. When the social democrats in 1978 proposed the so-called “job offer 
plan” (jobtilbudsordningen), it qualified it as a way to inhibit the growing 
number of long-term unemployed who were about to lose the right to 
compensation from entering the state’s cash benefit system for uninsured 
unemployed – kontanthjælpssystemeti (Christensen 2013: 549). By granting the 
unemployed 9 months of subsidised work, they would regain their right to 
another 2½ years of compensation, which would be succeeded by a second 
offer (Kolstrup 2013: 201). This was also the main function the job offers 
came to serve up until the 1990s (Christensen 2013: 551). 
However, the job offers contained other qualifications that would later be 
mobilised to criticise the same instrument. Firstly, the most obvious was 
also the most implicit: by offering a job, the unemployed were put to work 
and hence worthy in the city of Mobility. They would be “activated”; a term 
that would gradually become common in connection with the offers.ii 
Secondly, the offers were also qualified in Paternal terms. DA, the 
employers’ confederation, supported the job offers; but only in their 
capacity as “rehabilitation positions” (genoptræningsstillinger) (Christensen 
2013: 550). Thirdly, the job offers had a distinct Investment element, since 
the jobs had to fit the qualifications of the unemployed. An element which 
was strengthened later by replacing the second job offer with a (re-
)education offer (Kolstrup 2013: 201). 
                                          
i Directly translated to ‘the cash help system’ 
ii The usage of “activation” as a collective designation for the instruments aiming to bring the unemployed 
from support to employment gained a footing in relation to the introduction of the so-called Youth 
allowance (Ungeydelse) in 1990 (Torfing 2004: 171; Kolstrup 2013: 214ff). See also chapter 7, p. 167. 
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Fourthly, the job offers were seen as a strategy of job creation to increase 
Demand. Hence the jobs should be “productive and useful for society” 
(Christensen 2013: 557). Finally, the arrangement prepared dagpengesystemet 
for a redistributive qualification which would later serve as both a 
justification and object of critique. First of all the job offers had to be paid 
according to the collective agreements and should be “extraordinary” in 
order not to push wages down. However, the job offers also had an 
unintended consequence. The job offers had extended the total 
compensation period to around 9 years, making it resemble something like 
the ‘utopian’ idea of a guaranteed “citizen’s income” (borgerløn), which had 
gained intellectual and public impetus since the publication of the best-
selling book Oprør fra midten (‘Revolt from the centre’) in 1978. Criticising 
one of the core dimensions in the city of Demand, the three authors, a poet, 
a politician and a scientist, predicted the coming of the “zero growth 
society” and called for a “society of economic equality” based on a 
minimum guaranteed citizen’s income (Meyer et al. 1978; see also Petersen 
et al. 2013: 100f).  
The job offers were, thus, embedded with tensions: they should be 
productive (Demand) but at the same time extraordinary while rewarding 
equally (Redistribution); they should provide the unemployed with new 
rights to compensation (Insurance) while matching their qualifications to 
increase their employability (Investment); and they should activate the 
inactive (Mobility) and rehabilitate the incompetent (Paternal).  
T H E  B L A C K  B O X  O F  “ S T R U C T U R A L  U N E M P L O Y M E N T ”  
Apart from the specific Insurance-related problems, dagpengesystemet became 
part of a more general debate questioning the capacities and goals of the 
welfare state in relation to the labour market, which would frame the work 
of two governmental commissions leading up to the reform of LAAP. In 
contrast with France, the Danish economy was booming in the mid-1980s. 
Nevertheless, unemployment only modestly decreased to around 8 percent 
in 1987, when the economy abruptly returned to recession. 1987 was also a 
year with radical wage rises. Leading economists were interpreting the 
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events as a problem of “structural unemployment” (Larsen and Andersen 
2009). This explanation entailed a radical questioning of Keynesian Demand 
policies’ narrow focus on conjectural unemployment. The reason why 
unemployment had remained relatively high was because it had reached the 
threshold of what two economists earlier had labelled the NIRU (non-
inflationary rate of unemployment) (Modigliani and Papademos 1975)i. In a 
situation like this, Demand and consumption oriented policies would only 
lead to increasing inflation and hence to a situation of co-existing economic 
stagnation, often labelled “stagflation” (Torfing 2004). In 1989, structural 
unemployment became a central concern for the centre-right government in 
its white paper on the “structural problems of the labour market” (Ibid.: 
181).  
While the structural unemployment explanation was clear in its criticism of 
the city of Demand, it was unsettled on what kind of ‘structures’ were 
causing it. Besides Demand, the new qualification of unemployment rested 
beyond the scope of, and often in contradiction with, the cities of Insurance 
and Redistribution. Yet, as will be evident in the following sections, the 
cities of Investment, Incentives, Mobility and Paternalism could all be 
mobilised to identify unemployment-producing structures.  
In 1991 two governmental commissions were set up to look into how to 
tackle the problem of structural unemployment. The first, named the Social 
Commission (Socialkommissionen) and chaired by Aase Olesen, the former 
minister of social affairs from the Social Liberal Party, Radikale Venstre,  
was given the task of evaluating the role of benefit levels, including dagpenge, 
with the aim of getting more of the adult population included in the labour 
market. The second commission, the so-called Zeuthen Committe, would 
address the “structural problems” specifically with regards to dagpengesystemet 
concerning the “activation” of the unemployed and the financing of the 
system.   
                                          
i Modigliani and Papademos’ theory was a refinement of Edmun Phelps and Milton Friedman’s theories of 
a “natural rate of unemployment” that radically questioned the Philips curve’s alleged inverse relation 
between the rate of inflation and unemployment (Phelps 1968; Friedman 1968). 
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Much of the existing analyses of the Danish labour market reforms have 
focused on the construction of this need to reform through the discourse of 
structural unemployment (Cox 2001; Torfing 2004; Larsen and Andersen 
2009). Without questioning its importance, it is only by analysing the 
process in which the broad discourse is turned into specific changes in 
instruments and institutions that the moral consequences and plurality of 
the shift become visible. Further, the idea of structural employment is 
inadequate for understanding the debate leading up to LAAP. Firstly, as 
mentioned above, the city of Demand was not only questioned by the idea 
of structural unemployment, but also from ideas predicting zero-growth, 
thus countering the belief that unemployment could be effaced. In 
accordance with the city of Redistribution, ideas of zero growth would 
advocate the sharing of labour or a citizen’s income and thereby allow 
people to remain outside the labour market. Secondly, the idea of reducing 
unemployment by increasing Demand was still alive. The idea of structural 
unemployment did not exclude the presence of conjunctural 
unemployment, but rather relativised it. Finally, the scholarship on the 
“discourse” of structural unemployment tends to overlook that, as seen in 
the previous section, a lot of ‘structural’ explanations of unemployment 
were sedimented before the discourse entered. 
The following four sections highlight key test situations evolving from the 
debate surrounding the initial law to the adoption of the final law around a 
year later. Hence, the following will zoom in on four test situations with 
differing pivotal points. The first concerns a dispute around the Social 
Commission’s proposal of a ‘third labour market’. The debate concerns the 
role of wages and labour in relation to the threshold to the labour market. 
The second test situation concerns the problem of financing dagpengesystemet 
that followed the publication of the findings from the Zeuthen Committee. 
The third concerns how the intermediary periods of job offers are criticised 
and gradually re-qualified. The final test concerns the use of leave schemes 
in order to create entry points for the unemployed. 
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Q U A L I F Y I N G  L A B O U R  A N D  W A G E S  I N S I D E  A N D  O U T S I D E  
T H E  L A B O U R  M A R K E T  
As mentioned above, Demand qualifications were not excluded from the 
debate. For instance, an economist from the Social Commission estimated 
that “the use of traditional economic policy could, as a matter of course, 
reduce unemployment from the current level, 11 percent, to somewhere 
between 7 and 8 percent”.1 Likewise, the centre-right as well as centre-left 
recognised the city, but whereas the Social Democrats would use “long-
term investments in the societal infrastructure and expand employment in 
selected parts of the public sector”, the government recommended 
increasing consumption through taxation and credit policies2. In the 
temporary law, the city of Demand sedimented in the setting up of ten so-
called geographical “enterprise zones” (erhvervszoner) where businesses 
creating jobs would be rewarded with favourable conditions, such as tax 
reductions and faster case work by authorities.3 The government justified 
the measure as a “saline injection to particularly exposed areas” and 
emphasised that it was a “temporary measure (…) to immediately add 
renewed growth”.4 Meanwhile, unions and social democrats were criticising 
the “enterprise oases” from the city of Redistribution for making employees 
“outlawed” by “suspending all labour market laws so businesses can do as 
they please with employees and the environment”.5  
The city of Redistribution was also mobilised to justify a solution to the lack 
of jobs, namely distributing work better. For instance, the newly established 
“Unemployment Party” argued that all the “resources that were spent on 
the remedy of unemployment and repairing the damage” should be used for 
compensating the wage loses caused by work time reduction (see also 
Jensen 2008: 303).6 Unlike in France, reduced work time would not be used 
as an instrument in Denmark. However, the temporary law did include an 
instrument that aimed towards distributing work. The so-called “jobrotation 
scheme” would expand the rights of wage earners to take leave on the 
condition that the leave-taker was replaced by an unemployed person. The 
leave, on the other hand, should be used for either education (Investment) 
or child care, hereby freeing day care resources (Mobility).7   
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The central concern of the debate, however, was the question of “structural 
unemployment”. Concurrently with the negotiations of the temporary law, 
the Social Commission would publish its first discussion paper, entitled 
“Selection for life” (Sortering for livet) (Socialkommissionen 1992). The 
commission presented a somewhat sociological explanation that went well 
beyond its primary task of investigating the impact of benefits.  The report 
diagnosed a “polarised society with a soaring group of marginalised and 
excluded people”.8 The commission qualified the group mainly through the 
Investment, Incentives and Paternal cities. Firstly, the group had an 
educational deficit compared to the included (Investment). Statistics showed 
that the risk of unemployment for the unskilled was twice as high as for 
those with a vocational education, and argued that “a life with 
unemployment and benefits is inherited”.9 It also spoke of a “lost 
generation” of young people in the early 1980’s recession that had never 
managed to get a hold in the labour market.10 Although they were victims of 
stagnation, Demand policies had failed to re-include the group. Social 
democrats were worried:  
Also, we must do something for their children. Elementary school teachers 
already speak of new behaviour from children from homes where none of 
the parents have ever had a job. It’s a family pattern never seen before in 
history.11 
Along Investment thinking, the Commission proposed a special education 
for the “non-academic” students.12 
However, according to the Social Commission, as well as the government 
and employers, the identification of an educational deficit was not 
necessarily an Investment problem. Rather, on the one hand it was a 
problem of the level of benefits (Incentives), and on the other hand a 
Paternal problem related to wage levels. With regards to the former, the 
question of whether benefits were reducing the incentive to work was 
extensively put to the test by the commission. The general conclusion, 
however, was that lack of Incentives was not a problem for the large 
majority of the population receiving benefits. However, for certain 
“marginal groups”, young people and single parents, employment could 
result in reduced income.13 The government mobilised the findings as proof 
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of an unemployment insurance system that was “very generous” and where 
the “high degree of coverage (…) deprives the lowest-paid the economic 
incentives to work”.14 Unions, here the LO (Landsorganisationen)15, would 
radically criticise the Incentives premises: 
Believing that by making the lives of people sufficiently miserable they will 
get themselves a job does not hold water.16  
With regards to the Paternal qualification, it was not (primarily) benefit 
levels, but rather wage levels on the other side of the (un)employment 
threshold that explained unemployment.  
Many of them are tempted, after ending secondary school, by the fair wages 
of an unskilled worker and thereby do not even consider placing themselves 
in the danger zone of unemployment.17 
The idea of the unknowing Paternal subject was thus aligned with the 
Investment common good of education.  
However, the Paternal qualification also involved a more radical solution 
that would run counter to the idea of Investment. The Social Commission 
was sceptical of the capability of the education system to prevent exclusion 
and produce equal chances. While 8o percent of children from parents with 
superior positions would get a qualifying education, the same would only 
apply to one third of children from unemployed parents.18 
And even if you become a lucky break from family tradition and get an 
extended education, there’s a still a larger risk of becoming unemployed if 
your parents don’t have one. So even if you initially overcome the social 
heritage, your parents still rub off.19 
Further, the problem of this group was not simply external mechanisms of 
exclusion, but certain self-reinforcing mechanisms within the group. The 
chairman of the commission had insisted on a “No work, no money (yde-for-
at-nyde) attitude”, which was somewhat ineffective with this group of people, 
who “were incapable of taking care of themselves, let alone of others”.20 
The commission would hence raise the Mobility good of becoming active as 
a means to encourage responsibility in the Paternal sense. Since the 
commission did not see any demand for this group on the labour market, 
there was no reason for them to be at its disposal. Further, the commission 
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did not see much potential for investing in their employability. Hence, again 
combining Mobility and Paternal ideas, it proposed the establishment of a 
“third labour market”:   
The advantage of the alternative or third labour market is that the passively 
supported become active and hereby increase the welfare for themselves 
and society, gain larger self-respect and relieve the system from a number of 
control functions, such as whether the unemployed are at the disposal of the 
labour market.21 
Similarly, the centre-left newspaper Politiken recommended a labour market 
in “several speeds” with “special zones” of “jobs where the payroll costs 
and demands make room for the weakest”.22 Instead of increasing the 
employability (the Investment solution), the unemployed would get a job as 
well as a wage that would fit their low competence and function in non-
market conditions. They would be active (Mobility) and even though their 
lack of competence would not be rewarded, it would somehow be accepted 
(Paternal). Later in the reform process, the new centre-left government 
pursued this idea of “how groups without full work capacity, and hence are 
not at the labour market’s disposal, can get the opportunity in well-defined 
employment areas to take on minor tasks without deductions in their 
benefits”.23  
Everyone must have the chance of a life where you experience that there is 
a need for you and that you are good at something. But – the responsibility 
for how you want to live is your own.24 
The problem, hence, was no longer that the unemployed were excluded 
from the labour market, but that they were excluded from working and 
from being responsible.  
When the idea of a third labour market was introduced, it was considered 
highly controversial because it breached with the premises of the diagnosis 
of structural unemployment. The Economic Council, for instance, warned 
“expressly” against a “permanent ‘third labour market’ where jobs are 
protected against the regular market economy”25: 
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Such an artificial labour market (…) risks creating a situation where the two 
sides of industry neglect the real size of unemployment and hence agree on 
untenable wage increases.26 
In other words, the ‘third labour market’ would not increase the supply or  
‘reserve army’ of labour and lower the NIRU. The ‘third labour market’ was 
also criticised on moral grounds, mainly for not living up to the 
responsibilising requirements of the Paternal city. For instance, a politician 
from the social liberal party Radikale Venstre wrote: 
People with a lack of skills and opportunities for matching the requirement 
of the labour market of 37 hours of intensive and high-skilled work a week 
put to one side. The situation now is so absurd that everybody talks about 
an alternative or third labour market - in reality a second-rate labour market 
where the deviants are placed under the responsibility of the public 
authorities.27 
Hence, the solution, still within the Paternal city, was to somehow adjust the 
wages so that they would correspond to the productivity of the group. An 
example of such an instrument, which all centre-right parties and the 
employers justified, was the so-called “phase-in salary” (indslusningsløn); a 
minor wage targeting unemployed youth in particular.28 The lower wage was 
first and foremost a matter of emancipating the unemployed according to 
the Paternal city. DA thus argued that “the phase-in salary should be 
introduced for the sake of the weaker groups, such as the young or long-
term unemployed with little attachment to the labour market – not for the 
sake of businesses.”29  
Proponents of both the ‘third labour market’ and the ‘phase-in salary’ 
typically wished to create non-skilled jobs for the supposedly non-skilled, 
marginalised groups of unemployed people. As in the case of the jobrotation 
scheme, training was only an instrument for the wage earners. Both were 
thus disregarding the value of Investing in the unemployed. If the 
unemployed were to increase their worth, DA argued, it ought to be 
through their own actions: 
What you can do is be decisive for what you get. It is that simple when you 
are young and about to enter the labour market. ‘What you can do’ is a 
combination of natural preconditions, wisdom and experiences. The latter is 
Paternal / 
critique of  
Investment 
 121 
 
especially important when you want to carve a place on the labour market. 
Experiences grow and alongside you become more worthy to the enterprise 
that has bought your labour.30  
The Paternal tension with the city of Investment was exemplified in a 
comment from the minister of education from Venstre, who criticised the 
“misunderstanding that unemployment is the result of the unemployed not 
being sufficiently talented”: 
It is not education that creates jobs but rather the other way round.(…) Of 
course the two sides of industry would like the state to take care of an 
increasing part of the labour force and ‘look after’ the young at the 
taxpayers’ expense. (…) Better by far if the labour market demanded a bit 
more work by reducing the wage increases for vulnerable groups and limit 
educational and professional barriers as well as rigid wage systems.31 
Mobilising the city of Redistribution, the ‘phase-in salary’ was strongly 
criticised by social democrats who “refused to support a policy of increasing 
wage inequality”32, as well as by LO:  
If we lower the wage in the extreme and take away all social goods, we could 
create an underground economy that would flourish as nicely as in Hong 
Kong. But I don’t feel inclined to believe that shoe shiner jobs and other 
unqualified jobs ought to contribute to solving the problems of Danish 
society.33 
As a way of accommodating this criticism of the ‘phase-in salary’ and make 
it more “digestible”, an economist proposed to use “tax subsidies; when 
businesses pay salaries according to qualifications, it is replenished by the 
tax system so the result is a socially acceptable total income.”34 
Despite the fact that none of the concrete proposals of the ‘phase-in salary’ 
or ‘third labour market’ were implemented, the temporary law introduced 
instruments that corresponded to their logics. For instance, employers were 
given the opportunity of getting a long-term unemployed person “on 
probation” for two weeks, while the said person would still receive 
dagpenge.35 In addition, all insured unemployed people under 25 would be 
offered a job after six months with a salary corresponding to their dagpenge.36 
The law also introduced a so-called “foals scheme” (følordningi) where the 
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young uninsured would work in public jobs for a reduced “training salary” 
(oplæringsløn).37  
F I N A N C I N G  P U T  T O  T H E  T E S T   
Alongside the more general debate initiated by the Social Commission, the 
Zeuthen Committee published recommendations that specifically targeted 
the “structural problems” of dagpengesystemet (Udredningsudvalget 1992). Part 
of the work concerned the financing of the system. All the committee’s 
recommendations addressed the problem of ‘structural unemployment’, but 
through mobilising ideas and instruments from the city of Insurance.  
In line with the reasoning of the diagnosis of structural unemployment, the 
Zeuthen Committee was concerned with how to “make unemployment 
more visible”.38 The reasoning was that if the unions negotiating wages 
could more clearly see the negative consequences of (too large) wage 
increases (inflation, reduced competitiveness for firms, and in the end 
unemployment), the wage levels could be stabilised. The committee 
suggested using “differentiated contributions”, making the individual 
contributions depend on the risk of unemployment in the given profession 
or industry.39 Employees enrolled in funds with a low risk of unemployment 
would hence pay lower fees than those with high levels of unemployment.  
The solution nourished an already existing debate on whether some 
industries were (ab)using dagpengeystemet more than others. The employers in 
the financial sector had complained that industries with short notice terms 
were “tapping more into dagpengesystemet than we do” and hence called for 
differentiated contributions according to the length of the terms of notice.40  
The idea of differentiated contributions was criticised, however, from the 
city of Redistribution due to the fact that membership of the Danish funds 
was voluntary. Even the centre-right newspaper Berlingske Tidende noted that 
the outcome of differentiated contributions would be that “all those with 
low risk within the existing unemployment funds will try to move to funds 
with low risk” thereby pulling them together in different “risk pools”, which 
would “probably have an unacceptable effect in terms of distribution”.41 
Insurance 
Redistribution 
 123 
 
Similarly, but in stronger language, the Social Democrats stated “it is anti-
social. Those, who are exposed the most to unemployment shouldn’t pay 
the most”.42 
The Zeuthen Committee also sparked the old recurring issue of the 
employers’ abuse of insurance to lay off workers in ‘quiet’ periods. At the 
same time, the metal workers’ union claimed that around 170,000 layoffs a 
year simply functioned as “relief” for employers.43 This justified the 
committee’s proposal to let employers pay for the second day of 
unemployment, which was strongly opposed by the employers themselves. 
For instance, employers in the construction industry argued that short-term 
layoffs were due to weather conditions: 
It is worrying that distinguished economists can believe that master builder 
Hansen44 can control God and the weather. Expectations of this kind ought 
to belong to the faculty of theology.45 
Another shelved Insurance proposal of differentiated contributions came 
from the DA, who wanted an “actual insurance system” by allowing the 
high earners to pay a larger fee in order to get a compensation closer to the 
wage level of their industry.46 
While the solutions from the city of Insurance were shelved, the idea that 
there was a need to make unemployment more ‘visible’ for the two sides of 
industry by letting them contribute more survived. The final finance reform 
of dagpengesystemet, which officially became part of a tax reform and not 
LAAP, is noteworthy because it provided a kernel that would requalify the 
role of Insurance. I will come back to this after the following section. 
R E Q U A L I F Y I N G  T H E  R O L E  O F  J O B  O F F E R S   
While the discussions of financing took place, the job offers scheme was 
crucially put to the test by various critiques. The first, based on a 
redistributive qualification, concerned the employers’ motivation for 
offering these jobs. A number of stories in the media showed how both 
private and public employers were using unemployed people enrolled in the 
job offer scheme as regular labour. In the private sector, the phenomenon 
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was especially widespread in the restaurant business, using what were 
known as “cheap girls” as permanent staff.47 An unemployed person 
working in a job offer reported that she “applied for work down here and 
was told that [she] could get a subsidy from [her] municipality”.48 According 
to the restaurant business workers’ union, it was not a singular case: 
Today it is unfortunately the exception if an employer hires an unemployed 
person with wage subsidies as extraordinary labour. They are hired as cheap 
labour for tasks that are absolutely necessary. And by constantly renewing 
the unemployed who are temporarily employed, in reality a part of the 
regular labour force is replaced by the unemployed.49 
An economist from the Zeuthen Committee labelled the job offers “badly 
disguised state subsidies to businesses” since the “long-term unemployed in 
job offers were stealing jobs from the permanently employed”.50 
Also, in the public sector the job offers seemed to serve a similar function. 
Social democrats called it “grotesque when the municipality of Copenhagen 
lays off 2,000 of the permanent staff in order to make room for 1,500 long-
term unemployed”.51 According to HK Kommunal, a union representing 
local authority employees, “it often happens that local authority employees 
are fired, and then two years later are back in the same job as long-term 
unemployed.”52 
A way of accommodating the critique, the then Conservative minister of 
labour suggested, was to tie it to the jobrotation scheme, hereby avoiding 
“that others are pushed aside, once the unemployed move in”.53 
The second critique of job offers concerned their function in relation to the 
unemployed. As seen above, their main legitimating function, when the 
scheme was created, was to make sure the unemployed would keep their 
right to compensation. This Insurance justification was now criticised, 
which allowed for a complete requalification of the content of the job 
offers. Qualified Paternally, Venstre accused the rationale of the job offers 
for having “the underlying purpose of bringing people back on passive 
relief”.54 Terms like “incubator youth” (kuvøseungdom) and the “put-away-
factory” flourished.55 The chairman of Radikale Venstre, Marianne Jelved 
joined in: 
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I find it plainly offensive (…) when young people can be ‘slipped’ into 
dagpengesystemet through artificial municipal employment projects. Hereafter, 
everyone thinks that everything in the garden is lovely. (…) It is an easy 
solution, but, to me, at the same time, an indecent solution.56 
The Social Commission spoke of putting an end to “riding on the eternal 
merry-go-round of unemployment”.57 A way of stopping it was to remove 
the right to requalify for compensation, which was currently tied to the job 
offers.  
The right to requalify was also criticised from the city of Investment, which 
argued that the job offers should serve the purpose of qualifying the 
unemployed to become employable for a regular job. According to two 
economists from the committee: 
The right to requalify is making it difficult to advance and ‘tailor’ the 
activation offers and it implies the danger of, in practice, limiting the aim of 
activation in practice to securing the unemployed another turn in 
dagpengesystemet.58  
The risk was also related to the employability of the unemployed: 
During a prolonged course of unemployment there is a risk that the 
unemployed gradually loses qualifications, job training and self-confidence. 
Hence, it often becomes more difficult to bring the person back to lasting 
employment the later he/she is ‘activated’, which speaks in favour of 
advancing the activation offers for particularly vulnerable groups.59 
The Investment now not only qualified the insiders on the labour market, 
but also the unemployed. Although the term ‘activation’ would henceforth 
stick to job offers and other schemes targeting the unemployed, the 
strengthening of educational Investments would question the singular 
Mobility aim of ‘activating’ the unemployed.  
The tension between Investment and Mobility became clearest after the 
beginning of 1993 when the Social Democrats formed a coalition 
government with Radikale Venstre and two other centre-right parties. It was 
hence up to the new government to shape the reform that would replace 
the temporary laws that were adopted less than a year before. As a result of 
the criticism, it was clear that the job offers were to be part of the reform. 
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However, although the new Social Democrat minister of labour, Jytte 
Andersen, considered the job offers an “evil on the labour market” she 
would not abolish the scheme “because, you see, if we did that, the 
unemployed would be kicked out of dagpengesystemet after two and a half 
years. Today, the job offers are a condition for keeping dagpenge.”60 Instead, 
the minister wanted “to find better ways of making use of [the dagpenge]. We 
must not activate the unemployed. We must activate the funds so they can 
be used for generating employment.”61 
The minister hence wanted to abolish the requirement (based on Insurance) 
that hindered the unemployed from making use of a job offer before their 
entitlement to compensation was about to expire. At the same, she wanted 
to loosen the Mobility requirements of “being at the disposal of the labour 
market”; in practice, the demands to apply for a number of jobs every week: 
In a situation with such high unemployment, we could turn a blind eye to 
the ones who have already received 50 rejections. For instance, today there 
are 200 shoe factory workers but only 12 jobs remain. Today the shoe 
factory workers must, alternately, apply for the same jobs. It’s utter 
nonsense. Some should perhaps be re-trained while others can use their 
spare time on culture or in the housing association.62 
The minister hereby justified a solution closer to the cities of Demand and 
Redistribution. The city of Demand was further used as a justification for 
the responsibility of the government to create jobs: 
The labour market reform cannot stand alone. It presupposes that the 
wheels start turning as well as the creation of activity in society, otherwise it 
won’t function as intended.63 
By the same logic, the metal workers’ union had urged the previous 
government to “spend time on creating jobs rather than simply ‘stirring the 
pot’”.64  
The Demand qualification of the situation, in addition, provided scope for 
the city of Redistribution. At least in this period of recession, the 
unemployed should be allowed to do things which are first and foremost 
worthy tasks related to being a citizen. Even education could be qualified 
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like that, as evident in SiD’si, the largest union representing unskilled 
workers, critique of “artificial jobs”: 
People should have the right to choose an education that provides them joy 
for the rest of their lives. It’s better to educate people to become whole 
persons than qualify them narrowly for jobs which don’t exist anyway.65   
The technicians’ union went further and wanted to “free the unemployed 
from being at the disposal to the labour market”, abolish the job-offers and 
offer all the unemployed an unconditional “basic benefit”.66 
However, in the ministers’ response to the latter proposal, it became clearer 
that there were limits to the critique of Mobility: 
What they want, after all, is that the unemployed can withdraw from being 
available and then almost introduce a guaranteed basic income. That, I 
think, is dangerous to our responsibility towards the unemployed.67   
The requirement to be available to the labour market was hence, according 
to the minister, a legitimate way of responsibilising the governing 
authorities. Remaining in the city of Mobility, she wanted them to “attach 
greater importance to the quality of the job search rather than the 
quantity”.68 Meanwhile, she wanted to abandon the unemployed’s right to 
employ themselves in “unconventional areas” which, (dis)qualified 
Paternally, “taste too much of care” (omsorg).69  
The government’s solution was, in something that was reminiscent of the 
ideas of the ‘third labour market’, to establish “flexible employment areas” 
by “activating dagpenge (…) in employment projects on the condition that 
some of the unemployed, without optimal labour power, are hired”.70 In her 
justification, the minister would oscillate between Mobility and Paternal 
cities. The fact that these projects would not “create export trade” was not 
an issue: 
We must live up to the obligation that people must have a reason to get out 
of bed. One can be annoyed about the people sitting on the benches with 
their big dogs and drinking beers. They’ve had some opportunities, but 
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perhaps no demands were made on them. Yes, of course, we too have a 
responsibility here, but I believe that the reorientation to quid pro quo (noget 
for noget) is a timely arrival.71  
The lack of responsible behaviour was thus rooted in the lack of conditions 
and requirements. Not only would the ‘new’ job offers ‘mobilise’ the 
unemployed by giving them “a reason to get out of bed”, they would also 
serve the Mobility of the working population by carrying out tasks such as 
“service personnel at train stations or ‘fever patrols’, nursing sick children 
for parents with a job outside the home”.72  
It was not only the Mobility and Paternal cities that provided justification 
for the further use of coercion. If the activation ought to be “tailored”, the 
rights not only had to be less “rigid” (firkantede) but also become “duties”: 
First of all we must set in much earlier and the offers must be targeted at the 
labour market-related needs of the unemployed individual. Not all have the 
same needs. In my opinion it must be a right for the unemployed individual, 
but also a duty to ensure that the individual receives the targeted offer.73  
The fusion of rights and duties would thus answer the Investment problem 
of how to ensure that the unemployed invest in themselves and make use of 
their (equalising) opportunities. 
The plurality of the qualification of job offers took it very far from the 
initial function of requalifying the unemployed for compensation. Although 
the government still justified the ‘non-abolishment’ of the scheme with the 
city of Insurance, the new qualifications would gradually sediment and turn 
them into something else. The final LAAP is the first proof of this dynamic 
and thus marks a ‘tipping point’. 
T H E  A M B I G U O U S  W O R T H  O F  J O B R O T A T I O N  
As mentioned above, the temporary law had introduced various leave 
schemes, named jobrotation, to provide entry points for the unemployed. A 
year after, only a fraction of the expected participants had made use of the 
schemes. Unions still saw a great potential to turn the question of activation 
into a matter of labour Redistribution: 
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If only five percent of the labour force is permanently in jobrotation, we can 
create 100,000 new jobs.74 
Earlier a Social Democrat mayor had also argued for the use of jobrotation as 
a way of “better distributing the remaining labour”75. In addition, it would 
“reduce the number of people who ought to have a job offer”.76    
According to the government, the brake holding back widespread usage of 
the scheme was the employers’ requirement to replace the employee on 
leave with an unemployed person. Although it was still justified for 
Redistribution, the abandonment of the requirement displaced the scope of 
the scheme. Its target was no longer necessarily the unemployed, but to 
“prevent layoffs”.77 Hence the scheme was decoupled from the unemployed 
while providing Investment in the further training of employees, or possibly 
for an unconditional “Sabbatical leave”. The latter would function as a kind 
of Mobility reward that was only granted to those with at least three years of 
employment. The Mobility qualification was also evident in the overall 
justification of the new jobrotation: 
We must try to make the labour market more flexible (smidigt), thus getting 
more rotation and increasing dynamism in society.78 
But the sabbatical leave was also problematic to the work ethic of the city of 
Mobility. An employment consultant provided a curious solution to this 
problem:  
For better or for worse, work is at the centre of an adult life. Outside of it - 
in weekends and holidays - are short periods in which one, pure and simple, 
is ‘off duty’. If you have the same conception of leave, it is understandable 
that a leave of 13 weeks instead of 3 is no longer that attractive.79  
The consultant hence suggested establishing “leave counselling” with the 
unemployed advising people in work on “how to set up goals and plan how 
to create growth and development in a period of leave”.80 The solution, 
however, did not sediment in the final LAAP legislation. 
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S E D I M E N T A T I O N :  T E S T S ,  S U B J E C T S  
By encompassing the four tests presented above, it probably comes as no 
surprise that the final reform adopted by the majority governmenti consisted 
of a rather complex set of instruments and laws. 
Regarding financing, the ideas of strengthening the Insurance elements were 
abandoned in favour of a tax reform. Whereas the state’s contributions to 
the insurance funds had been part of its core budget, they were now 
separated into three funds dealing with dagpenge, activation and sick pay 
respectively. The contributions would be collected by a special “labour 
market contribution” (arbejdsmarkedsbidrag) from the gross earnings that 
would be adjusted every two years (Folketinget 1993a). It would hence 
accommodate the wish of LO for an “economic connection between 
dagpenge and activation”. In this way, the costs of unemployment were made 
visible, but at the same time it would also, from the perspective of the 
working population, allow further scrutiny and tests concerning the effects 
of activation.  
The pivotal elements of the reform, however, concerned activation, job 
offers and leave. With regards to the latter, the modification of the scheme 
was much less a matter of distributing labour between people in work and 
the unemployed, and more an instrument to increase “dynamism” 
(Mobility), qualifications (Investment) and labour distribution with the aim 
of preventing people in work from becoming unemployed. Only the 
“Sabbath” obliged the employer to replace the employee with someone 
unemployed (Folketinget 1993c: § 9).  
However, the leave schemes of education and child care were also granted 
to the unemployed. The educational leave gave the unemployed an 
Investment of up to a year’s participation in a programme. While they still 
                                          
i The reason why Venstre and the Conservative Party rejected the reform, although it contained an array of 
their own proposals, was primarily because they were never invited to the negotiations, which only took 
place between the four parties in government (Torfing 2004: 206).  
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received dagpenge, the period would not count within the period of 
entitlement (Folketinget 1993d: § 55). 
The former two instruments, activation and job offers, would be integrated 
in a set up where, much like the French PARE, the enrolment begins with 
the formulation of an “individual action plan”. The plan describes the 
“employment goals of the unemployed”, outlining “activities to  achieve the 
goals” by taking its departure “in the wishes and qualifications of the 
unemployed, considering the needs of the labour market” (Folketinget 
1993b: § 11). At the same time, if the unemployed “without satisfactory 
reason refuses to participate in the preparation of the action plan, or refuses 
an offer with reference to the action plan”, they cannot receive dagpenge 
(Folketinget 1993d: § 16). Next to the Insurance-based tests that look 
backwards (whether unemployment is self-inflicted) (Folketinget 1992: § 
63), the LAAP introduces instruments that are “continuously revised”  and 
hence with the permanent possibility of putting the present and future 
actions of the unemployed to the test; as did the already existing Mobility 
obligation to be “at the disposal of the labour market” (Folketinget 1992: 
§62), although the action plan allows a larger variety of instruments related 
to both the Paternal and Investment cities, and always involves the 
possibility of sanctions in case of refusal. 
There are basically three possible “activities” within the action plan. The 
first is “job training”, which is similar to the existing job offers scheme, but 
with the difference that it can be introduced from day one and not only 
once the right to compensation is about to expire. Another notable change 
is that whereas the subsidised work previously requalified the unemployed 
for compensation, the job training now became part of the entitlement 
period (Folketinget 1993d: § 12, 21). The job training accommodates the 
city of Mobility, but in response to Redistribution criticism, the salary must 
be “according to collective agreements” and not “anti-competitive” 
(Folketinget 1993b: § 13, 14). The second activity is education, which can be 
either “ordinary educational activities” or a “specifically arranged 
educational programme” (Ibid.: § 16). The third activity is a “specifically 
arranged job training course”, which is only for the unemployed “who can 
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only obtain employment under normal wage and working conditions with 
difficulty” (Ibid.: § 22). In other words, these are jobs for the incompetent 
of the Paternal city, consisting of work “which would otherwise not be 
carried out by ordinary paid labour” (Ibid.).    
LAAP also changed the periods of entitlement. At first sight, the change 
from a total period of around nine years to seven appears less radical. The 
changes with regards to what takes place within the period are radical, 
however. Firstly, the distinction between periods of compensation and 
periods of work (e.g., job offers) that requalify the unemployed for 
compensation is dissolved. Instead, the entitlement period is divided into 
two “part periods” of four and three years. The first period should consist 
of at least one year of the abovementioned activities, based on the action 
plan. In contrast, in the second period, “efforts are made for (…) full time 
activities” (Ibid.: § 33). If this is not possible, the unemployed should 
“receive an offer of employment of an average of 20 hours” (Ibid.: § 34). 
This plain condition of working takes away the Insurance qualification of 
the unemployed in this period. They are no longer compensated, but 
exclusively rewarded for their behaviour, which is evaluated according to 
how they are qualified. Do they have Investment potential, are they simply 
having difficulties putting themselves at the disposal of the labour market 
(Mobility), or are they unemployable with little potential (Paternal)? Hence, 
the unemployed are continuously put to the test; a test that, as the law 
states, is based on “judgement” (skøn) (Ibid.: § 3). If an instrument fails, the 
unemployed are requalified, action plans are revised, and another 
instrument, or “combination” of instruments (Ibid.: § 25), is tested. The 
experimental character of the new arrangement is underlined by the fact 
that the unemployed may be offered other “trial and development 
initiatives” apart from the activities listed above (Ibid.: § 26). 
Hence, by requalifying a few instruments with relatively minor adjustments, 
LAAP tipped the whole dagpengesystemet towards the ‘active society’. This is 
not to say that dagpengesystemet from one day to the next was ‘active’ or 
‘activated’, but rather that it was now staged for consecutive tests and 
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transformations that brought it, and the unemployed, closer to the ‘active 
society’. 
This has certainly been the case in Denmark after LAAP. Since 1993 all talk 
about job sharing and a guaranteed citizen’s income have died away 
(Kolstrup 2014: 228). Rather, consecutive reforms have increased Incentives 
by shortening the entitlement period to two years, strengthening obligations 
to be available and geographically mobile, and speeding up and intensifying 
activation measures (Christensen and Petersen 2014). Reforms since 2003 
have toned down the educational possibilities in favour of Incentives and 
Mobility (Ibid.: 644, 662). The reduction of the entitlement period was 
seriously put to the test in the aftermath of the North Atlantic financial 
crisis, but it only resulted in minor changes and intensifications of other 
cities that drove the path towards the ‘active society’. Although a reform in 
2012 temporarily increased the entitlement period by half a year, its main 
‘solution’ to the unemployed in danger of losing the right to entitlement was 
more intense and personalised instruments (from the city of Mobility) in the 
form of a “job alert”, giving the unemployed a right to fast and 
extraordinary help finding a job (Ibid.: 705-7). 
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This final part of the thesis presents two reforms that address the problem 
of unemployment in different ways, but reach beyond the scope of the 
insurance and contribution-based systems. Whereas the two reforms in part 
II could be seen as ‘tipping points’ within these systems, the reforms in part 
III are rather modifications of systems that have already adjusted towards 
being more ‘active’ for several years. Both sets of reforms thus contain very 
little radical critique of the aim to make the governing/unemployed more 
active. The reforms thus intensify some of the dynamics that sediment in 
previous reforms. By intensifying, I mean a governing with more scope for 
the use of sanctions and coercion, an increasing will to avoid a laissez faire 
approach to the unemployed, an increased attention towards the behaviour 
of the unemployed (both in evaluations of the governing and in the 
governing itself), and finally the institutionalisation of tests that are used to 
further diversify the governing of the unemployed and to sanction 
inappropriate behaviour.  
While the reforms intensify the path towards the ‘active society’, they also 
exemplify different displacements within the path. The two reforms provide 
an interesting comparison between a reform that was mainly driven by ideas 
relating to the city of Incentives (the French case of RSA), and a reform 
driven by the city of Investment. However, none of the reforms are 
examples of a ‘pure’ mobilisation of a singular city; both cities shaped both 
reforms, alongside mainly the Mobility and Paternal cities. 
The ‘intense’ reforms exemplify dynamics that were less visible in the 
reforms of part II. Firstly, the city of Insurance is not, and has for obvious 
reasons never been, sedimented to the same degree in the systems that 
target the uninsured, and hence does not shape and  limit the qualification 
of the unemployed to the same degree. Instead, justifications of reforms in 
both cases entailed rather fierce criticism of the city of Redistribution as 
constraining or even inhibiting the emancipation of the unemployed. 
Although the city did not evaporate, it was marginalised in both cases to 
qualify issues beyond the actual governing, such as questions of financing. 
Secondly, the reforms also exemplify a dynamic in which the governing of 
unemployment is simultaneously a question of how to emancipate the 
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unemployed and a spectacle that suspiciously compares the behaviour of 
the unemployed to the morality of society in general. Intensification is thus 
reflected in an increasingly intimate governing with increasing and 
continuous attention towards the behaviour of the unemployed, both in 
order to emancipate and control them – the two aims often being 
impossible to separate. This dynamic is evident both in new instruments of 
screening, categorising, support, coercion and control, as well as in public 
attention towards the intimate life of the unemployed. AKGN is in this 
regard an extreme case of how the unemployed became ‘affairs’ of ‘intimate 
spectacles’.  
Finally, the cases show how poverty among the uninsured unemployed can 
be qualified and put to the test in the ‘active society’. The threshold of 
poverty is highly ‘qualifiable’ by the Paternal, Mobility and Incentives cities, 
but on the other hand tend to exclude the morality of the city of 
Redistribution. Whereas the city of Redistribution would intervene directly 
in the phenomenon, poverty in the ‘active society’ becomes something that 
should be governed with attention to its effects on other dynamics. It can 
be governed too much and too little. Governing poverty in the city of 
Incentives is on the one hand a matter of ensuring that the unemployed are 
capable of playing the game of economic men on the labour market, and on 
the other ensuring that there are still sufficient incentives to work. In the 
Paternal city, governing poverty is about striking a balance between charity 
and not caring too much, which would fail to responsibilise the 
unemployed. In the city of Mobility, eradicating poverty may infringe upon 
society’s work ethic by accepting a lack of will to work. In the city of 
Investment, poverty is a potential problem to the idea of equal 
opportunities, especially for children, but it also raises the question of when 
inequality becomes an illegitimate matter of unequal opportunities, or a 
legitimate outcome of unequal talent as well as the will to use it. 
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6 
‘Income of active solidarity’ 
Putting the poor and low-paid work to the test in France 
The reform process of the Revenu de Solidarité active (‘Income of active 
solidarity’, henceforth RSA) was launched at the end of 2007, which was at 
the beginning of Nikolas Sarkozy’s presidency. RSA replaced RMI (Revenu 
minimum d'insertion), which had been in place since 1988. RMI had both 
introduced a guaranteed minimum income and measures that would aim to 
reintegrate the recipient into society and/or the labour market, and was 
organised in a contract between the recipient and the state. RSA entailed a 
negative tax scheme to increase incentives for recipients to take low-paid 
part-time work, while also introducing a number of instruments and 
obligations with the aim of increasing the mobility of the unemployed. The 
reform also introduced intensified control of the financial behaviour of the 
household of the recipient. Figure 5 below provides an overview of the key 
events during the debate up to the passing of PARE. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section analyses the creation 
of RMI with a view to present how the scheme was the result of 
compromises between certain cities of unemployment, as well as look into 
subsequent modifications of the scheme. The next section addresses how 
the justification of RSA was closely linked to a specific critique of RMI 
where certain cities of unemployment were mobilised while others were 
denounced. The third section presents how the justifications of RSA 
interpellated and aimed to emancipate unemployed subjects belonging to a 
number of cities. The next three sections present three test situations in 
which, firstly, the behaviour of the recipient; secondly, the threshold 
between part-time and full-time work; and thirdly, the financing of RSA 
were put to the test. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
sedimentation of tests in the adopted law of RSA. 
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Figure 5: Timeline RSA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T H E  W I L L S  T O  I N S E R T I O N   
As mentioned in chapter 4, the French post-war unemployment system was 
mainly composed of corporatist contribution-based schemes (including 
Assurance chômage) and a tax-financed system of “assistance” for the most 
needy. The 1970s and 80s led to the establishment of state-led schemes of 
“solidarity” that targeted the increasing number of unemployed who had 
exhausted their rights and hence fell between the Assurance chômage and the 
system of assistance. Despite the introduction of solidarity schemes in the 
1980s, there were still groups without any rights to support (Béraud and 
Eydoux 2011: 132). For instance, the most important scheme of solidarity, 
ASS (allocation de solidarité spécifique), required the unemployed to have 
acquired five years of work during the preceding ten years (Daniel and 
Tuchszirer 1999: 325). An influential report in 1987 estimated that around 
400,000 people were without social protection cover (Palier 2002: 306). 
In the 1970s, the growing number of long-term unemployed were 
interpellated as “les nouveaux pauvres” subject to “social exclusion”. The term 
had already been introduced in 1965 by the sociologist Jules Klanfer 
(Beland 2007: 126). His book, L’exclusion sociale, provided a Paternal 
explanation as to why a large number of Frenchmen were decoupled from 
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the prosperous effects of the economy. Klanfer spoke of, for instance, 
“personal traits” that characterised the unemployed, such as 
“indecisiveness”, “lack of maturity” and an “absence of the notion of social 
and personal responsibility” (Klanfer 1965: 69).  
In the late 1970s, social exclusion entered the political debate and was 
coupled with the idea of policies of insertion. Here social exclusion involved 
other qualifications. In accordance with the city of Redistribution, the 
problem of social exclusion was a problem of citizenship (Barbier and 
Fargion 2004: 442). In the French context, this involved social, economic 
and political participation; all of which the group was excluded from and 
where poverty was seen as the main barrier (Béland and Hansen 2000: 56). 
At the same time, the dynamics causing exclusion were seen as socially 
created and related to the city of Investment. For instance, the civil servant 
René Lenoir pointed to a number of phenomena related to urbanisation 
that resulted in “uprooting” (Lenoir 1974; cf. Beland 2007: 126). Lenoir 
criticised the educational system for being too uniform and privileging some 
intellectual qualities (competiveness) while disfavouring others (creativity), 
thus treating children with the same IQ unfairly (Lenoir 1974: 25). The 
solution for Lenoir was to introduce polices that aimed at “prevention 
rather than cure” (Ibid.: 84).  
It was in this context that the non-contributory scheme of RMI was created 
in 1988. The scheme was meant for those with little to no income and 
incapable of working (Palier 2002: 323). The incapacity could be related to 
age and the mental and physical condition of the unemployed, but also the 
situation of the economy and employment. It thus disregarded the Paternal 
distinction between those who can (and should) work and those who 
cannot (cf. Castel 1995: 695).i RMI contained a guarantee of a minimum 
level of resources to anyone aged 25 or over by installing a means-tested 
differential benefit (Palier 2010a: 84). The aim of inclusion was 
institutionalised in a contrat d’insertion between the recipient and ‘society’, 
which was embodied in the social worker where the recipient committed 
                                          
i See also chapter 3, p. 57 
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herself to engaging in a projet d’insertion (Ibid.). The activities encompassed 
health, housing, counselling and activities that targeted employment, such as 
job search and professional or educational internships  (Barbier and Théret 
2001: 161-62; Palier 2002: 324).  
Embedded in the RMI reform, and in its aim of insertion, was thus a 
compromise between requalifying the unemployed for citizenship by means 
of Redistribution to make her work and become worthy in accordance with 
the city of Mobility, and providing her with better chances by Investing in 
her qualifications and skills. The tension resulted in debates on the 
conditionality of the benefit related to the recipient’s behaviour (Barbier and 
Théret 2001: 162). In practice, however, RMI mainly served the 
redistributive aim. The aim of up-skilling was challenged by the problem of  
a lack of resources and overloaded institutions, and only half of the 
recipients signed a contract and very few of those were sanctioned (Ibid.). 
When the scheme was evaluated three years after its initiation, it was judged 
effective in improving recipients’ living conditions, while the Mobility and 
Investment effects of inclusion in the labour market were limited (Ibid.: 
168-69).  
However, RMI was also qualified and shaped in accordance with a fourth 
city, namely Incentives. In 1974 the economist Lionel Stoleru, in his book 
Vaincre la pauvreté, claimed that the problem of poverty was not in 
contraction to developed welfare states but correlated with it (Stoleru 1974). 
In the book he presented the idea of a “negative tax”, i.e., a benefit that 
gradually decreases until a certain income has been reached. According to its 
first proponent, Milton Friedman, it thus “makes explicit the cost borne by 
society.”  
It operates outside the market. Like any other measure to alleviate poverty, 
it reduces the incentives of those helped to help themselves, but it does not 
eliminate incentive entirely, as a system of supplementing incomes up to 
some fixed minimum would. An extra dollar earned always means more 
money available for expenditure. (Friedman 1962: 162) 
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The ‘founding father’ of RMI, the socialist prime minister and adherent to 
the Deuxième gauchei Michel Rocard, hired Stoleru to prepare the law.1 
Although the RMI reform, as seen above, entailed other qualifications, the 
city of Incentives and the negative tax were integrated in the “differential” 
component that made the size of the benefit dependent on whether the 
recipient received other benefits.  
The target population of RMI was estimated to be around 400,000 people, 
yet more than one million people have received RMI since the 1990s (1.1 
million in 1992; 1.2 million in 2008). If one includes spouses and children of 
recipients, then the total number reaches 3.5 million (Palier 2010a: 84). The 
‘success’ of the scheme was increasingly problematised during the 1990s and 
2000s. The evaluations were often orchestrated by the state itself as RMI 
marked an experimental phase with permanent evaluations of the effects of 
social policy instruments (Palier 2002: 235; Castel 1995: 697).  
R M I ’ S  I N T E R F E R E N C E  W I T H  W O R K  
The criticisms of RMI were mobilised from mainly the Incentives, Mobility 
and Paternal cities, all of whom questioned the Redistributive element of 
the scheme in some way. The criticisms all agreed that the problems of 
exclusion, and even poverty, could not be resolved by redistribution. It was 
within this setting that RSA would later arrive.   
At the end of the 1990s, RMI was intensely qualified and criticised from the 
city of Incentives. Analyses showed that recipients of RMI were losing 
income if they took up low-paid part-time jobs (Palier 2005: 139). To take 
one example of a problem that the analyses raised, the RMI reform was 
connected to a number of ‘secondary social benefits’ (droits connexes), such as 
Prime de noel and housing benefits, which further disincentivised the 
unemployed to take low-paid jobs (Vlandas 2013: 120). The most important 
reform following in the footsteps of the critique of disincentives was the 
Prime pour l’emploi (PPE, ‘Premium for employment’) in 2001 (Palier 2010a: 
                                          
i On the Deuxième gauche, see chapter 4, p. 84. 
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90). Based on the logic of negative tax, this offered a (minor) tax credit to 
encourage low-paid jobs in order to counter “inactivity traps” (Palier 2005: 
139). 
The PPE reform, however, did not radically change the belief that RMI 
performed poorly (Palier 2010a: 85). However, ideas surrounding the model 
of negative tax still occupied governments at the beginning of the new 
millennium. In 2005 a commission proposed a scheme, labelled the revenu de 
Solidarité active (RSA, ‘Income of active solidarity’), which aimed to 
strengthen incentives to work with in-work benefits for low-paid and often 
part-time employees (Hirsch 2005). RSA was supported by all centrist 
parties. Up until the election of UMPi candidate Nikolas Sarkozy as 
president in 2007, the socialist candidate Ségolène Royal had included RSA 
in her campaign.2 However, soon after his inauguration in May, Sarkozy 
initiated the experimentation with the RSA scheme in 17 départementsii.  
RSA seemed to fit with Sarkozy’s electoral campaign of “rehabilitating 
work” (réhabiliter le travail) as it valued the work ethic of the city of Mobility 
and, with a Paternal qualification, promised policies for “the France that 
gets up early” (la France qui se lève tôt).iii The campaign entailed a criticism of 
the “Aubry law”, which introduced the 35 hour week, and the idea of 
Redistributing the total work load.iv France was a “country drugged on 35 
hours”3. One of the slogans of the campaign was thus “work more to gain 
more” (travailler plus pour gagner plus) (Hirsch et al. 2008: 309). TEPA (La loi 
en faveur du travail, de l'emploi et du pouvoir d'achat) was the first act of Sarkozy 
and his government led by François Fillon. Apart from the experimentation 
with RSA, the law entailed a “tax shield” (bouclier fiscal) that reduced the 
income share that can be taken by direct taxes from 60 to 50 percent, and a 
complete tax exemption for overtime work. The overtime (de)regulation in 
                                          
i UMP (L'Union pour un mouvement populaire) is a centre-right party created by Jacques Chirac in 2002.  
In 2015 it was renamed Les républicains. 
ii Départments is one of three governmental levels below the national level, situated between the regional 
and the municipal level. There are currently 101 départements in France. 
iii “Getting up early” refers to the French proverb, “Le monde appartient à ceux qui se lèvent tôt” 
corresponding to the English, “The early bird catches the worm”. Initiative and responsibility hence ought 
to be (further) rewarded. 
iv See chapter 4, p. 86. 
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particular had the aim of stimulating Demand by increasing people’s 
purchasing power through increased working hours (Lizé 2013).  
The tension between Redistribution and the government’s justification was 
also clear in its criticism of the existing RMI scheme. Sarkozy criticised the 
“sledgehammer argument” of increasing social expenses and taxes to 
combat poverty, which had done nothing but “serve to buy the silence of 
those that live on the fringes of society. Our social expenses have never 
been this high (…) If this was a strategy that worked we would know about 
it”.4 The minimum allowances should again serve the “role of a safety net 
and not as a settlement of all outstanding accounts”.5 This kind of criticism 
was widespread on the right. A commentator from Le Figaro spoke of the 
“generous allocations of the nourishing (nourricier) state” where “the suicidal 
social minima policy had brought about a phenomenon of a descending 
social elevator (descenseur social)”6, while a deputy from the UMP stressed that 
they should “finally break with this ‘French preference for unemployment 
and exclusion’ that maintains, with the help of some billions of social 
benefits, several millions of our co-citizens far away from the labour market, 
that is away from society full stop”.7  
The criticism thus often qualified RMI Paternally as being too caring. 
Judged on this scale, it qualified the social system as the “assistanat”; a term 
denouncing the allocation of benefits as ‘maternal’ and its recipients as 
‘assisted’.  The diagnostic of RMI also entailed a critique of the aim of 
insertion. According to Hirsch, the system of RMI had “stiffened”, leaving 
people in a “permanent pseudo-insertion”8. Since two thirds of the 
recipients of RMI were capable of working, “the system had wrapped up 
(emballé) and shut up (enfermé) a population that it was not created for. These 
people are not in need of social care.”9 It was thus not further Investment 
this group needed. RMI was thus the exemplary case of a general problem 
related to the city of Insurance: 
Society has functioned as a centrifuge throwing the least efficient outside of 
the system. In place of adapting the demands in order to make room for the 
most vulnerable, the mechanisms of compensation have been multiplied, 
category by category. (…) The route towards insertion is often composed of 
gates that are half open and then closed.10 
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The questioning of both the cities of Investment and Insurance was also 
evident in Lionel Stoleru’s diagnosis of the scheme he himself had 
contributed to. The first problem of RMI was that it did not contain the 
“means to treat all the RMIstes individually; the ‘I’ had cost much more than 
the ‘RM’”11. To Stoleru, the ‘I’ was not a matter of Investment, but simply 
created to “reassure the deputies obsessed by the ‘misdemeanour of 
laziness’” thereby satisfying the worth of the city of Mobility.12 Importantly, 
however, RMI did not live up to the city of Incentives. Whereas Stoleru had 
suggested “the richer a citizen is, the more positive tax he pays; the poorer 
he is, the more negative tax he receives”, RMI “did not have this quality”.13    
It is given to the one who has nothing and completely removed from the 
one who finds a job and a revenue again. From the moment one gains 100 
euro by working, one loses 100 euro of RMI. This is obviously not very 
motivating for working.14 
Not surprisingly, Stoleru supported the RSA project. The main challenge 
with regards RSA, however, was its “complexity”. In order to be “efficient”, 
the scheme had to be “comprehensible and comprehended”. Contrary to 
the PPE, which “not one beneficiary [had] ever understood; not why, how 
or when he reaches it”, the recipient ought to “appropriate” RSA in order 
to respond to it as an economic man.15  
R E Q U A L I F Y I N G  P O V E R T Y  
In order to carry through the experimentation of RSA and prepare the 
scheme for nation-wide implementation, the government created the Haut 
commissariat aux solidarités actives contre la pauvreté, headed by the inventor of 
the scheme and former chairman of the 2005 commission, Martin Hirsch. 
The hiring was somewhat controversial since Hirsch was considered a figure 
of the left and not in favour of TEPA. Before obtaining the position as haut 
commissaire, Hirsch was president of the association Emmaüs, an influential 
secular NGO working against the exclusion of homeless people and created 
in 1949 by the catholic priest Abbé Pierre, one of the most popular public 
figures in France.  
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It was Hirsch who, together with Sarkozy, launched the experimentation 
with RSA in 16 départments in October 2007i. The process was labelled a 
grenelle d’insertion, a kind of consultative roundtable where unions, 
professionals, recipients of RMI and civil society associations were invited 
to join by initially signing a letter committing themselves to the 
government’s objective of reducing the poverty rate by one third within five 
years. Most NGOs, however, were sceptical. According to the Collectif 
Allerte, many of the government’s actions during the first five months had 
“been in contradiction with the goal of reducing poverty”.16 Even Hirsch’s 
former employer Emmaüs refused to “sign a blank check to the 
government”.17 Despite the scepticism, Hirsh defended RSA with great 
dedication throughout the reform process, and contrary to many of 
Sarkozy’s other policy programmes, the RSA scheme itself was supported 
by all centrist political actors.  
Hirsch’s “fight against poverty” was first of all a fight against “poverty 
traps” in encouraging an inquiry into the variety in behavioural responses to 
monetary stimuli within the targeted population of 2 million:18 
How many children? How many working poor? How many single-parent 
families? It is all this data, the chosen measures, the analyses of their effects, 
judged in the light of this accepted objective. Setting an objective makes you 
follow it. (…) The social issue hereby becomes a political issue. Setting an 
objective makes it possible to see in plain sight where poverty hits the most, 
within which age groups and within which categories, thereby making the 
mechanisms that create it come into the open in order to set up the ones to 
combat it. This is what we have done. With a special attention towards the 
working poor. Why? Because it is a transitional (charnière) population. 
Accepting poverty in work is the same as making all voluntarism in favour 
of returning to employment illusory, and it implies letting the organised 
cleavages around the more and more fragile protections expand. It is to 
these cleavages that the revenue de solidarité active must contribute with a 
response. It was conceived to remove poverty traps and ensure that, for 
those who are at an active age, work constitutes the pedestal of income to 
which the national solidarity must not replace, but complement.19   
                                          
i In the end, 41 departments took part in the experimentation. 
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The problem of poverty was thus not a lack of Redistribution, but related to 
the allegedly problematic convergence of work and poverty. Poverty was 
thus re-qualified, in Sarkozy’s words, from a “consequence” to “repair”, to a 
phenomenon with “causes”.20 It became a dependent variable which, for 
that very same reason, could only be addressed through independent 
variables, and not directly. 
E M A N C I P A T I N G  T H E  E C O N O M I C ,  C O N S U M I N G ,  
W O R K I N G ,  R E S P O N S I B L E ,  U N ( D E R ) E M P L O Y E D  
The recipient of RMI was thus ‘trapped’ and the RSA scheme became the 
emancipatory solution. The various instruments of RSA claimed to 
emancipate unemployed subjects from four cities: Incentives, Mobility, 
Demand and Paternal.     
This emancipation was evidently both part of the justification and 
governmental set-up of RSA. The RSA, according to Hirsch, was “essential” 
because it involved “the win-win principle” that “if you start working again, 
you won’t lose money”, which eventually would “motivate the people to 
exit unemployment”.21 An unemployed person who participated in the 
experiment responded in accordance with the interpellation:  
It’s motivating because I know that if I do more hours, my RSA will 
increase.22 
Although the actual rate of the negative tax was not settled, the overall logic 
of the instrument in the RSA scheme was clear. The principle was 
integrated by adding a supplementary benefit on top of the existing RMI 
that would reward the hours worked by the un(der)employed; a reward that 
gradually decreases with each additional hour until a threshold of between 
1.1 to 1.2 times SMIC.23  
The justification as well as the instruments of RSA were, however, much 
more composite than Stoleru’s ‘pure’ perspective from the city of 
Incentives. Although the core instrument rested on the economic man, the 
RSA as a whole responded to, and sought to emancipate, other unemployed 
Incentives  
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subjects. Firstly, the negative tax scheme emancipated the subject of the city 
of Demand, namely the consumer: 
Every time an unemployed person finds a job, he improves his purchasing 
power.24 
The goal of the government was hence both to “decrease unemployment 
and maintain consumption”.25 
Secondly, the negative tax scheme did not solely strengthen Incentives to 
change the behaviour of the economic man; regardless of his behaviour, it 
satisfied the ‘active’ working man of the city of Mobility and removed a 
potential excuse for its antithesis, the lazy unemployed. In Sarkozy’s words, 
the scheme thus aimed to “rehabilitate work” and ensure that  
not a single person can say:  If I get up this morning, I will earn as much as 
if I did nothing.26 
The city of Incentives has no problem with the lazy. Rather, it assumes that 
everyone is lazy and adjusts the environment accordingly. Stoleru, for 
instance, had no problem with artists choosing to live from benefits. “Had 
RMI existed”, Stoleru imagined, “perhaps Van Gogh and Verlaine would 
have suffered a little less”.27 The prime minister provided a similar 
perspective when he stated that it was not the recipients of RMI “who 
should be condemned; it’s the system that derails.”28 
However, abstaining from work is not a legitimate option in the RSA 
scheme. When the president visited one of the départements in which RSA 
had been experimented with, a father said that “because of RSA, I was able 
to buy a bicycle for 15 euros for my son”. Sarkozy allegedly responded:  
You are out of the assistanat (…), you have moved from survival to life 
(survie à la vie): the exit road is work, again work, always work.29 
RSA therefore addressed neither the poverty nor the purchasing power of 
the non-working unemployed. RSA transformed the unemployed individual 
from being a stigmatised ‘assisted’ person into an underemployed worker 
who strove to work more: 
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RSA will not figure on the payslip. The employer will not know of it and 
will not know the sum. An employee benefitting from RSA will then be an 
employee like anyone else.30 
In accordance with the cities of Incentives and Mobility, it thus functions as 
a kind of reward system, but also a ‘signalling’ system to reinstall justice for 
all those who “get up early” to work. RSA thus, according to Hirsch, 
excluded the “absurd moment where you regret working because it makes 
you lose other revenues”.31 Sarkozy addressed those who pay for the 
scheme in a televised interview: 
I want to tell the Frenchmen, it’s you who pay for RMI, but with RMI you 
don’t live, you survive. What I will do is give these people a chance to 
rehabilitate through work and not through the assistanat.32 
Mobility was also intensified by other instruments. Sarkozy noticed that 
“with 2.2 million unemployed, it is absurd to have around 500,000 vacant 
jobs without any takers”33.  
The vast majority of the unemployed try to find a job. There are some who 
don’t want to set out for work. It’s a minority, but it’s a minority that 
shocks.34  
Hence, Sarkozy argued for a “sanctioning process for an unemployed 
person who refuses two jobs that correspond to his qualifications and his 
salary aspirations”35. In Hirsch’s words, the “rule of active search for 
employment” would contribute to “putting an end to the imbalance 
between rights and obligations.”36. The “assistanat” would thus be “replaced 
by a logic of rights and obligations applicable to beneficiaries, public 
authorities and to companies.”37 Why? “because there are no rights without 
recompense.”38 Thus, the RSA would naturally both  
reinforce the quality of personalised support and make sure (veiller à) of the 
effective application of sanctions towards those who do not play the game. 
RSA must be the decisive little push (coup de pouce) towards work, not a new 
form of life-time revenue.39  
The justification thus entailed this ambiguous qualification of the 
emancipation of the majority and potential punishment of a lazy minority.  
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There was very little criticism that radically questioned the general 
justification or instruments of RSA. As RSA had been part of the socialists’ 
programme, it was hard to criticise. Most criticism came from sociologists 
and unemployed people who argued that RSA strengthened the idea that 
unemployment is the fault of the unemployed. The “responsibilisation of 
the individual”, a sociologist noted, turns the unemployed into “culprits” in 
“failure”.40 A collective of the unemployed criticised RSA for suspecting 
them of “fraud”.41 The criticism was a response to a draft of the legislator’s 
proposal that had been leaked to the public and which stated that RSA 
would include control of the recipients’ “way of life” (train de vie) in order to 
track potential “pronounced disproportions”.42 A commentator, mobilising 
the city of Redistribution, argued that “the fight against poverty necessitates 
questioning the foundation of our economic logic and entails terminating 
the shaming and tracking of those who cannot manage to make ends 
meet.”43 Similarly, a social worker denounced “the complete harassment” 
involved, while an unemployed person denounced the “systematic 
surveillance” of RMI recipients.44  
The criticism thus mainly targeted an issue related to the city of Insurance, 
that of fraud, and did not really question the morality of the cities used to 
justify the scheme. A criticism of a young woman and long-term recipient of 
RMI, Gwenn Rosière, is quite symptomatic of this dismantling of radical 
critique. Rosière responded to a local call for opinions on the RSA scheme 
that was about to be launched in her département as part of the grenelle. Her 
highly critical letter somehow reached Hirsch, who responded and initiated 
a correspondence that would later be published in a book (Hirsch et al. 
2008). Rosière initially posed a critique in line with the one presented in this 
paragraph, but her letters, as well as the whole book, ended up supporting 
the project. According to Hirsch, Rosière, “seemed, in the most natural way, 
to having understood our approach” (Ibid.: Blurb).  
The absence of a substantial critique of the subject of emancipation meant 
that the criticism either missed its target by only denouncing coercive and 
controlling measures, or was sucked into the pragmatic quest of how to 
emancipate. 
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P U T T I N G  T H E  R E C I P I E N T ’ S  B E H A V I O U R  T O  T H E  T E S T  
The lack of a radical critique of RSA coincided with the extensive evaluation 
of the experiments taking place throughout the country (Okbani 2013). In 
the same experimental spirit, the haut commissariat had produced a green 
paper inviting stakeholders and citizens to contribute to solving a number 
of specific challenges related to RSA (Hirsch 2008). Thus, simultaneously 
with the justifications concerning emancipation and what is commonly 
good for ‘Frenchmen’, a pragmatic quest for who the unemployed were and 
what makes their behaviour change was taking place. The mobilisation of 
the cities of unemployment thus bind together the moral and pragmatic 
processes. 
First of all the experiments led to controversies within the city of Incentives. 
For instance, the socialist president of a department complained that the 
government’s rate of decrease of RSA would be higher than the one his 
department had experimented with, which would make “the incentive to 
return to employment a lot smaller”.45 The economist Thomas Piketty 
questioned whether the rise in “profits” from around 150 euros in the PPE 
to 200 euros for taking a part-time job, as well as the abandonment of the 
maximum duration of one year, would “boost the rate of exit from RMI to 
part-time work”.46 The testing also led to a lot of debate concerning the 
Incentives to part-time work, which will be presented in the next section. 
However, the tests did not simply confirm the existence of the economic 
man. A local social worker, for instance, noted that “for a certain number of 
people, RSA will supplement their meagre resources. For them it’s a strong 
encouragement”.47 However, there was also another group of recipients: 
Some are really helpless facing employment. And when a contract appears 
they need a considerable support, sometimes a mediation with the employer, 
simply because they no longer dare ask if they can join their colleagues in 
the coffee breaks.48  
The social worker thus pointed to barriers to Mobility that, for some, were 
there regardless of Incentives. Another social worker thought that the 
unemployed often disregard Incentives in order to acquire worth in the city 
of Mobility: 
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Work is predominantly seen as a way to insure the future and acquire a 
social status. Often the beneficiaries accept a job, even if they have no 
financial interest in doing so.49   
A beneficiary, working 12 hours a week despite any change in income, 
justified her behaviour in a way that would be disqualified in the city of 
Incentives, but highly appreciated in the city of Mobility: 
I like it. It gets me moving.50   
Alongside the experiments, a number of surveys of the unemployed were 
conducted in order to trace the barriers to returning to employment. The 
surveys put the cities to the test vis-à-vis each other. For instance, an opinion 
poll showed that 32% considered the absence of job offers to be the biggest 
obstacle to employment (Demand), while 8% mentioned health issues and 
6% age (Insurance).51 27% emphasised the fact that the offers were “not 
suitable” as being the main obstacle. This was kind of a black box that could 
be interpreted according to a number of cities; for 39% of respondents, 
offers were unsuitable since they did not correspond to their qualifications 
(Investment), whereas for 19% the offers were too short-term (Insurance), 
or it was uncertain whether they would gain financially by taking the offer 
(Incentives).52 Similarly, 62% of unemployed people in another survey 
pointed to their inadequate training for the profiles that employers were 
looking for.53  This could be taken as a problem of inadequate investment in 
skills, or an insufficient quality of jobs, but they also correspond to some 
degree with the idea of the unadaptable unemployed.   
Whereas beneficiaries thus did not really put great emphasis on their own 
inner economic man, 86% of them estimated that the incentives of RSA 
would encourage beneficiaries to become professionally active.54 Similarly, 
another survey conducted by the Comité d’évaluation of the haut commissariat 
confirmed that 42% of the beneficiaries in the “zones” of experimentation 
“would, thanks to RSA, accept a job that they would have refused before”55. 
Although this confirmed that many recipients would like to respond to the 
economic stimuli, the comité concluded that the only “certainty” with regards 
to the effects of RSA was that a “tailor-made support when it comes to help 
to mobility or child care removes some of the barriers to employment”.56 
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Another survey conducted by the ministry of work that specifically targeted 
parents showed that their job searches were mainly limited by an “absence 
of means of transport, the price of transport and child care”57. Yet another 
survey, this time of recipients of PPE, confirmed this mobility problem. 6 
out of 10 recipients evoked the “cost of job searches (transport, 
correspondence)”.58 The evaluations thus led to a number of proposals 
supposed to improve the means of Mobility for the unemployed. An 
advisor of Hirsch proposed the financing of driving licences59, and a 
politician from the UMP suggested offering an “option” that would 
temporarily cover displacement expenses and child care.60 The socialists 
went even further and called for the establishment of a “genuine public 
service of early childhood, whose absence limits the access of women to 
work”.61 
The evaluations thus came to underpin the need for intensifying Incentives 
and Mobility in instruments as well as for treating the unemployed as a 
diverse group with different needs and values. 
T H E  P R O B L E M A T I C  T H R E S H O L D S  T O  A N D  F R O M  P A R T -
T I M E  W O R K  
An important justificatory context of why RSA was primarily concerned 
with poor part-time workers was SMICi, the universally guaranteed 
minimum wage and the main instrument in France to prevent the 
phenomenon of the working poor. An influential report by a group of 
economists for the governmental Conseil d’analyse économique thus argued that 
with the increasing amount of part-time work, SMIC was “not an effective 
instrument to reduce poverty”.62 The report was in fact commissioned to 
argue for fixing the rate of SMIC, which the government considered too 
high, but it also served as a justification for RSA.63 The economists on the 
one hand wanted to transfer the question of minimum wages to the 
negotiations of the two sides of industry, and on the other hand let RSA 
become the main instrument to fight poverty. 
                                          
i Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance 
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Although the negative tax scheme of RSA strengthened Incentives for the 
unemployed to take part-time jobs in particular, it was uncertain whether it 
would have any significant effect. However, the consequences for the 
threshold from part-time to full time work were potentially disincentivising. 
To Thomas Piketty, RSA would lead to a “strong reduction in the 
difference between working 20 and 35 hours a week.64 UMP members had 
similar concerns. The difference between part-time and full-time work of 
around 200 euro was “too weak” and “not consistent with ‘work more to 
gain more’”.65 Another spoke of the “risk of perpetual part-time work”.66 
Another economist, Michel Godet, was even harsher in his critique of the 
“perverse” effects of incentivising part-time work: 
A person working at 60% [of a full working week] on an RSA contract can 
have the same resources available as a wage earner working full time and 
paid SMIC, and even more if one considers the connected advantages of 
RMI that beneficiaries of RMI continue to benefit from. (…) How was it 
possible to transform the good intentions of the active solidarities into 
unjust, useless, and perverse transfers? By enriching the working poor, one 
risks in fact maintaining them in the trap of part-time work and discourage 
full-time wage earners. The latter will be rebellious from not gaining more 
while they work more.67 
Not only did RSA lead to ‘perverse’ Incentives, it also infringed the work 
ethic of the full-time workers paid close to the SMIC rate. RSA was thus 
criticised by mobilising the same cities that were used to justify it. 
Accordingly, RSA also faced criticism of the same Paternal kind that had 
been posed against RMI. RSA “remained the most complete form of the 
assistanat” and simply consisted of “playing good Samaritans”.68 
Hirsch responded directly to the “falsehoods” of Godet.69 RSA would 
ensure that “a person that passes from inactivity to activity will not end up 
with revenues superior to a low-wage-earner. The latter will therefore also 
receive an additional revenue de solidarité active.”70 Regarding the “connected 
advantages” of RMI, they would no longer be “attached to a status, but be 
proportional to the revenue.”71 Finally, Hirsch warned against this kind of 
criticism: 
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Before the presidential election everyone, or almost, was favourable to the 
revenue de solidarité active. During the past year, it has had few detractors. On 
the contrary, it was supported so passionately that one person told me in a 
mocking tone that it would be dropped by the president of the republic. 
Today, when he makes it in strict respect of its initial principles, one sees the 
temptation of denigration, the fear of acting out, the apology of the status 
quo. (…) It is however remarkable to note that those who created RMI (…) 
are in favour of transforming it into revenue de solidarité active. I find it more 
comfortable to be loyal to their convictions rather than changing 
positions… or not having one!72 
Critiques of RSA were thus both wrong and afraid of progress, or even 
worse, simply cynical or indifferent. There were thus limits to the criticism 
that the process of the grennelle had encouraged. 
Nonetheless, the perverse effects were also qualified and criticised from the 
city of Insurance and Redistribution. From the city of Insurance, part-time 
work was a symptom of increasing insecurity on the labour market. 
According to a sociologist, RSA would “multiply bad odd jobs by 
institutionalising a second labour market based on the precariat.” This was 
mainly due to ‘perverse’ incentives for employers who would be “content 
with hiring part-time workers knowing that the employees benefit from 
assistance.”73 Also, the socialists warned against an “increase in 
precariousness”.74 Concurrently, the problem was qualified according to the 
city of Redistribution as a consequence of exploitative employers. An 
economist argued for “sanctioning employers who profit from RSA in 
order to multiply unworthy jobs”, and also called for measures that “oblige 
the industries to open negotiations on minimum wages and the reduction of 
part-time work”.75 Also, the FO, one of the largest unions, wanted the 
government to ensure that “capital would genuinely be harnessed (mis à 
contribution)”.76 Rather than questioning RSA as such, these criticisms 
pointed towards solutions outside of the scheme and current reform 
process (minimum wages and regulation of part-time work). The debate 
regarding the financing of RSA became symptomatic of this 
‘marginalisation’ of more radical critiques. 
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F I N A N C I N G  P U T  T O  T H E  T E S T  O F  R E D I S T R I B U T I O N  
Despite the fact that the majority of political actors supported the content 
of RSA, the adoption of the law nonetheless ended up being controversial. 
The controversy surrounded the question of how to finance the RSA. 
Initially Sarkozy wanted to finance RSA partly by abolishing PPE.77 The 
financing led to criticism, legitimised by the city of Redistribution, from 
both the left and the right. For instance, the social liberal and third largest 
party, MoDemi, argued that “RSA was perfectly well-founded but the 
solidarity cannot rest on the most poor without calling on the most rich”.78 
The socialists complained that “RSA in reality is an arrangement that 
undresses the poor full-time workers in order to dress the poor part-time 
workers!”.79 Deputies from the UMP as well as Hirsch suggested financing 
RSA differently by limiting the possibilities for tax breaks (plafonnement des 
niches fiscales) that the richest benefitted from. 
The government changed their approach with justification from the city of 
Demand. The financing of PPE would not be redeployed to RSA, “because 
we are going through a period of weak growth. It does not seem optimal to 
amputate purchasing power at a time where economic activity must be 
supported.”ii 80 The government thus proposed to finance RSA by raising a 
tax on property.81 The proposal, however, did not stop the criticism. 
Because of the “fiscal shield” mentioned above, the richest part of the 
population would not be paying the additional tax. The government’s final 
proposal, which was adopted by the national assembly, accommodated the 
critique and installed a “global ceiling” on tax breaks that would work 
outside of the fiscal shield.82   
Somewhat paradoxically, the criticism resulted in both substantial changes 
in the financing of RSA while also legitimising its content, which, as shown 
earlier, was justified by a rather strong critique of the city of Redistribution. 
It may have become financed in a less unequal manner, but RSA itself 
                                          
i Mouvement démocrate 
ii The lower expectations for growth and increasing public deficit in spring 2008 were the first signs of the 
impact of the financial crisis on the French economy. 
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strengthened instruments that would fundamentally contradict the aim of 
more material equality; at least between the non-working recipient and the 
rest of society. 
S E D I M E N T A T I O N :  T E S T S ,  S U B J E C T S  
The adoption of RSA in the national assembly and in the senate was run 
through quickly in a process of “urgency”. After a few debates it was 
adopted by the two chambers at the end of November 2008 and signed by 
the president on December 1st, which was exactly 20 years after the 
adoption of RMI. RSA would come into force as of June 2009, but the law 
did not bring the experiment to a halt – it generalised it. At the same time 
the law became applicable, the findings from the initial experiments were 
presented to the government (L'Assemblée nationale et le Sénat 2008: 
Article 2). Furthermore, during the coming five years, the policies were 
evaluated by an “evaluation committee” in relation to the progress towards 
the objective of reducing poverty as well as incentivising work (Ibid.: Article 
1). The findings were discussed at an annual “national conference” that 
gathered the relevant stakeholders (Ibid.: Article 32). 
Besides the law generalising RSA (L'Assemblée nationale et le Sénat 2008), a 
decree specified the details regarding the conditional situation of resources 
of the recipient, the modes of administration, sanctioning measures and the 
negative tax (Premier ministre 2009). The negative tax was set at a rate of 
accumulation of 62%, meaning that each time a recipient gains 100 euros, 
for instance, he will lose 38 euros of his RSA since only 62% of the work-
related income will be deduced from the RSA income (Ibid.: Art.D. 262-4). 
RSA takes into account “all resources of the household”, including other 
social services such as the prime de noël and housing assistance (L'Assemblée 
nationale et le Sénat 2008: Art.L. 262-3). The Incentives are thus ensured 
from the first hour to the last worked. It thus “incites the exercise of 
professional activity and fights against the poverty of certain workers, 
regardless of whether they are wage-earning or not” (Ibid.: Art.L. 262-1). 
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Once eligible, which requires the fulfilment of a vast number of test criteria 
(over 25 years old, thresholds regarding income and savings of household, 
etc.), the recipient is subject to certain “rights and obligations” (Ibid.: Art.L. 
262-27 to 262-37). The recipient has the “right to social and professional 
support (accompagnement) adapted to his needs and organised by one 
dedicated referent.” (Ibid.: -27). The support is always up for revision, thus 
installing a permanent test situation: 
If the examination of the situation of the beneficiary brings out that, due to 
difficulties, another organisation would be better to directly conduct the 
necessary support actions (…) the referent proposes a new orientation to 
the president of the general council. (Ibid.: -30) 
The support actions are documented in the “personalised project for the 
access to employment”, which is developed “together with the referent” 
(Ibid.: -34). This “contract”, which is “freely debated (…) specifies the 
positive and repeated actions of job searches that the beneficiary commits 
to carry out” (Ibid.: -35).i The elaboration of the contract takes into account 
a number of factors relevant to the Mobility of the beneficiary. Some 
(potentially) set limits to the Mobility, such as “training” and 
“qualifications”, as well as the “personal and family situation”, while others 
work in the opposite direction; for instance, the “situation of the local 
labour market”, “the nature and characteristics of the applied jobs” and “the 
expected wage level” (Ibid.). All this information defines what a “reasonable 
job offer” is, which the beneficiary only has the right to refuse twice (Ibid.). 
In this case the beneficiary is “erased from the list of job-seekers” and the 
allocation is suspended (Ibid.: -37). In general, sanctions are valid once “the 
beneficiary does not respect a stipulation of the contract” (Ibid.: -35). The 
contract (and its potential revision) is thus a permanent test of the 
availability (refusals, search effort, etc.) and adaptability (willingness to be 
geographically mobile, to adjust demands for skills, wages, etc.).  
The need for Mobility also opens up rights for the recipient. The 
“personalised help for the return to employment” has the “aim of taking 
                                          
i The form of the “project” was inspired by PAP (Projet d’aide personalise), which was used in in the system 
of Assurance chômage (See chapter 4)  
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charge of all or parts of the reported costs on the occasion of the 
resumption of a professional activity, whether it is a job, taking a training 
course, or creating a company” (Premier ministre 2009: Art.R. 5133-10). 
The costs comprise “transport, dressing, accommodation, hosting young 
children, obtaining a diploma, license, certification or authorisation that 
entails a professional activity” (Ibid.: -11). 
RSA did allow some Investment, but, as in the justification of the scheme, it 
was clearly a marginal city. The beneficiary is encouraged to engage in 
contracts (contrats d’accompagnement dans l’emploi), that is, employment 
contracts (the recipient is interpellated as the “wage earner”), but with 
special “insertion companies” and “insertion workshops” (atelier chantier 
d'insertion) (L'Assemblée nationale et le Sénat 2008: Art. 18).  The contract of 
the recipient may have the aim of “professional education”, but the main 
goal of the contracts is to “develop the experience and competences of the 
wage earner” (L'Assemblée nationale et le Sénat 2008: Art.L. 5132).  
Finally, all recipients are subject to “control” to counter the risk of “fraud”. 
The control against fraud relates to the city of Insurance, that is, the 
question of whether the recipient has actually been exposed to the risk that 
entitles him to compensation. Meanwhile, there is something else at stake 
here. The city of Insurance is primarily interested in the event of 
unemployment and in ‘speculative’ behaviour, such as continuing to receive 
compensation even though the compensated is no longer unemployed. The 
problem here seems not to be entitlement to compensation, but rather 
entitlement to charity in the Paternal sense. The control of the recipient, or 
rather the household of the recipient, encompasses an “evaluation forfaitaire” 
of whether there is a “clear disproportion” between a “way of life” and the 
“resources declared” (L'Assemblée nationale et le Sénat 2008: Art.L. 262-
41). The evaluation takes into account a list of “elements” connected to the 
household (Premier ministre 2009: Art.R. 262-74): constructed and non-
constructed property, maintenance of buildings and means of transport, as 
well as more intimate elements such as appliances, objects of art, jewellery, 
spending on holidays, restaurants, cultural goods and services, and sports 
and recreational clubs. It is thus in fact not the actual resources of the 
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household that determines whether the household deserves the allocation, 
but its behaviour, including the most intimate behaviour. The test of 
entitlement is thus permanent and implies, for instance, that it is forbidden 
for relatives to support the recipient financially in any kind of way (Helfter 
2015).  
Nonetheless, it does qualify the recipient in terms that fit well with the 
justifications of RSA, such as the justification that the recipient should 
always be motivated to work, and thus his “way of life” should always be 
less pleasurable than someone on the labour market. It also fits the Mobility 
justification that it is only through work that one gains worthiness and 
freedom to live without showing moderation. Finally, it ensures a relation of 
subordination in which the recipient, through his behaviour, shows humility 
and respect to the breadwinner of the pater. In this way the control of the 
‘way of life’ of the recipient(‘s household) can be seen as the sedimentation 
of concurrent dynamics in the public debate. The governing of the 
unemployed aims both to emancipate the unemployed, that is, transform 
things from the way they are, as well as make sure that the current state of 
affairs, regardless of whether they change anything, do not put the 
hierarchies and moralities of society to the test. 
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7 
‘Everyone can be useful’ 
Putting the long-term unemployed and the youth to the test in 
Denmark 
This last analytical chapter will present the final case of a reform process – a 
reform that intensified a governing that was already intense and 
transformed over the last 25 years to underpin and strengthen the active 
society. The reform process of Alle kan gøre nytte (’Everyone can be useful’, 
henceforth AKGN) was initiated in May 2011 when the future Social 
Democrat prime minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt gave a speech on Labour 
Day. AKGN, which was adopted around two years later, transformed the 
system of uninsured unemployed – kontanthjælpssystemet – in several ways. It 
reduced benefits and installed an “education injunction” for young 
recipients, required all ‘able’ recipients to work for their benefit, 
strengthened sanctions, introduced new instruments towards the 
‘vulnerable’ recipient and young single parents, and created a complex 
system of “triage” in order to categorise the recipients according to a variety 
of instruments.i  
Like the vast majority of past reforms, AKGN was supported by the major 
parties; in this case all parties except Enhedslisten, which is a coalition of 
movements from the radical left. Just as in the past, there was very little 
involvement from the unions, who traditionally put their efforts into 
dagpengesystemet, which is the system for ‘their members’. From the first 
reform proposal to when AKGN was adopted, the process was 
‘interrupted’ by two public affairs in which two individual recipients of 
                                          
i It also entailed an extension of the “support obligation” of married couples to all couples “resembling” 
married couples. Since the extension had little to do with unemployment, it will be disregarded in the 
following presentation. 
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kontanthjælp (the benefit for the uninsured unemployed) exemplified its 
dysfunctions.i In different ways the affairs put the question of whether the 
system was in fact underpinning the ‘active society’ to the test. Figure 6 
provides an overview of the most significant events. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section looks into the state’s 
involvement in the governing of the uninsured unemployed since the first 
‘social’ reform in 1933. It highlights key changes with a focus on the youth 
and previous workfare measures. The next five sections present the key 
qualifications and tests during the reform process. Firstly, the diagnosis of 
rising unemployment and in particular youth unemployment in the 
aftermath of the North Atlantic financial crisis will be presented. The 
second and third sections present the two affairs concerning individual 
long-term unemployed people, known as ‘Poor’ Carina and ‘Lazy’ Robert. 
The fourth section analyses the problem of institutionalising the 
qualification of the recipients with a system of “triage” (visitation). The fifth 
section presents how so-called “utility jobs” became a panacea for all able 
recipients. The final section analyses the legal and institutional content of 
the final reform with a particular focus on the system of triage. 
Figure 6: Timeline AKGN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
i For an analysis of the role of media as well as the impact of the affairs on public “attitudes”, see 
Hedegaard (2014). 
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T H E  W E L F A R E  S T A T E  A N D  T H E  U N I N S U R E D  
U N E M P L O Y E D  
In 1933, the first comprehensive reform of the poor relief system dating 
back to the 19th century marked the unfolding of the welfare state in the 
coming decades. However, the ideas shaping this and consecutive reforms 
were very far from the mobilisation of the city of Redistribution that 
Esping-Andersen would later attribute to the development of the Danish 
welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1985; 1990). They also did not radically 
break with the former system. 
The chief architect of the reform was the Social Democrat minister of social 
affairs K.K. Steincke. On the one hand, the reform expanded social rights; 
on the other hand, the rights were deliberately excluded from certain groups 
of the population. The uninsured unemployed were predominantly part of 
these excluded groups, where the old poor relief instruments remained. This 
implied that the recipient of help could be deprived of his right to vote (a 
clear sign of the Paternal city) and “recalcitrants” were sent to work houses 
(Kolstrup 2011: 199). The law distinguished between those whose needs 
were underserved and another group with sub-categories of “workshy, 
grossly negligent breadwinners, habitual drunkards” and “tramps, destitutes 
and prostitutes” (Ibid.), in other words, a composite group of unworthy 
subjects from the Paternal and Mobility cities. Although the former group 
was treated with less stigma, the help was not a compensation in the city of 
Insurance sense, but a loan to be repaid (Ibid.: 202). 
Another group excluded from the expansion of rights who often coincided 
with the group of uninsured unemployed was the so-called “anti-social”. 
Inspired by eugenic thought, Steincke believed that the “unhampered 
reproduction” of this group of mentally deficient, psychopaths, alcoholics 
and prostitutes constituted a “threat of degeneration” that would undermine 
the welfare state financially, socially and morally (Koch 1996: 55; see also 
Koch 2006). Extensive programmes of compulsory sterilisation thus 
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provided a means to reduce the use of internment that was considered both 
costly and inhuman (Koch 1996: 58).  
Whereas the “antisocial” group was considered incorrigible, the 
unemployed youth was qualified differently in the reform of 1933, although 
still within the Paternal and Mobility cities. The recession and rising 
unemployment of the 1930s spurred a fear of a “radicalisation” of the youth 
towards Nazism and Communism among the established parties 
(Christensen 2012b: 460). The solution became the establishment of a 
number of “work colonies” (arbejdskolonier) where the unemployed would be 
exposed to physical work and educational programmes. In the beginning, 
the subscription to the colonies was voluntary, but it soon became 
conditional for receiving any financial support and was extended to young 
people up to 24 years old as well as the long-term unemployed who had lost 
their right to unemployment insurance (Ibid.: 462). The mandatory placing 
was justified as the Paternal saving of the incompetent, whose irrational 
emotions could lead them down the wrong track:  
The young one suffers from restlessness and depression, nervousness and 
discontent to everything and everyone, easily loses the sense of 
responsibility and self-control, and gives into feelings, varying from 
complete despondency to wild desperation. (Julius Bomholdt in Sode-
Madsen 1985: 36) 
Everyone would thus benefit from going to the ‘colonies’: 
The youth, whose core (kernehus) is still fresh, will volunteer, and those left 
are the few who are victims of the unemployment psychosis. Those who 
need a stay with work and education the most are perhaps so passive that 
they cannot pull themselves together to do anything. (Ibid.: 75)  
It was not only the work colonies that would prevent radicalisation; the 
economic boom of the post-war period would also avoid the creation of a 
youth proletariat who never acquired the necessary work discipline to hold a 
job (Christensen 2012b: 460). The economic boom of the post-war period 
rendered the work colonies superfluous (Sode-Madsen 1985), but the 
instrument would mark the first targeted governing of the unemployed 
youth.    
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Although the work houses and the programmes of sterilisation persisted up 
until the 1960s, other ideas from other cities of unemployment gradually 
sedimented. The unemployed were increasingly considered as “fellow 
citizens” (medborger) whose poverty was the result of events beyond their 
control  (Kolstrup 2012: 188f). The unemployed hence had “potential” and 
could be “resocialised” or “rehabilitated” by the new profession of social 
work  (Ibid.: 172). The culmination of these ideas was the Social Assistance 
Act (Bistandsloven) of 1974. The act combined elements from the city of 
Investment with the cities of Insurance and Redistribution. Individualised 
needs-oriented assistance from the social worker would release the potential 
of the unemployed (Investment) while the financial support (without 
sanctions) should help to maintain previous living conditions, hereby 
providing security (Insurance) and the necessary means to exert citizenship 
(Redistribution) (Kolstrup 2012: 213; 2013: 139). 
However, in the 1980s, shortly after it was implemented (1976) and in the 
midst of an economic crisis, the act was questioned from a variety of cities. 
Firstly, the act was criticised from the city of Redistribution for relying too 
much on “professional judgement” (fagligt skøn), leading to illegality and no 
guaranteed minimum income (Kolstrup 2014: 142ff). Secondly, its benefit 
levels were criticised from the city of Insurance for disincentivising people 
from enrolling in dagpengesystemet (the unemployment insurance system), 
which led to the introduction of a “ceiling” (dagpengeloft) to ensure that 
benefits did not exceed dagpenge (Ibid.: 162). Thirdly, the act was criticised as 
disincentivising the recipient to work; among others by the then minister of 
social affairs Aase Olesen, who would later chair the Social Commission 
(Ibid.: 182).i  
The criticism gained serious impetus in the late 1980s and 90s, leading to far 
reaching changes. The flashlight especially, once again, turned towards the 
youth. In emphasising “no work, no money” (yde for at nyde), the centre-right 
government in 1989 introduced special instruments towards the youth. 
Young unemployed people (18-19 year olds) were entitled to a lower benefit 
                                          
i See chapter 5, p. 114. 
Redistribution / 
Investment / 
Insurance 
Redistribution / 
Insurance / 
Incentives / 
critique of  
Investment 
Incentives / 
Mobility / 
Investment 
 168 
 
to increase incentives to work or educate themselves and were required to 
participate in “activation” projects that combined work and training after 14 
days of unemployment (Kolstrup 2014: 218; Torfing 2004: 174). In the 
same period, the Social Commission published its work, which described 
the unemployed as having a lack of educational skills, problems of social 
heritage and a lack of incentives to work. During the 1990s the group 
entitled to the low “youth benefit” was gradually extended to everyone 
under 25 (Kolstrup 2013: 222-26). Under the Social Democrat led 
government, the reduced benefits were increasingly arranged in order to 
push young unemployed people towards education (Kolstrup 2014: 197-99). 
The Active Social Policy Act of 1997 universalised many of the measures 
targeted at the youth. Instruments of “activation” henceforth applied to 
everyone and ought to be mobilised as soon as possible, and non-
compliance was to be met with sanctions (Ibid.: 205-6). It emphasised the 
“rights and duties” as well as specifying the “responsibility” of the recipient 
(Kolstrup 2014: 200). Furthermore, the goal of making the recipient return 
to the labour market overshadowed all other aspects (Ibid.: 201).  
In the 2000s the entrance of a centre-right government led to certain 
displacements, but also a general intensification in the sense of increasing 
sanctions and control of the behaviour of the uninsured unemployed. The 
incentives to work, especially for families, and especially for immigrant 
families, were consistently scrutinised. Similarly to the problem of droits 
connexes in France,i families had access to additional support that lowered the 
financial “carrot” for working and thus constituted “problems of 
interaction” (samspilsproblemer). A number of instruments were introduced 
and intensified: a general “ceiling of social benefits” (kontanthjælpsloft), a 
special low benefit for people living in Denmark less than 7 out of the past 
8 years (labelled “start help”) and a rule requiring married recipients to work 
a number of hours in a given period in order to prove that they were 
available for the labour market (Kolstrup 2014). Concurrently, the up-
skilling dimension of activation was increasingly toned down. Instead it 
should be “job-targeted” (jobnær) (Ibid.: 264). The displacement from 
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Investment towards Mobility and Incentives, as well as the intensified use of 
sanctions and incentives, were justified by an influential evaluation of 
Danish activation measures that fundamentally questioned whether the up-
skilling instruments had any positive effect on employment (Larsen 2013: 
139f). The economists concluded that the participation in “active labour 
market programmes” (ALMP) had extremely little effect, if not a negative 
one, on the unemployed person’s chance of becoming employed. However, 
this was not a critique of the idea of “activation” as such, since the 
programmes had another much more efficient effect that they, inspired by 
earlier studies in the US (Black et al. 2003), labelled the “threat effect”: 
There might, however, be more to the story; for example, a very important 
threat effect of ALMPs that affects the behaviour of unemployed 
individuals before they become enrolled in ALMPs. For some unemployed, 
participation in ALMPs might not be very attractive, perhaps because it is 
stigmatizing, it is like a tax on leisure time (you receive your unemployment 
benefits, but you have to turn up at ‘work’ each day), and the payoffs are 
clearly not very promising. It is therefore argued that to avoid participation 
unemployed will increase their job search effort and lower their reservation 
wages, and as a consequence they will leave unemployment faster when 
faced with a threat of programme participation than without the threat. 
(Rosholm and Svarer 2004: 3) 
The “threat effect”, in other words, made the unemployed less lazy and 
more mobile. They thus came to the conclusion that  
it would seem that a  very  active  labour  market  policy regime  relies  
mostly  on  the  threat  effect. [...] [I]f policy makers wanted explicitly to 
achieve a maximal threat effect, there  would be  several ways of  doing  
that,  including  the  introduction  of  strict  search  requirements  and  
severe  sanctions  for non-compliance,  lowering  the  [unemployment 
insurance] benefits,  introducing  programmes  that  are  truly  cold,  wet, 
hard and have no skill-enhancing components (e.g., cleaning beaches) and 
so on.(Ibid.: 35) 
Another intensification towards the active society occurred in the 
categorisation of the recipient of kontanthjælp. In 2000, the first national 
system of “triage” (visitation) divided the unemployed into five categories 
corresponding with specific targeted instruments. This, and subsequent 
systems, responded to both a need for a more precise governing and a 
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critique of the judgment of case workers (Nielsen 2015b). In 2004, the 
categories were replaced by five new “match categories” that estimated the 
proximity of the unemployed to the labour market (Ibid.: 54).  In 2010, the 
five categories were merged into three categories: the “job ready” (jobklare), 
the “action ready” (indsatsklare) and the “temporarily passive” (Ibid.: 52). 
Although the categorisation aimed at aligning all governing towards 
employment, the latter category also provided some scope for the type of 
social work that the act of 1974 had envisioned. 
C R I S I S  D I A G N O S I S  A N D  T H E  ‘ T H I R D  W A Y ’  O U T  
In November 2011, a new government composed of the Social Democrats, 
the socialist party SFi and the social liberal party Radikale Venstre was 
formed. Before the election the Social Democrats and SF had already 
announced a reform programme of kontanthjælpsystemet (the system of social 
assistance for the uninsured unemployed).1 One of the core elements was to 
abandon the “poverty benefits” (the “ceiling” and the other reduced 
benefits that the previous government had introduced). The reductions 
were originally supported by the Social Democrats, but in the post-financial 
crisis climate in which the rising material inequalities and austerity agenda 
were put to the test, new winds seemed to blow. Mobilising the city of 
Demand, the government initiated a “kickstart” with public investments 
contributing to “job creation”.2  
However, the crisis was also qualified in accordance with the city of 
Investment. According to the prime minister, the Keynesian stimulation of 
the economy was insufficient and could only be a short-term instrument to 
deflect the most immediate effects: 
We are in a new reality where competition – including from emerging 
markets – is ruthless. Now, they are not just cheaper. They have become 
smarter.  (…) Competitiveness is not just a matter of taxes and wages. 
Competitiveness is also about our educational level, our infrastructure and 
about the way our society functions in general. (…) Intuitively, all Danes 
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know that. We all know quite well that we must live by being skilful and 
productive. That we must create value for every hour we work and that we 
must create more value than many others if we want to remain one of the 
richest countries in the world.3 
The government thus asked for further “investment in people” to ensure 
the readiness of the unemployed once the crisis ended: 
We must be ready to ride on the wave, once we get new growth. (…) It is 
not a question of whether there are enough jobless, but a question of 
whether there’s enough labour force.4 
The Investment diagnosis became an issue of urgency in relation to the 
youth. Similarly to the work of the Social Commission around 20 years 
earlier,i the unions’ sponsored think tank emphasised the importance of 
education for the future employability of the young unemployed: 
The risk of being on kontanthjælp is more than 10 times higher [for young 
people without a post-secondary education.5 
Meanwhile, youth unemployment continued to increase after the new 
government entered office.6 The minister of employment, the Social 
Democrat Mette Frederiksen, was “deeply worried” since “9 out of 10 
under-30s on kontanthjælp haven’t completed an education. If we don’t 
change our course, we risk them becoming the losers of the future.”7 The 
diagnosis within the city of Investment implied that if young people were to 
have equal or better opportunities, there was only one emancipatory path: 
education. Thus, according to the minister, “without the will to obtain an 
education, no kontanthjælp”.8 Also, the think tank suggested imposing an 
“obligation to education” (uddannelsespligt) for young unemployed people 
that would “send a signal to the young and their parents that there is no 
getting away from getting an education.”9 This need to use coercion in 
order to make sure the youth invested in themselves took a particular form 
that I will get back to.  
While the government had announced its intention to reform 
kontanthjælpssystemet, the launch was ‘interrupted’ by two ‘affairs’ concerning 
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two long-term recipients of kontanthjælp that brought other cities of 
unemployment into the debate. 
T H E  A F F A I R  O F  “ ‘ P O O R ’  C A R I N A ”   
The affair of ‘poor’ Carina turned the intimate life of recipients of 
kontanthjælp into a public spectacle. It also turned a debate on poverty into a 
question of kontanthjælpssystemet’s effect on the lifestyle of recipients in which 
the Paternal, Incentives and Mobility cities were mobilised.   
One of the first actions of the government, supported by the left-wing party 
Enhedslisten, was to abandon the “poverty benefits” (except for the youth 
benefits) that, according to the government, were below the poverty 
threshold. Only a few weeks after the parliament’s vote, the affair of “poor 
Carina” unfolded; an affair that later fed back into the debate concerning 
the reform of kontanthjælpsystemet. Even today, five years later, “‘poor’ 
Carina” is still part of the public memory.  The controversy began when a 
socialist politician suggested that the state should offer Christmas aid for 
poor people. In response to this, a sceptical politician from the new 
libertarian party LAi stated that it was “scornful of the millions of starving 
people around the world to speak of poor people in Denmark.”10 The 
socialist politician felt confident enough to publicly invite the libertarian to 
discuss the question of poverty in Denmark, as well as the legitimacy of 
abandoning the low benefits, to an exemplary reality test; but within which 
city? Although the call for state involvement was clearly underpinned by 
diagnoses of insufficient Demand and Redistribution, the test was first and 
foremost a test within the Paternal city of the need for charity. Later, other 
cities entered the affair, but never the cities of Demand and Redistribution. 
With media attention, the socialist politician organized a visit to an allegedly 
poor family. The visit was at the home of a 36 year old single mother (who 
remained anonymous, but was referred to as “Carina”) of two children, who 
agreed to have her household budget scrutinised. Carina had a total income 
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of 15,728 DKK (€2,000) per month, with 5,000 DKK (€700) available for 
food, clothes and leisure activities.11 According to the libertarian, Carina’s 
situation did not stand the Paternal test:  
Material poverty doesn’t exist in Denmark. The 25 percent of the 
population on public benefits are caused by the lack of a responsible social 
policy in Denmark when it comes to including people in the labour market. 
Our welfare society is a failure if we give up on these people and put them 
on passive assistance. (Joachim B. Olsen in Petersen 2014: 47)  
Soon the household budget of Carina was the object of debate on social 
media and among most political actors. Was it irresponsible of her to spend 
money on cigarettes in her situation? Was her telephone bill too high? 
Should she get rid of her dog? And so on.12 In this sense, the affair is a 
radical example of the testing and control of the household on RSA that 
goes beyond the question of entitlement.i Or more precisely, as with RSA, 
the question of entitlement is not settled once and for all, but subject to 
continuous testing through the behaviour of the recipient. 
Throughout the affair that followed, Carina became exemplary of a plurality 
of subjects from different cities of unemployment. SF tried, unsuccessfully, 
to turn the attention towards the lack of jobs and the government’s 
responsibility to create more of them.13 Carina, first of all, became 
exemplary of the lack of monetary Incentives to work. The question of 
whether Carina’s situation was simply a result of rational economic 
behaviour was put to the test in a number of evaluations of the single parent 
recipient. A liberal think tank estimated that this group would only gain 
1,000 DKK monthly by taking a job. “It is so little that for some it will be 
outweighed by the effort of taking the bus to and from work”, the think 
tank judged before concluding: 
But appeals do not deliver more hands on the labour market. Incentives 
do.14 
Another analysis from the ministry of finance revealed that 14,250 people 
would gain no more than 1,350 Danish kroner monthly from taking an 
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unskilled job. The minister of finance recognised that this was “14,250 too 
many” since “there must be economic value in working even if we also have 
a welfare society in which there must be an efficient security net ensuring 
one receives help if one cannot work”.15 The minister of employment “fully 
acknowledge[d] that there [were] problems of interaction between 
kontanthjælp and the labour market.  
But it was never the idea that the abolition of start help and the other low 
benefits would stand alone. (…) This is one of several elements and that is 
why we have heralded a tax reform to increase low-paid employees’ rewards 
for going to work.16 
However, according to the minister, the tax reform’s increase of the 
working tax credit “only gave an answer to some of the problems with 
Carina.” 17 Concurrently, Carina was exemplary of a problem of the city of 
Mobility to whom incentives were only secondary: 
No matter how little the difference between wages and kontanthjælp may be, 
it must never be voluntary whether you go to work. (…) As a Social 
Democrat, I support a tougher judgment of work availability 
(rådighedsvurdering) than the one that stands today.18 
The coming kontanthjælpsreform would therefore “accentuate the right and 
duty to work.”19  
Finally, Carina became exemplary of phenomena belonging to the Paternal 
city. Here, Carina was proof of a certain loss of self-control and ‘childish’ 
behaviour among recipients of kontanthjælp. In response, the minister of 
social affairs criticised the “norm slide” towards an “entitlement mentality” 
(krævementalitet) in society (Petersen 2014: 51-53), and an influential 
economist (who earlier participated in the Social Commission) denounced 
the lack of “moderation”: 
Yes we have become spoiled. We take many welfare services for granted and 
we don’t know the price of the services.20 
An ex-recipient claimed to know that “in the underclass, all they think about 
is getting money from the municipality.”21 There, the “victimhood 
mentality” thrived: 
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We felt so sorry for ourselves. (…) We were victims and therefore had a 
right to help. No one said that it could be someone’s own fault that you 
were in trouble. But the truth is that these people disclaim their 
responsibility for their own life.22 
Recipients could not take refuge in the city of Insurance. According to a 
head of a job centre, “many [recipients] develop a lifestyle where they get 
used to the life on benefits.”23 
The explanation was a lack of Paternal virtues of “upbringing” and 
“respect”. According to the economist, the “right-and-duty discussion as 
common upbringing is more important than ever.”24 Similarly, Mette 
Frederiksen saw the “passive” benefits as doing the unemployed a 
“disservice” (bjørnetjeneste) because you do not get a happier life by being on 
kontantlhjælp.  
You don’t get more freedom, you don’t get more responsibility, you don’t 
get the basis for uprooting your own life in order to move on.25  
According to the minister, there was a “far too large a propensity” among 
local caseworkers to “indirectly maintain people on kontantlhjælp because the 
caseworkers, with all their heart, wish to secure people’s income.”26 Instead, 
she suggested another attitude towards the unemployed: 
To me, making demands on people is a consequence of respecting them. 
The day we don’t make demands, we don’t respect people. And what is the 
alternative? That some of them get stuck and then we can meet again in 20 
years and, once again, find a young woman near her 40s who has been 
sitting 18 years on kontanthjælp? That simply won’t do.27 
The Paternal measures were not only necessary to ‘responsibilise’ the 
recipient. As the single mother Carina illustrated, there was a danger of 
transferring the mentality of the unemployed parents to their children. Thus 
the problem with Carina is “that this woman has been on kontanthjælp all her 
adult life. This means that the child grows up in a family where it never sees 
anything else.”28 A think tank claimed that around 40 percent of young 
recipients of kontanthjælp have parents who have been on kontanthjælp within 
the last 10 years, hereby concluding that the “social heritage” of young 
people with “kontanthjælp parents” resulted in them having a 3.6 times 
higher chance of becoming recipients of kontanthjælp.29  
 176 
 
T H E  A F F A I R  O F  “ L A Z Y  R O B E R T ”  
The tax reform, as well other reforms of, for example, the early retirement 
pension, had postponed a more detailed programme of the coming reform 
of kontanthjælpssystemet. Meanwhile, the debate about the system exploded 
once again in September 2012 after the long-term recipient Robert Nielsen, 
who called himself “lazy Robert”, participated in a discussion programme 
on public television. In the programme, Robert put the city of Mobility to 
the test by simply disagreeing with the idea that the unemployed should be 
at the disposal of the labour market unconditionally. He had thus often 
refused offers and refused to show up at meetings with the job centre, even 
though he was sanctioned. Referring to a janitor job at McDonald’s that he 
quit after a half a year because he fell out with the manager, Robert justified 
his right to kontanthjælp: 
As a human being I am faced with a choice in the job centre; shall I take a 
shitty job in McDonald’s for 100 kroner an hour, or do I want to continue 
on kontanthjælp? And here I say that the job is so poor that I would rather be 
on kontanthjælp; if not, society must provide an offer that corresponds to my 
competences and strengths.30 
There were elements of both Redistribution and Investment in his 
reasoning. Regarding the former, kontanthjælp was a means, like strikes and 
demonstrations, to demand a job that “you could be proud of” and to have 
the “right not to become aggrieved when you work”.31 Robert Nielsen thus 
basically echoed Esping-Andersen’s principle of de-commodification 
(supposedly of the Scandinavian countries) to ensure that “citizens can 
freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out 
of work when they themselves consider it necessary” (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 23). Regarding the latter, he wanted a job that corresponded to his 
competences (although he had not completed an education) and a job that 
“was developing for oneself and the surroundings”.32    
However, in the following months, the city of Mobility was not impaired 
but reinforced. The ironic self-naming of “lazy Robert” was rather taken 
very seriously. Whereas it was mainly the budget of Carina that was 
scrutinised, it was availability in the case of Robert Nielsen. How was it 
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possible, as he had proclaimed, to “fly under the radar” of the job centre? 
What exactly happened when he quit the job at McDonald’s? Why did the 
sanctions not seem to affect him? And so on.33 The liberal party Venstre 
wanted to  
make the sanctions so tough all over the country that specimens of 
recipients of kontanthjælp resembling Lazy Robert, who tried to avoid ending 
up doing something, will be punished so severely that they die out.34 
According to the right wing newspaper Jyllands-Posten, Robert Nielsen was 
exemplary of a spread of laziness throughout society: 
The workshy non-Western immigrant women are (…) far from the only 
problem (…). Far into all classes of society (…) it has become completely 
natural that one can say no to work that does not fit oneself and let diligent 
Eastern Europeans do the job.35  
Robert Nielsen thus became another symptom of coinciding events in the 
city of Mobility, namely inflexible, picky unemployed people and employers 
with vacant jobs. According to Venstre, it was “absurd” that despite 
“thousands on dagpenge and kontanthjælp (…) we have nonetheless put 
ourselves in the situation where there are jobs that unemployed Danes do 
not take”.36  
We must break with the attitude that it is better being on passive support 
than picking strawberries. We must re-establish that there is more prestige in 
getting out of bed than in sleeping late.”37 
The criticism also turned towards the governing of the recipient in the local 
job centres, thus putting the city of Investment to the test. The conservative 
newspaper Berlingske claimed that the job centres were too focused on up-
skilling the unemployed, hereby “despising the Danes and foreigners who 
go to work every day to clean and help in the kitchens, in the stables or in 
the greenhouses.”38 The chairman of the social services directors’ union 
recognised that it was “paradoxical that we import a labour force when we 
have unemployment.  
Perhaps we should be even sharper with sanctions. Danes do not face 
financial difficulties because they get money from the state.  
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The municipalities’ confederation emphasised that they did sanction the 
recipients extensively (30 percent of them during the last year), and that “we 
have some tough rules which means that the jobless must make a dedicated 
effort to find a job if they want to receive the benefit.”39 However, 
… unfortunately there is a smaller group of jobless who can, but do not 
want to, make a sufficient effort to get a job. This group should feel the 
financial effects rapidly if they do not live up to the obligation to be 
available for work (rådighedspligten).40 
The organisation suggested an “intensified obligation to be available for 
work” for this group, entailing that it was no longer up to the job centre to 
prove insufficient availability, but up to the unemployed themselves to 
prove the opposite.  
The government largely rubberstamped the criticism towards both Robert 
Nielsen and of the governing of him and his ‘like’. The prime minister 
insisted that they would “inspect the employment initiatives closely and if 
there are people out there like ‘Lazy Robert’, tightened demands will be 
placed upon them.’41 Like the municipalities, she also separated recipients 
into two groups who would need different instruments. Next to the 
‘Roberts’ there were “all the many people who would like to have a job” 
who “should not suffer from the few who resist taking a job” and thus 
would be subject to less control.42 
However, adding the parallel Investment diagnosis of the youth, the 
questioning of the Incentives and responsibility (Paternal) of Carina to the 
(im)Mobility of ‘Lazy Robert’ means that it takes a more complex 
categorisation of the recipients to mitigate the tensions between the many 
subjects.  
C A T E G O R I S I N G  B E T W E E N  A N D  W I T H I N  C I T I E S  
As mentioned earlier, the existing system of triage operated with three 
categories of uninsured unemployed: the “job ready”, the “action ready”, 
and finally the “temporarily passive”. The latter category, “match category 3, 
became seen as part of the explanation of the long-term recipients 
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(including Carina and Robert Nielsen). A think tank argued that the 
category corresponded to a “kind of ‘guaranteed minimum income’ 
(borgerløn) in which ‘rights and duties’ are suspended” and that municipalities 
had an economic incentive to place people in this category.43 The minister 
of employment regretted that “so many are put in match category 3 because, 
other things being equal, it’s harder there to get back to the labour market” 
and thus also implicitly criticised the judgment of the case workers.44 Thus 
all persons in match category 3 should be part of the active measures. Her 
justification echoed the ‘disservices’ given to Carina.  
In itself, the match category of “temporarily passive” was dangerous since 
the unemployed were hereby “labelled (påklistret) a classification which 
could have a self-reinforcing effect”45 and hence put the unemployed at an 
“imminent risk of becoming trapped in kontanthjælp, and if you don’t get out 
and around among other people, may fare worse”.46 The classification ought 
to be in the positive language of opportunities. 
To me [changing the category] is the first step confronting the passive 
culture in kontanthjælpssystemet. We shall no longer simply look at people, but 
give them an active initiative (indsats). (…) This entails another philosophy 
of man. I have not yet met a human being who cannot profit from a proper 
social professional initiative, if it is good and targeted at the individual 
human being.47  
Although this group needed “extra help”, the “objective” was now “work 
for everyone”. The minister had “from personal experience seen how some 
recipients of kontanthjælp, whom the system had given up on, suddenly begin 
to flourish when they are put in an environment that believes in them.”48 
Governing the unemployed necessitated “a belief that people can do more 
than we get to see just now”49, i.e., that “Everyone can be useful”50. The 
message to the long-term unemployed or the young mentally ill would no 
longer be that they “do not have to get up in the morning”, which was 
simply a “too tough message” to send.51 The principle of compensating 
injury from the city of Insurance was thus seen as constraining people 
rather than emancipating them. The true “solidary” message was 
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Yes it is tough, and the road will be rocky, but we will invest some money, 
some time and some energy in order for you to get into the community 
(fællesskabet).52 
The goal of the group was thus the same as for all other unemployed 
people, but the instruments differed. A report ordered by the ministry of 
employment showed that the most vulnerable recipients were “thrown 
backwards and forwards” (kastebold) between the different divisions of the 
municipalities.53 Mette Frederiksen, the minister of employment, argued for 
a “cross-disciplinary”54, “coordinated” and “holistic”55 initiative with 
supportive “mentors”56. The immigrant women were also qualified as a 
group that had been categorised in the passive match category. According to 
Frederiksen, kontanthjælpssystemet was “de facto a parallel early retirement 
pension for women with minority backgrounds.”57 In future, with the 
introduction of an “integration injunction”, “we will make demands, have 
expectations and count on the immigrants.”58 
The future system of triage would thus no longer care about “where people 
come from, but on what opportunities they have for succeeding in 
society”.59 Whereas the group of “vulnerable” recipients were in need of 
“care and patience”60, the ‘non-vulnerable needed more uncompromising 
instruments. The threshold thus defined the two subjects within the city of 
Investment: those with and those without a capacity to fulfil their potential.  
However, the former group was in fact a composite of various subjects. 
Firstly, the qualification echoed the affair of ‘Lazy Robert’ by saying that 
“people who can work must work”61 and hence the “rules of availability 
[had to be] tightened so that one cannot choose to do without work, that is, 
do without the community (fællesskabet).”62 While sanctions were a “natural 
consequence of rights and duties”, it should “primarily be used towards the 
resourceful recipients of kontanthjælp.”63  
Secondly, the message and instruments responded to the crisis diagnosis as 
well as both Carina and Robert Nielsen as examples of the long-term 
unemployed without an education. This implied that the unemployed youth 
would be faced with an “education injunction” and a new benefit that 
would no longer be kontanthjælp but “education help” (uddannelseshjælp). 
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Financial support was henceforth conditional on engaging in educational 
activities. According to Frederiksen, this was not to be considered “financial 
whipping”: 
No, because the greatest gift we can give those who can obtain an education 
is to press them to do it. To some it is necessary that we add a financial 
pressure because otherwise they think that it is easier to refrain from doing 
it.64 
The youth were hence qualified Paternally as being easily tempted down the 
wrong path, as economic men in need of Incentives, and finally as people 
who, for the benefit of themselves and society, ought to accumulate human 
capital. In relation to the latter, the minister argued that the youth were not 
taking advantage of the Investment, i.e., opportunities, they were offered.  
There are too many who don’t make an effort and don’t take obtaining an 
education seriously. My position is that we should be tough against the 
young ones who can, but who don’t take the trouble. One should have the 
courage to say: Now your benefit is removed.65 
“Education help” replaced the “youth benefit” and was reduced to the 
equivalent of the universal state-sponsored study grant, SUi. Importantly, 
the category of “youth” was expanded to include 25-29 year olds, who as a 
consequence had their benefits halved. A think tank supported the 
expansion since their analyses had shown that the 25-29 year olds were, on 
average, on kontanthjælp 25 percent longer than the 18-24 year olds; allegedly 
because of the disincentivising financial support. Furthermore, they claimed 
to show that young unemployed people close to becoming 25 tended to 
“stick around in the system.”66 Although some unions criticised it for 
treating “adults” as youths67, the expansion of the category was widely 
supported. Frederiksen called it a “system error” that it “is more profitable 
remain iddle than educate themselves.”68 Even the chairman of the social 
workers’ union agreed that “completely well performing young people who 
could begin an education and who really do nothing but scratch their 
backsides because they don’t really want to begin” should have a benefit 
corresponding to SU.69 
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The prospect of getting more recipients of kontanthjælp into educational 
institutions led to criticism of the government’s proposal. The technical and 
vocational schools questioned whether the use of coercion towards the 
youth, forcing them into schools, was really compatible with the city of 
Investment. The schools warned against enrolling more students “without 
motivation”.70 The confederation of employers in the construction industry 
noted that “it is impossible to cram motivation and skills down the throats 
of the students”71. The schools would instead become “depositories for 
social problems”.72 The problem was not simply that these young people 
performed poorly, but that it affected the ones that were motivated. 
According to the chairman of the technical and vocational schools, they 
were “struggling to avoid an image as a garbage can education” and 
“worried that the smart young ones will leave the technical and vocational 
schools if they have to team up with 27 year olds who are forced there by 
the job centre.”73  
The problem within the city of Investment of how to distribute investments 
according to potentials and talents was thus put to the test. In other words, 
is the governing ensuring equal opportunities, or is it rather restricting the 
opportunities for the (most) talented to realise their potential? The inclusion 
of the “weak” entailed a risk of “pushing the gifted pupils aside”, a director 
of education argued.74 Concurrently, it was also uncertain whether the 
“weak” were in fact weak, or had simply, according to the Paternal city, 
received too much comfort and security. The director divided the “pupils” 
into two categories that he wanted to physically separate in the schools: 
first, a group of “decent, correct and well-behaved” young people who did 
well; and second, a group who “drop out or drift around in the system”: 
They don’t see any reason to get ready. If you ask them why, they say that ‘it 
is comfortable (hyggeligt) to attend school and I get SU.’ Many feel they don’t 
have to make an effort. They have a firm believe that no matter what bad 
choices they may make, society will ensure that they are well off.75 
The response of the government by and large recognised the critique.  
It is no use that the schools must carry such a big social responsibility that it 
lowers the educational standards, or makes the young people who are eager 
to obtain an education get an inferior one.76  
Investment 
Paternal 
 183 
 
The solution, according to Mette Frederiksen, was “triage and a very precise 
assessment ensuring that the ones getting the education injunction are 
education-prepared.”77 Further, the “education-prepared” (uddannelsesparat) 
group was a “composite group” in need of different instruments.78 The 
group with many drop-outs, for instance, needed a “flex-education”, the 
group “that would like to obtain an education but has weak academic 
premises” needed “reading and spelling courses”, while others needed 
“mentoring” or “apprenticeships”.79 
J U S T I F I C A T I O N  O F  ‘ U T I L I T Y  J O B S ’  
Although the reform would transfer young recipients to educational 
programmes, there was a residual group of non-vulnerable ‘adult’ recipients 
as well as young recipients who were either not “education-prepared” or 
waiting to enrol in a programme. According to the government, all these 
were “job-prepared” (jobparat). In the earliest reform proposal, this entailed 
a “right and duty” to work for kontanthjælp.  
If you are capable of working it is only good for society and the individual 
that you are offered a job and must show up every day and perform a task 
of public utility. (…) I think that it is perfectly logical that you must work 
for your kontanthjælp, if you have the slightest capacity for work.80 
The government wished to create special “utility jobs” (nyttejobs) for all “job-
prepared” recipients of kontanthjælp, such as cleaning beaches, cities and 
forests. The jobs came to function as a kind of ‘compromising device’, 
underpinning and making the triage and past affairs compatible.  
The utility jobs were inspired from practices that some municipalities had 
already developed, in particular the so-called “immediate activation” in the 
municipality of Aalborg, where since 2009 the job centre’s “project garden 
service” had obliged young recipients to work 34-37 hours a week in “utility 
creating projects” in order to receive benefits (Nielsen 2014: 10). The utility 
jobs first of all had a “threat effect” similar to the one identified by the 
economist mentioned earlier. A conservative councillor from Aalborg 
explained: 
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There is a scare effect which works. So even if this is a garden project which 
doesn't qualify for much else than gardening, it gets some people quickly in 
ordinary jobs and keeps others going.81 
A manager of a job centre in Aarhus applied a similar approach and claimed 
that “when we confront them with the condition for receiving benefits, 40 
percent immediately prefer to search for jobs by themselves.”82 Similarly, 
the Danish National Centre for Social Research recognised a “motivational 
effect that makes some of the stronger jobless recipients of kontanthjælp find 
a job instead of entering the system.”83 There was thus an underlying idea 
that the ‘unpleasantness’ of these jobs would work in a similar way to 
financial Incentives. Rather than monetary carrots, it would be freedom 
from the subordination of utility jobs that would make the unemployed find 
an ordinary job. The minster of employment thus estimated that there will 
be many “who after a short while will think that it’s probably better to find 
paid work when one has to work to get kontanthjælp anyway.”84 The utility 
jobs would ensure better control of the lazy, a local politician from Radikale 
Venstre argued. 
The majority want to work. They may have lost their hope, and therefore it 
is a matter of motivating rather than whipping them. But there is of course 
another group that does not want to apply for all jobs and that we have 
difficulties controlling whether they are really at the market’s disposal. You 
know, we can’t force them to send an application to a cleaning company. 
Here, the kontanthjælpssreform will help since now their alternative will be 
utility jobs.85 
The lazy may not be the economic man responding to sanctions and 
Incentives (like Lazy Robert), but now he would be forced to work anyway.  
Next to threatening the recipient to find a job, the utility jobs also 
underpinned the worth of Investment by encouraging recipients to educate 
themselves. The largest trade union, LO, thus had “no problems with the 
municipalities getting tough in order to make the youth understand that an 
education and a lasting job is also best for themselves.”86 In this way the 
utility jobs eased the tension between the cities of Investment and Mobility. 
While the utility jobs threatened the recipients towards work or education, 
they also had some value in themselves. The recipients engaged in utility 
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jobs would first of all “be useful” and live according to the work ethic of 
the city of Mobility. It would also liberate the recipient from the critique of 
kontanthjælp as a “passive” benefit. From now on it would have nothing to 
do with either Redistribution or Insurance, but first of all a “quid pro quo” 
for labour. He would neither be lazy (Mobility) nor live on other people’s 
money (Paternal).  Utility jobs would therefore replace previous activities of 
job training with a “univocal focus on work” because “doing a piece of 
work has greater value than being in activation.”87 The utility jobs would 
hence reinstall society’s “support” for kontanthjælp, which the affairs of both 
‘poor’ Carina and Lazy Robert had put to the test.88  
The recipients working in utility jobs would also be brought closer to the 
competent subjects of the Paternal city. They would “get a sense of what 
sort of thing working time is”89 and “learn to get up in the morning every 
day”90, while the jobs would have “an educational effect that made it clear 
that the municipality is not a gift shop”91.  
The governing of the unemployed through utility jobs was denounced as 
“throwing suspicion on the unemployed” by Enhedslisten. Likewise, an 
unemployed person participating in a scheme similar to utility jobs noted 
that it was “unpleasant to feel audited and be ticked off for attending or not. 
It is like going to elementary school again.”92 Mistrust is inevitable towards 
the irresponsible or potentially lazy, however, and evident in the difference 
in measures between the ‘young’ and the 30 plus: whereas the young would 
be met with an instant requirement to work for the benefit, the latter group 
would initially be “met with trust (tillid) and given 6 months to find a job 
themselves. After this, they must work for their kontanthjælp”93 (see also 
Regeringen 2013: 21). 
Just as with the ‘job offers’ scheme of LAAP,i the utility jobs were also 
criticised from the city of Redistribution for being a “sweatshop 
arrangement” 94, “crowding out wage earners employed on completely 
ordinary conditions”.95 The government responded to the critique (which 
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remained marginal) by ensuring a limited duration of 13 weeks for the utility 
jobs and insisting that they would not replace ordinary work.96  
Finally, just like the RSA reform, its financing was criticised. Even before 
the reform was adopted, a large majority of the parliament had reserved 
savings deriving from the reform (reduction in benefits) to finance cuts in 
corporate taxes.97 Members from both the Social Democrats and SF 
denounced the financing as “socially unjust”98 and a “reverse Robin 
Hood”99. However, unlike in the case of RSA, the criticism led to no 
significant changes. Despite the plural qualifications of the recipient of 
kontanthjælp by the influential political actors during the reform process, 
none of them considered the recipient as in need of further Redistribution. 
S E D I M E N T A T I O N :  T E S T S ,  S U B J E C T S  
Before going into the actual kontanthjælpsreform, it should be noted that the 
Carina affair, as mentioned earlier, already played a role in the tax reform 
that was adopted in June 2012. Importantly, this reform entailed an increase 
in the tax credit on work for all “engaged in active employment”, and 
another tax credit on work targeting single parents in particular, hereby 
increasing the Incentives for recipients resembling Carina (Folketinget 
2013a: § 1).  
The core of AKGN came in the shape of a new and highly composite 
system of “triage” that tested and categorised the uninsured recipient. 
Whereas the previous system operated with one benefit, kontanthjælp, the 
reform instantly divides all recipients into two categories with each their 
benefit. On the one hand, there are “adults” (30 plus) as well as young 
recipients who have obtained an “education providing a formal 
qualification”. All these will receive kontanthjælp. On the other hand, there 
are young recipients without an education who are entitled to “education 
help” (uddannelseshjælp), which is the lower benefit corresponding to SU. 
Hence the recipients are divided into those who can stay in the city of 
Investment and those who are excluded because they are either too old or 
have already benefitted from an investment.  
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The latter group of recipients of kontanthjælp is yet again tested and split up 
into two categories according to factors that are less clear-cut than age and 
formal education. From then on the categorisation is based on probabilities. 
In the triage the recipient is “job-prepared” or “activity-prepared” 
(Beskæftigelsesministeren 2013: § 1). The “job-prepared” are recipients who 
“are assessed to be able to get a job within a brief period (…) and must be 
available for the labour market” (Ibid.: 17). The “activity-prepared typically 
have complex problems and therefore ought to receive a cross-disciplinary 
and holistic initiative” (Ibid.). The “activity prepared” are not economic 
men. On top of kontanthjælp, they receive an “activity supplement” if they 
commit to engaging in the suggested activities (Beskæftigelsesministeren 
2013: 56). This entailed a “coordinating case worker”, mentors and an 
“early” and “work-targeted initiative” (Regeringen et al. 2013: 10). Although 
this may sound like Investment, the activities do not seem to fully believe in 
the potential of the recipient. The goal is not education or skills, but simply 
some kind of (protected) work; for instance, a job in a “social economy 
enterprise” (Ibid.). In terms of sanctions, they are also to be qualified 
Paternally as people who cannot fully control themselves: 
The system of sanctions must take into account that activity-prepared 
recipients of kontanthjælp do not always have the possibility of meeting the 
demands that are made of them. (Regeringen et al. 2013: 9) 
This is not at all the case with the “job-prepared”. First of all, they get a 
lower benefit to ensure Incentives to work. Secondly, upon categorisation 
they are put to the test in the city of Mobility. In the first three months they 
are met with “unambiguous demands to search for jobs”, while the 
municipality must “support and council the citizen in his/her job search 
through an intensive interview course” (Styrelsen for Arbejdsmarked og 
Rekruttering 2013: 2). The period of ‘trust’ was thus shortened from six 
months. If they fail the test, a period of more suspicion towards the 
recipient seems to set in. Henceforth, they “must work for their 
kontanthjælp” in utility jobs (Ibid.). Utility jobs are not about up-skilling: 
Whereas trainee positions in a company aim to improve the skills and 
improve the possibilities of the jobless for [getting an] ordinary job or to 
clarify employment goals, the utility initiative must keep the jobless active 
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until the person can begin in a job or an education. (Styrelsen for 
Arbejdsmarked og Rekruttering 2013: 1) 
Further sanctions towards the “job-prepared”, echoing the affair of Lazy 
Robert, are intensified to counter recalcitrant behaviour. For instance, the 
reform introduces the possibility of “enhanced availability” to make sure 
that recipients “cannot hang on to the benefit systems by systematically 
circumventing the demands that are made of them” (Regeringen et al. 2013: 
9). This “lacking will to make oneself available for work” can result in the 
loss of kontanthjælp for up to three months (Folketinget 2013b: § 1 (65)). 
Another instrument to counter ‘lacking availability’ is the so-called “paradox 
alert”, which is a regional “telephone hotline that companies can call if they 
experience paradox problems” (Regeringen et al. 2013: 13). 
Another overlapping system of triage is also mobilised towards the ones 
entitled to “education help”, i.e., the young without a formal education. As 
mentioned above, these are included in the city of Investment and thus 
subject to an “education injunction” (Folketinget 2013c: § 1 (44)). 
Education here is both a right and a duty. The recipients are divided into 
three categories: the “activity-prepared”, the “education-prepared” and the 
“overtly education-prepared”. Initially, the latter group, those that are 
“assessed to have no barriers (…) for beginning and obtaining an 
education” (Styrelsen for Arbejdsmarked og Rekruttering 2014: 2), “are not 
in need of help and support” (Ibid.). Rather, they are potentially lazy, which 
is why they are immediately required to work in “utility jobs” and are 
subject to the same sanctions as the “job-prepared”. They are sanctioned if 
they “reject a job” that they are “referred to” and must “exploit [their] 
employment opportunities until they begin the ordinary education” 
(Folketinget 2013b: §1 (21, 25)). Furthermore, the lower benefit ensures 
Incentives to not only work, but also to educate themselves.   
After the initial screening out based on an interview, the process of triage 
ought to be different from the one used on the recipients of kontanthjælp. 
Henceforth, a series of tests is initiated over three months. The triage insists 
on the potential of the recipient, and it hereby insists that the case-worker 
does the same. It is only a question of how long it will take. The “education-
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prepared” are assessed to be able to begin and complete an education “with 
the right help and support” within a year (Styrelsen for Arbejdsmarked og 
Rekruttering 2014: 2). The “activity-prepared”, on the other hand, “need 
extra support and help for more than a year before they can begin an 
education” (Ibid.). However, in the initial screening, “all young people are 
met as education-prepared” (Ibid.: 1) and it is only in “exceptional 
circumstances” that the recipient can be categorised initially as “active-
prepared” (Ibid.: 3). In this way, the idea “that people can do more than we 
get to see just now”i is institutionalised.  
The first step of the “thorough triage” is that the young are “forced to 
consider relevant educational opportunities” (Ibid.). Hereafter a number of 
activities can be initiated, such as trainee positions in a company, 
counselling, interviews, up-skilling and reading, writing and arithmetic tests 
to help the recipient “overcome barriers on the path towards education” 
(Ibid.: 3-4). In the continuous assessment, the case workers are encouraged 
to take into account a number factors which “can be important for the 
likelihood of a recipient to complete an education” (Ibid.: 2). There are 
factors of “motivation in relation to education” such as “well-being”, ”self-
confidence”, “self-esteem” and future “expectations”; factors of educational 
competences such as “drop-outs” and “performances and attitudes in 
elementary school”; and factors of health such as “mental health problems”, 
“exercise” and “sleep”. Finally, the “social background” of the recipient 
should be considered. In what seems like a compromise with the city of 
Insurance, “negative life events” can put off the ‘right and duty’ to 
education. Similarly, factors from the city of Redistribution (“financial 
situation”) and from the city of Mobility (“distance to education”) set limits 
on the opportunities for the recipient. There are also factors of social 
heritage relating to the city of Investment, such as “parents’ educational 
background” and “acquaintances’ educational backgrounds and attitudes to 
education”. Finally, there are factors of social heritage that derive from the 
Paternal work relating to the (lack of) upbringing of the recipient and a 
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transfer of a ‘passive culture’, echoing the ‘risk’ of Carina’s children.i These 
include “parents’ commitment to the young” recipient and their 
“attachment to the labour market during childhood”. 
However, if the recipient is categorised as “activity prepared” after three 
months, he, like the “activity-prepared” recipients of kontantjælp, is qualified 
as less of an economic man (he also receives the “activity supplement”) and 
less responsive to sanctions. He is also entitled to the same intensified 
support, but unlike the recipients of kontantjælp, he is still subject to the 
“education injunction”, which means that all activities must have education 
as their final objective and that the “municipality is required to estimate if a 
person who has applied for or receives education help (…) continuously 
meets the requirements for the help by actively participating in the 
individually orchestrated education-targeted initiative” (Folketinget 2013b: 
§1, 21). 
In this way, the plurality of cities ensuring the active society is sedimented 
and distributed into the highly complex institution of this system of triage: a 
system that establishes more or less worthy subjects within and between 
subjects. AKGN is on the one hand a displacement towards the city of 
Investment that insists on the potential of (almost) all young uninsured 
unemployed people. At the same time, it is an intensification that removes 
some of the last loopholes of the cities of Redistribution and Insurance. In 
the new system, benefits do not disappear, but they are neither a way to 
redistribute or compensate. Rather, they are qualified as “quid pro quo”, 
adjusted to incentivise work and education, and conditional on obedience 
towards the worthiness that corresponds to the particular subject that the 
recipient is categorised as being. 
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8 
Conclusion 
The permanent trying of the unemployed 
The preceding five chapters have sought in different ways to answer the thesis’ research 
questions of what cities of unemployment are mobilised in contemporary reform processes of the 
governing of unemployment, how are the cities mobilised to justify and criticise, and how do the cities 
sediment into instruments and institutions governing the unemployed? It has developed a new and 
more nuanced typology of seven distinct cities of unemployment that focuses on their 
capacity to qualify the phenomenon and govern unemployment for evaluation, whether 
in terms of critique or justification. It has operationalised the typology to analyse a 
variety of test situations and show how compromises have been reached and sedimented 
into the composite governing of unemployment in four key reforms in France and 
Denmark, each of which address both the insured and uninsured unemployed. With 
their own combination of instruments, each reform aimed to lead the governing of 
unemployment closer to the ‘active society’.  
In France the PARE reform (chapter 4) introduced an individual contract that 
designated the actions and measures that would make the insured unemployed return to 
the labour market. The reform also strengthened obligations to accept the offers of the 
job exchange services. Directed towards the uninsured unemployed, the RSA reform 
(chapter 6) introduced a negative tax scheme to increase incentives for uninsured 
recipients to take low-paid part-time work while introducing a number of instruments 
and obligations that aimed to increase the mobility of the unemployed. The reform also 
introduced intensified control of the financial behaviour of the household of the 
recipient. In Denmark the LAAP reform (chapter 5) introduced a similar contract to 
PARE while introducing a variety of instruments: leave schemes to ease access to the 
labour market, job training for the unemployed and job offers that the unemployed, 
after a period of time, would have to accept in order to continue to receive 
compensation. The AKGN reform (chapter 7) introduced obligatory workfare schemes 
to all able young uninsured recipients and increased sanctions and obligatory education. 
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By looking into the public debates surrounding the four reforms, the thesis has exposed 
the politics and morality at stake and the fragility and tensions in the transformation of 
and within the governing of unemployment. Finally, it has exposed a number of cross-
cutting dynamics, such as the close relation between coercion and emancipation, the 
qualification of the unemployed through categories and institutionalised tests, and the 
intensified attention paid to the behaviour of the unemployed and what causes it – both 
in public debate and in the instruments and institutions that constitute the governing of 
unemployment. 
In the following I elaborate on key findings that cut across the four cases and thus, 
hopefully, have broader relevance. The three sections correspond to the three findings 
briefly presented in chapter 1 concerning the type, content and dynamics of the 
transformations. The fourth finding concerning the role of critique will be addressed 
throughout all three sections.  
C U M U L A T I V E  T R A N S F O R M A T I O N S ,  C O M P O S I T E  G O V E R N I N G  
Regarding the type of transformation, the findings of the thesis are congruent with 
theories emphasising changes that are not rapid ‘punctuated equilibria’ but “gradual”, 
“incremental” and “cumulative”, such as “institutional drift” and “layering” (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005; Hacker 2004). Parallel to and sometimes inspired by these debates within 
historical institutionalism, discursive institutionalismi has departed from a conception of 
ideas as the consecutive replacement of one “policy paradigm” with another as crises 
mark the passage from one to the next (Hall 1993). Instead, they have emphasised the 
role of agency in driving incremental ideational changes (Béland 2007; Béland and Cox 
2010a; Carstensen 2011a; 2011b). A common denominator, regardless of whether the 
theories are concerned with institutions or agency, is a conception of ideas as tools that 
are strategically used to bring about changes.  In his analysis of French transformations 
(including PARE), Bruno Palier argues that changes become acceptable because they are 
“ambiguous”, since “the different positions which actors adopted toward the new 
measures shows that they agree on the same measure, but for very different – often 
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contradictory – reasons.” (Palier 2005: 137). Palier terms the new instruments 
“polysemic measures” (Ibid.: 138) and concludes that “changes in institutions and logics 
in French social policy come about less through an explicit and radical ideological 
change than through a change in the policy instruments.” (Ibid.: 141). The polysemy and 
ambiguity thus operate as kinds of ideological masking that work on top of actual changes. 
The reasoning resembles the argument put forward by discursive institutionalism that 
that the power of an idea, such as neoliberalism, lies in its vagueness, ambiguity and 
“flexibility” (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016: 324).  
While all four cases confirm the lack of a homogenous “social policy paradigm” (Palier 
2005: 142), the analyses do not show ambiguity and vague concepts as driving the 
transformations. Rather, it is a matter of a plurality of relatively unambiguous ideas that 
are tied together in unstable compromises. This implies that the ideas that the thesis has 
mapped, the cities of unemployment, are not tools in the hands of strategic actors. They 
are, in other words, not separable (as independent variables) from both actors and the 
governmental transformations. On the other hand, cities of unemployment do not work 
their way as self-evident taken-for-granted paradigms. It is thus a different type of 
explanation that the thesis invokes. The argument of the thesis is not that this and that 
idea caused this change, but that the fact these ideas were mobilised in these ways, 
regardless of underlying intensions, made a difference to the gradual transformation of 
the governing of unemployment. Processes of justification and critique matter simply 
because people would not be able to make sense of governing instruments and 
institutions without them. Without ideas to qualify the ‘whatness’, the complexity and 
composite character of the assemblage and institutions would make it unmanageable. It 
is thus not the ideas themselves, but the situations in which they are mobilised that 
matter. Here, the capacity of ideas (to qualify and evaluate) intersect with existing 
institutions and instruments, uncertainty and tensions as to how to qualify them, 
contingent events and the reflexivity of the people involved.  
The co-existence of a plurality of ideas that sediment into a composite governing also 
challenges the idea that the governing of unemployment within countries is characterised 
by different homogenous paths or regimes. This is not to say that there are no 
differences between countries, but rather that, analytically speaking, one should be 
cautious to assume what is taken-for-granted or uncontested in a given national setting. 
The history of governing unemployment in both France and Denmark is a process of 
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permanently unstable systems that are constantly put to the test and consequently 
adjusted. The historical contextualisations of each reform indicate that even before the 
economic downturn of the 1970s, in the heyday of the trente glorieuses, there was not a 
complete consensus as to how to interpret and govern unemployment. The governing of 
unemployment has never worked flawlessly, and has thus always been subject to 
continuous test situations that demand justification and critique.  
This entails that the legitimacy of the governing of unemployment is neither self-evident, 
deriving from taken-for-granted norms and values, nor grounded in false smokescreens. 
Legitimacy is a much more dynamic matter of legitimation and delegitimation generating 
feedback and sedimentation.i If one lets the analysis be driven by the normative question 
of whether the governing is legitimate or effective, one thereby easily becomes absorbed  
by this circle of justification and critique (cf. Hansen 2016b: 134). The critique becomes 
a pleading in an already staged trial. This is of course a perfectly valid aim of analysis, but 
it has limitations when it comes to mapping the spectrum and content of ideas that are 
mobilised. Instead, the thesis has adopted a non-normative approach that seeks to take 
the justifications and critiques of actors engaged in reform processes seriously. The non-
normative approach should neither be confused with a value-neutral ‘objective’ science 
nor as implying an uncritical approach that indirectly endorses the current 
transformation. As stated in the beginning of the thesis, the study is driven by uneasiness 
towards the turn towards the ‘active society’. On the other hand, it is also driven by a 
curiosity and openness to the kinds of realities and power relations the turn produces. 
This is important in order to avoid indulging in the comfortable but imprecise diagnosis, 
“it’s neoliberalism, stupid!” – the idea that every ‘leftist’, from social democrat to 
communist, as well as radical social movements, are united in denouncing; in fact, they 
rarely speak about the same thing (Hansen 2015: 305). The findings presented in the 
following two sections illustrate that although the turn towards the ‘active society’ is not 
simply neoliberal, its content and dynamics may provoke a wish for “not being governed 
like that” (cf. Foucault 1990). 
                                          
i Cf. Figure 1, p. 26. 
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J U S T I C E  A N D  G O V E R N I N G  I N  T H E  ‘ A C T I V E  S O C I E T Y ’  
As regards the content, the mapping of the cities of unemployment exposes the politics 
and morality at stake in the transformations. They are used to distinguish the 
unemployed, qualify them as more or less worthy, and govern them accordingly. All 
cities contain legitimate inequalities between its subjects that are reinforced by governing 
in accordance with its principle. The question of which cities are mobilised to justify 
transformations towards the ‘active society’ is thus not a question of more or less 
governing, but of what kinds of governing and in accordance with which yardsticks and 
with what kind of hierarchies and forms of legitimate coercion.  
The analyses of the four cases show that reforms are particularly driven by justifications 
from the Paternal, Mobility, Investment and Incentives cities tied together in multiple 
and distinct, but often similar ways. In the justifications mobilising these cities, there are 
certain patterns of coercion, or to put it another way, governing, that in one way or 
another are recognised as being unpleasant for the unemployed. In the cities that are left 
to the margins of the ‘active society’, the use of coercion is legitimate against those who 
are somehow breaching the morality of the city. Elsewhere, coercion is legitimate 
towards the speculative or fraud-committing in the city of Insurance, the egoistic or 
greedy in the city of Redistribution, or those who do not spend or create jobs in the city 
of Demand. In these cities coercion is thus not emancipating the one who is coerced; 
rather, it is used as a means to ensure that emancipation is generally possible in the city. 
In the ‘active society’, coercion plays a more ambiguous role. For instance, although 
coercion in the city of Mobility can play a similar role as an act of punishment to signal 
that lazy behaviour breaches its work ethic, coercion (e.g., the obligation to search or 
work for benefits) governs the unemployed towards their emancipation, which is more 
activity. Similar patterns can be seen in the city of Investment, where coercive measures 
to ensure that the unemployed invest in themselves are justifiable; in the city of 
Incentives, where increasing the relative undesirability of being unemployed frees the 
enterprise of the economic man; and in the Paternal world, where coercion is integral to 
bringing up the unemployed to take responsibility for their own lives. In all cases, 
coercion functions as different forms of “chemotherapy” – governing must be cruel to 
be kind. (Boland and Griffin 2016) 
The issue of what is a “right” and a “duty” is subject to a similar requalification in the 
‘active society’. It is not that there were no duties before the governing became ‘active’: 
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in the city of Redistribution, rights come with citizenship, but being a citizen entails 
duties, such as paying taxes; and in the city of Insurance, rights derive from membership, 
which entails paying contributions in solidarity. However, rights and duties are two 
different things in both cities. Justifications of all four reforms emphasise the 
importance of “rights and duties”, but again in a different way. Whereas rights are 
accessible a posteriori (after obligations have been fulfilled), it is rather the other way 
around in the ‘active society’: as soon as rights are activated, so are duties. “Rights and 
duties” is thus always a pair in the ‘active society’, and sometimes they are completely 
inseparable, such as the right and duty to education in the city of Investment, or the 
duties in the Paternal city which emancipate by responsibilising.  
The moralities and governing thus correspond poorly to the dichotomous thinking of 
two opposing approaches that the existing comparative literature so often invoke as 
driving transformations.i Firstly, when mapping repertoires of evaluation that are used to 
justify transformations bottom-up, the question is not whether or not they entail 
coercive measures, but how they do it. ‘Sticks’ and ‘carrots’ are in other words 
inseparable or preconditions for each other. Furthermore, the literature seems to 
presume that the ‘soft’ approach remains generous, universal, egalitarian, etc. and is 
somehow capable of encompassing and conserving the ‘classic’ welfare ideas of 
Redistribution and Insurance. To this end, the Nordic countries are repeatedly pointed 
out as the ‘actually existing’ materialisation of this ‘soft’ and more socially just way. 
Denmark in particular is singled out as exemplifying the “politics of social solidarity” 
(Thelen 2014) or “flexicurity” (where security is not sacrificed) (Madsen 2002). As 
mentioned in the introduction, France, although it is rarely pointed out as best practice, 
also ought to keep a ‘soft’ non-coercive approach in line with its Republican legacy, 
while its Bismarckian heritage would make it a strong defender of the city of Insurance. 
However, both Danish and French reforms entail a more individualised governing with 
an increased and justified use of coercion towards the unemployed.  
On the surface this is a puzzle, but not if one looks at the four reform processes. The 
moralities of both cities of Redistribution and Insurance were fiercely criticised in all 
reforms; mainly Insurance in the cases of the unemployment insurance systems and 
Redistribution in the cases of the uninsured. Thus while a static picture of the governing 
                                          
i See Table 1, p. 4. 
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in both countries might show fairly ‘generous’ systems compared to the Anglo-Saxon 
and Southern European countries, the direction of change clearly distances the cities of 
Redistribution and Insurance in both countries. Money is still transferred to the 
unemployed, but to a lesser extent for compensating and redistributing. When it comes 
to justification, the cities thus play key roles in the imaginative dystopian inverse of the 
‘active society’ – the ‘passive society’. The governing of the ‘passive society’ 
“invalidates”i, makes the unemployed “survive” rather than “live”ii, leaves them “alone 
with their difficulties”iii, and by making no demands, it does not “respect” themiv. The 
cities that are mobilised to justify the turn towards the ‘active society’ thus keep finding 
and disqualifying elements of Insurance, Redistribution and Demand in the governing 
that enhance unemployment and inhibit the emancipation of the unemployed. The city 
of Investment questions short-sighted passive spending; in the city of Mobility, such 
spending breeds a scandalous attitude that money is not solely a reward for 
(burdensome) work; the Paternal city warns against making the unemployed 
irresponsible by nursing them too much; and according to the city of Incentives, such 
spending demotivates the economic man. According to all four worlds, the focus on 
conjunctural unemployment neglects an array of causes of unemployment that have 
nothing to do with a lack of available jobs.  
The cities of Redistribution, Insurance and Demand, however, do not vanish 
completely, but they are increasingly marginalised in the qualification of the unemployed. 
The three cities are made the preserve of those who are already part of the active society 
with its equality in financing between tax payers (RSAv), keeping of compensation rates 
for those engaging in activation (PAREvi), right to leave (and distribute work) as a 
reward restricted to the busy working population (LAAPvii), right to union rates for 
working, with the exception of the unemployed (AKGNviii), and the means to 
consuming preserved the working poor (RSAix).  
                                          
i See p. 58. 
ii See p. 150. 
iii See p. 99. 
iv See p. 175. 
v See p. 157. 
vi See p. 99. 
vii See p. 129. 
viii See p. 167. 
ix See p. 149. 
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Finally, it is worth returning to the question of neoliberalism. Is the mix of repertoires 
driving transformations congruent with what many interpret as a neoliberal era (e.g. Hall 
and Lamont 2013; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013)? The findings indicate that there are 
good reasons for being cautious with placing the transformations in the neoliberal 
master narrative. Neither the ideas nor instruments of the four reforms fit with the 
‘classic’ idea of neoliberalism as a welfare state dismantler. Foucault’s and others’ studies 
of varieties of neoliberalism (Foucault 2008; Lemke 2001; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; 
Dean 2012) have nuanced this understanding to open up more interventionist and 
constructionist versions, such as the school of Ordo liberalism. Within this broader 
perspective, the city of Incentives has clear threads to neoliberal thought, for instance, 
through the negative tax. The city of Investment has obvious elements from another 
neoliberal school, the Chicago school and the works on human capital by Gary Becker 
(1964), but it is clearly also informed by social democratic thought (Andersson 2009). 
The Paternal and Mobility cities, on the other hand, seem difficult to label as neoliberal, 
even in neoliberalism’s most generic definition as somehow concerned with organising 
according to the market. This is not the concern of the two cities. Unlike the cities of 
Incentives and Investment, the Paternal and Mobility cities do not presume a labour 
market. They are concerned with making the unemployed work (on whatever conditions) 
and with making them capable of providing for themselves (and their families). The 
‘active society’ is thus a peculiar and often contradictory composite mix of ideas to 
which applying the label of neoliberalism would neglect some important moral 
underpinnings and conflate others.   
M U L T I - C A U S A L I T Y  A N D  T H E  M A N Y - F A C E D  E M A N C I P A T O R  
With regards to dynamics, the composite mix of ideas driving the four reforms towards 
the ‘active society’ result in ongoing test situations where tensions between cities become 
visible. For instance, the cities of Mobility and Investment clash in the question of the 
right to refuse work that does not fit the skills of the unemployed (PAREi) and in the 
question of whether the unemployed should simply be activated or up-skilled (LAAPii, 
AKGNiii). The city of Investment and the Paternal city contradict each other by the 
                                          
i See p 97. 
ii See p. 125. 
iii See p. 177. 
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former insisting on the potential of the unemployed, thus being worthy of investment, 
and the latter qualifying some as permanently incompetent, thus being worthy of charity 
or protected work (LAAPi). Finally, the cities of Incentives and Mobility clash in the 
question of freedom to choose not to work vs. obligation to work and whether the 
unemployed should be motivated to work for the sake of earning (more) money, or 
merely for the ethical value of working (RSAii). 
How are the tensions mitigated between the four cities driving change? The previous 
four chapters have shown how the moral tensions result in a permanent trying of the 
unemployed – at the level of both justification and critique, as well as governing. 
Therefore, there is nothing that indicates that contradictions will inevitably lead to a 
crisis. Rather, they seem extremely productive, leading to calls for further reforms in the 
direction of the ‘active society’. In the processes of justification and critique, tensions 
and compromises cannot simply be reduced to a conciliation of interests of various 
actors. No political actors involved in reforms adhere to a singular city of 
unemployment, and most of them mobilise a plurality of them.  
Instead, actors are aligned towards an interest in the relation between the behaviour of 
the unemployed and the causes of unemployment. This underpins an overall 
problematisation of the governing of unemployment that seems distinct and central to 
the way in which the four cities of Investment, Mobility, Incentives and Paternalism 
shape the ‘active society. In this multi-causal formatting of the question of unemployment, 
there is always scope for refinement and it is always debatable which explanations matter 
the most. There is thus always room for improvement in the ‘active society’ and hence 
room for more governing. In this setting, the unemployed, by being unemployed, are a 
symptom of the cities of Demand, Redistribution and Insurance prescribing the wrong 
medicine, hence the need to increase or adjust the doses of Incentives, Investment, 
Mobility and Paternal governing. As long as there are vacant jobs and/or people are laid 
off, the unemployed can always acquire more skills, be more mobile, have better 
incentives and be more responsible. The path towards the ‘active society’ therefore 
seems infinite and independent of the economy’s condition. There are always more 
people to include, who can always be included faster, while the thresholds marking the 
                                          
i See p 118. 
ii See p. 152. 
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‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the active society can always be more distinct. Furthermore, 
reforms never seem to work quite as intended; one reform invariably calls for another. 
In this permanent trying of the governing of unemployment, the unemployed are 
qualified in two rather contradictory ways overall. On the one hand, the unemployed are 
outcomes, and victims, of malicious governing where justifications and critique partake 
in an experimental and managerial quest for better governing to emancipate the 
unemployed. As is evident in all four cases, this does not preclude the use of coercive 
measures, but these are used to ensure that the unemployed make the right choices in 
order to emancipate themselves. On the other hand, and this is clearest in the 
‘intensifying’ reforms of the uninsured recipients of benefits, the unemployed are a 
potential enemy of the moralities of the ‘active society’; they are people who deliberately 
refuse to participate in the governing that will bring them closer to the ‘active society’. It 
may be a minority, “but it’s a minority that shocks”i. As the case of ‘Lazy Robert’ 
indicates, it does not take more than a single person to initiate this qualification of the 
unemployed.ii Here the use of coercion is legitimised differently. Rather than 
emancipating the unemployed, it resembles a spectacle, i.e., a punishment that 
predominantly sends signals to the rest of society (cf. Hansen 2015: 202-204; see also 
Peck 2001: 23; Wacquant 2009). The two qualifications of the unemployed entail two 
different qualifications of the ‘audience’ – those already included in the ‘active society’. 
In the former case, its people are emancipated by working (hard), using their talents, 
striving to earn more and being self-supporting. However, in the latter case, its people 
are burdened by carrying the incompetent, namely those who do not exploit their 
opportunities and those who refuse to work. The ‘active society’ is thus concurrently the 
ideal place to live and constantly threatened by forms of living that contradict its 
moralities.  
Coercion and control can thus both be legitimised for the sake of those outside the 
‘active society’ (the unemployed) and for the insiders (the employed) to insure that the 
‘active society’ is the most pleasurable place to live. One of the outcomes of the two 
concurrent qualifications could be a certain acceptance of a group of unemployed 
remaining outside the ‘active society’ and its privileges. The more governing intensifies 
                                          
i Cf. p. 71. 
ii Cf. p. 176f. 
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towards emancipating the unemployed (they had the opportunities, incentives and 
upbringing), the more the idea that (some of) the unemployed are to blame, or at least 
not worthy of living in the ‘active society’, can flourish.  
This gradual re- and potential dis-qualification of the unemployed also sediments into 
governing instruments and institutions, but firstly it is worth noting how the multi-causal 
problematisation as well as tensions between the cities sediment. In the governing of the 
unemployed, the thresholds between cities and the various qualifications of the 
unemployed entail an encounter with what could be termed the many-faced emancipator. 
Firstly, there are tensions and uncertainties regarding which mobilised cities are 
transferred into an initial screening of the unemployed. These institutionalised tests of 
triage and categorisation, often organised around interviews, basically ask what kind of 
subject the unemployed person is and hereby qualify the precise aim and content of 
being “active”: is it a case of skills, being more flexible and mobile, getting an incentive 
to work, becoming responsible, etc.? This is not to say that there were no tests before, 
but the tests based on Insurance and Redistribution looked backwards, i.e., they asked 
whether the unemployed person had done his duty so he could claim his right. However, 
the evaluation institutionalised by all four reforms is forward-looking while remaining 
interested in the past, present and future behaviour of the unemployed. It asks: “tell us 
who are you and what have you done”, hereby retroactively establishing the causes of 
the unemployed person’s situation, and, looking forward, the necessary corrective 
actions.  
Here, the individual plans and contracts, which all reforms somehow entail, are central. 
They establish the obligations and rights in order to emancipate the unemployed 
according to who they are. The plan radically changes the way the unemployed are 
qualified, intensifying both uncertainty as well as the trying of the unemployed. Both the 
French and Danish plans are inherently unstable and revised and adjusted continuously 
according to the current situation of the unemployed. The result is a process in which 
the question of who the unemployed are is continuously put to the test. The same 
continuous testing revises backwards the explanations for the situation. Initially 
unemployment may be caused by an ‘accident’, but once the plan begins, this is 
irrelevant. Here, the unemployed individual may be qualified as someone with potential 
and hence worthy of investment, but as time goes by he or she may be re-qualified as 
immobile or irresponsible. Looking forward, revising the plan may accordingly result in a 
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new end goal, which may entail the emancipator changing face and thus emancipatory 
status, e.g., from being worthy on the labour market (just in need of being matched to a 
job), to being equipped with (unreleased) potentials for acquiring more human capital, to 
being in need of economic motivation, to being worthy of nothing but a subsidised low-
paid job, and perhaps, in the end, to being ‘worthy’ of being poor.  
Finally, it is worth asking how this institutionalised and continuous trying surrounding 
the individual plan of the unemployed person qualifies his or her voice. The instrument 
of the plan implies a functional and future-oriented formatting (Thévenot 2006) where 
the activities of the authorities, as well as of the unemployed, are qualified in terms of 
their expected effect on the desired outcome. The format, in other words, qualifies the 
unemployed as a dependent variable in an experiment where a number of independent 
variables are tested; something which resembles the present obsession with ‘evidence-
based’ policymaking (Triantafillou 2015). The interest is thus displaced from the 
question of what instruments can reduce the collective and statistical artefact of 
unemployment, to what instruments will make the unemployed person employed; or, at 
least, the solution to the former problem is said to be found in the latter.  
It is within this setting that the voice of the unemployed matters as a means of 
understanding the degree of social heritage, limits to mobility, lack of self-control, 
responsiveness to incentives, etc., and for providing the necessary engagement to fulfil 
the plan. The voice of the unemployed is hence limited to a source of knowledge and sign 
of engagement in the plan. The voice is a means of knowing who he is and what he has 
done, and that he confirms his engagement in his plan and wants to be part of the ‘active 
society’. What happens if the unemployed person raises his voice and criticises the 
governing in the ‘active society’? The case of AKGN perhaps provides some disturbing 
hints. Both the affairs concerning ‘poor Carina’ and ‘Lazy Robert’ illustrate how issues 
of unjust governing (from the perspective of the unemployed) are almost immediately 
ricocheted back to a scrutiny of the unemployed reminiscent of the institutionalised tests 
asking “who are you, and what have you done?”. The only difference being that it takes 
place in public as ‘intimate spectacles’.   
The current challenge is to invent forms of critique, subjects, governing and forms of 
work that are not easily absorbable by the dynamics of the ‘active society’ – not only for 
the sake of those unemployed who may have doubts towards the governing they are 
confronted with, but equally to open paths towards that question the inequalities and 
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power relations within the ‘active society’. The need is made no less important by the 
fact that the only potent alternative to the ‘active society’ at the moment seems to be 
coming from the populist right. 
 
Each European country has its particular history, test situations and sedimentation in 
relation to the governing of unemployment; even within clusters of welfare regimes, 
divergence is substantial. Furthermore, even each reform within a single country has its 
own particularity. This obviously raises the question as to the relevance of the findings 
beyond the concrete objects of analysis – i.e., the four reforms. In terms of validity, the 
four reforms certainly do not qualify as a representative sample of France and Denmark, 
the Continental and Nordic welfare regimes, or Europe as such. Both Denmark and 
France each have their unique composite mixture of seven cities of unemployment. 
However, although the transformative path of other countries should be studied 
separately, the analysis of the thesis can contribute to the general discussion and 
theorisation of European employment and labour market policy, including the role of 
neoliberalism. Hence, the findings of the thesis have relevance for countries that are 
witnessing resembling transformations towards a more ‘active society’ and are 
introducing similar instruments and institutions.  
By tracing similar ideas and resembling dynamics in two different countries and in two 
different systems of governing (insured and uninsured), it is likely that similar ideas and 
dynamics are in place in other countries with similar histories, and where a turn towards 
an ‘active society’ is in the making. The argumentative strength and general relevance of 
the study lie in its systematic, comprehensive and, importantly, in-depth analysis of a 
small but heterogeneous selection of cases. The method does not unveil generalisable 
cause-effect relationships, but rather provides a toolkit for critically opening eyes 
towards resembling situations. It is thus my hope that the concepts and theorisations can 
be useful for putting the turn towards the ‘active society’ itself to the test wherever it is 
unfolding. 
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Appendix A 
Selected cases 
 France Denmark 
 Insured 
 PARE – Plan d’aide et de retour à 
l’emploi  
LAAP - Lov om aktiv arbejdsmarkeds-
politik  
Period 5th of April 2000 to 1st of January 
2001 
1st of March 1992 to 1st of August 
1993 
Search words "PARE", "Plan d’aide et de retour à 
l’emploi", "Projet d’action 
personalisé pour un nouveau start", 
"contrat d'aide au retour à l'emploi", 
"contrat d’aide pour le retour à 
l’emploi", "contrat d’aide et de 
retour à l’emploi", "conventions 
d'aide au retour à l'emploi", "contrat 
d'aide et de retour à l'emploi", 
"refondation sociale" AND 
"medef" AND "chômage" 
"aktiv arbejdsmarkedspolitik", 
"zeuthen-udvalg*", "aktivering*" 
AND "arbejdsmarked*", 
"dagpengeområde*", 
"arbejdsmarkedsreform*", 
"socialkommission*", 
"arbejdsmarked*" AND 
"strukturproblemer*", ”aktivlinjen” 
Articles 281 439 
 Uninsured 
 RSA – Revenu de Solidarité Active AKGN: Alle kan gøre nytte 
Period 1st of August 2008 to 1st of January 
2009 
1st of May 2012 to 18th of May 2013 
Search words "Revenu de Solidarité Active", 
"RSA" 
 
Articles 316 354 
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Appendix B 
Coding scheme 
D E S C R I P T I V E ,  I N T E R P R E T I V E  A N D  P A T T E R N  C O D E S  
Descriptive codes  
Who speaks? Every coded statement is coded according to who enunciates. 
Sub-codes: Civil society, Employers' organisation, Government, 
Governmental agency, Practitioners, Labour unions, 
Newspaper, Politician (Centre Left, Politician Centre Right, 
Politician Far Left, Politician Far Right), Scholar, Social workers' 
rep., Think tank, Unemployed (person/organisation), 
Unemployment insurance org., Other (person/organisation) 
  
Evaluation of existing 
policies 
When the existing policies, or fractions of them, are evaluated, 
this can include everything from statistics to anecdotes, from 
normative moral justifications to descriptions. 
  
Solutions A solution concerning the problems the reform is dealing with is 
proposed.  
  
Organisation Statements involve the issue of how to organise the governing 
of unemployment between actors and organisations, e.g., social 
partners vs. state, national vs. municipal, disciplinary vs. actor-
centred. 
  
Societal good/bad References are made to the impact of policies/unemployed on 
the well-being of society as a whole, that is, beyond the 
unemployed or group of unemployed the policy is directly 
targeting 
  
(Un)employed subject The persona of the unemployed or the employed is somehow 
qualified 
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Interpretive codes  
Cities of unemployment Instances in which a repertoire of evaluation is mobilised to 
justify or criticise 
Sub-codes: Demand, Redistribution, Insurance, Paternal, 
Mobility, Investment. 
  
x Cities of unemployment Instances in which the morality/principle of a repertoire is 
denounced. 
Sub-codes: xDemands, xRedistribution, xInsurance, xPaternal, 
xMobility, xInvestment. 
 
 
Pattern codes  
Societal good/bad References are made to the impact of policies/unemployed on 
the well-being of society as a whole, that is, beyond the 
unemployed or group of unemployed the policy is directly 
targeting 
  
(Un)employed subject The persona of the unemployed or the employed is somehow 
qualified 
  
Freedom/coercion The question of whether and how to make use of coercion 
towards the unemployed.  
  
Profiles/thresholds Categories, thresholds and comparisons are used to distinguish 
between different types of unemployed. 
 
C H A N G E S  I N  C O D I N G  S C H E M E  
The tentative grammar entailed seven cities of unemployment. The seven cities were: 
Social citizenship,  Insurance, Incentives, Paternalism, Social Investment, Transitional 
and Coaching. Although the final coding scheme was still composed of seven cities of 
unemployment, these were seven substantially different cities. For instance: 
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- Initially, the typology involved a city of “Social citizenship” focusing on social 
rights and universalism. However, this city was too close to particular objects that 
were mobilised in many cities, and hence did not mobilise to justify or criticise the 
governing of unemployment as such, but was considered a tool. For instance, 
“rights” play an important role in both “Insurance” and “Investment”, and even 
“Incentives” acknowledge certain minimum rights. On the other hand, another 
topic closely related to social citizenship proved to be pertinent in most cases. 
This was the issue of economic inequality in which the governing of 
unemployment was evaluated according to its redistributive effects. Hence, the 
city was re-qualified and re-coded as a city of “redistribution”. 
- The tentative typology involved a city of “Paternalism” as well as a city of 
“Coaching”. Whereas the former distinguished between competent and 
incompetent/childish human beings, the latter saw human beings as more or less 
realised selves. Initially all matters relating to punishment were coded as paternal, 
but it quickly became clear that the issue of punishment and coercion was 
generally identifiable across most repertoires of evaluation. In other words, it was 
a subject (and legitimate possibility) in all cities, and hence should be considered a 
pattern which belongs to the grammar. Excluding the issue of punishment from 
the Paternal city made it clear that it shared a lot in common with the Coaching 
city. Both take a behavioural view of the unemployed, and both trace the causes 
of unemployment to the individual person’s lack of mental and cognitive 
capabilities. Hence the behavioural qualifications in the Coaching city were 
recoded as “Paternal”. On the other hand, the qualification of the unemployed as 
being one with inner potential was recoded as Investment, as this was in harmony 
with this city’s aim of equal opportunities and non-discrimination. 
- At an early stage, I added a city of “Inclusion” to capture the role of social work 
and the qualification of unemployment as a problem of social heritage. This, 
however, appeared intertwined with the Investment city’s common good of equal 
opportunities and its belief in the (human capital) potential within the 
unemployed. Once the cities were merged, they appeared to illustrate a variety of 
tools and qualifications within the principle of investment. 
- A repertoire that I had expected to be buried in the graveyard of history, but, 
nonetheless, was frequently mobilised in both France and Denmark, was the city 
of Demand, building on Keynesian thought.          
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List of abbreviations, terms and actors 
AC !  Agir ensemble contre le chômage; French social movement  
AKGN Alle kan gøre nytte;  ’Everyone can be useful’ (reform, see chapter 7) 
ALMP Active labour market programmes/policies 
ANPE  Agence nationale pour l’emploi (see p. 84) 
Apeis L’Association Pour l’Emploi, l’Information et la Solidarité des chômeurs et des 
précaires; French organization for unemployed and precarious workers  
Assedic Association pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le commerce (see p. 84) 
Assistanat Term designating the people receiving public benefits (see p. 145) 
ASS Allocation de solidarité spécifique (see p. 140) 
Assurance chômage The French system of unemployment insurance (see p. 82) 
AUD   Allocation unique dégressive (see p. 85) 
CARE Contrat d’aide au retour à l’emploi (see p. 88) 
CFDT  Confédération française démocratique du travail ; French union confederation (see 
p. 84) 
CFTC  Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens ; French union confederation 
(see p. 83) 
CGPME Confédération générale des petites et moyennes entreprises 
CGT Confédération générale du travail; French union confederation (see p. 83) 
Dagpenge The Danish benefit for insured unemployed (see p. 108 ) 
Dagpengesystemet The Danish system of of unemployment insurance (see p. 108) 
DA Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening; The Confederation of Danish Employers 
Deuxième gauche ‘The Second Left’ (see p. 84) 
DI  Dansk Industri; ‘Confederation of Danish Industry’  
FO Force ouvrière; French union confederation (see p. 83) 
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Enhedslisten Danish left-wing political party 
Kontanthjælp The Danish benefit for uninsured unemployed (see p. 164) 
Kontanthjælpsystemet The Danish  system for uninsured unemployed (see p. 112) 
LA Liberal Alliance (Danish political party) 
LAAP Lov om aktiv arbejdsmarkedspolitik; The active labour market policy act’ (reform, 
see chapter 5) 
LCR La ligue communiste révolutionnaire (French political party) 
LO Landsorganisationen; The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions 
Medef Mouvement des entreprises de France (see p. 86) 
MNCP Mouvement national des chômeurs et précaires; French organization representing 
unemployed. 
MoDem Mouvement démocrate (French political party) 
PAP Projet d’action personalisé 
PARE Plan d’aide au retour à l’emploi; ‘Help plan for the return to employment’ (reform, 
see chapter 4) 
PCF Parti communiste français (French political party) 
Radikale venstre Danish Social-Liberal Party 
Refondation sociale Social restructuring (see p. 86) 
Régime de solidarité Regime of solidarity in France (see p. 85) 
RMI Revenu minimum d’insertion ; ‘Minimum income benefit of insertion’ (see p. 86) 
RSA Revenue de solidarité active; ‘Income of active solidarity’ (reform, see chapter 6) 
Sécurité sociale French system of social protection encompassing disease, work accidents, family 
benefits and old age schemes. 
SF Socialistisk Folkeparti; The Socialist People’s Party of Denmark 
SU Statens Uddannelsesstøtte; The Danish universal state-sponsored study grants (see 
p. 181) 
UMP L'Union pour un mouvement populaire (see p. 144) 
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Unedic Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce 
(see p. 84) 
UPA Union professionnelle artisanale 
Venstre Liberal Danish political party 
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